Washington Journal of Modern China

The Opening & Establishment of U.S.-China Relations: The Cold War Transformed
As Recollected by:

Brent Scowcroft
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Winston Lord
Chas W. Freeman
Richard Smyser

A Nixon Interview
Fumiko M. Halloran

Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations
Kerry Dumbaugh

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Editor’s Note:

February 28, 2007 marked the 35th anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, the document which pledged both nations to work towards normalization of relations. It is one of the most significant accomplishments in U.S.-China relations. Our foundation celebrated the event at the National Press Club where Ambassadors Chas W. Freeman, Jr., J. Stapleton Roy, Dr. Richard Solomon and Mr. Stanley Karnow participated in a roundtable discussion. An earlier event took place in September 2006 at the U.S. State Department, a conference to mark the release of a volume in the “Foreign Relations of the United States” series on the Nixon Administration’s policy on China. Of special interest for us is that the State Department conference also hosted some of the key policymakers from the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. Like the participants at the Press Club seminar, these policy makers shared their recollections of the seminal years during which the framework for U.S.-China relations was being crafted and in its wake, the international setting, shaped by the Cold War, became transformed. In this issue of the journal, we are happy to provide a transcript of those State Department proceedings, as well as to offer other related articles and material of likely interest. Ed.
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A Brief Note on Nixon’s Trip to China

Wang Chi

President Richard M. Nixon’s historic trip to China remains one of the most important events in U.S.-China relations and perhaps modern world history. Why was it so important? In September 1971, a secret trip to China, undertaken by Henry Kissinger, John Holdridge and Winston Lord, changed the world, eliciting an invitation by the Chinese for President Nixon to visit China himself.

The following February 1972, President Nixon accepted the invitation and visited China. The trip created a sensation in world politics, though it was not until recently, years after the fact, that the following details were made available. Last fall, State Department historians met with top U.S. government officials involved in Nixon’s monumental trip. Except for
Nixon and Kissinger, all who had participated were present including Winston Lord, Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (founding member of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation) and Richard Smyser.

Though the trip surprised the Soviet Union, Japan and other countries, it ultimately benefited every country in the world. Nixon, Kissinger, Mao and Zhou became the four most important political statesmen in the world 35 years ago, when both sides made big decisions. The world not only became more peaceful, but state relations also changed; China was no longer treated as a monolithic society, and it became clear China was not under Soviet dominance. Nixon’s daring trip and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

Kissinger had the foresight to alter the political balance that not only changed Nixon’s presidency but deeply affected the Carter administration and has led to the current status of relations in the Bush era.

Comments of Former Diplomats and Government Officials: A Transcription

Because of our need for some brevity in providing a transcription of a 2 hour 50 minute conference, introductory comments by Dr. Marc Susser, the historian of the Department of State, were omitted. Those of the keynote speaker, Dr. Philip Zelikow, counselor of the department, were significantly condensed and edited. Still, his comments, as presented below, provide valuable context for the transcription material. We regret that these important contributions had to be so treated. Ed.

PHILIP ZELIKOW: As I turn to this subject, I want to note that it is really appropriate that we are holding this conference on this date because it is almost exactly one year since Bob Zoellick spoke last September, September of 2005, about America's relations with China today and the way those relations have really entered a new phase, a phase made possible by the developments and policy makers whose work we are studying today and in the succeeding days.

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1 Robert Zoellick was U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, 2005-2006.
Let me offer some questions and policy reflections: first, on why normalization occurred when it did; second, what did the United States want from normalization; third, on what I think is a striking continuity in American hopes for China; and fourth, some of the lingering consequences of this history today.

I think it is interesting to look at the role that Richard Nixon himself played. Nixon’s role is interesting in this matter because Nixon was more interested in Asia than many American national leaders were even of his time. It's important to remember that Nixon, for example, in contrast to the life story of Henry Kissinger before 1969, that Nixon was a man of the West and a man of the Pacific Rim in some distinctive ways. Nixon grew up in California. His World War II service was in the Pacific, not in the European theater. The Republican Party, in which he had spent his formative years, the Republican Party of the late 1940s and early 1950s, was actually a Republican Party that was extremely interested in Asia.

Indeed, one of Nixon’s signature issues when he became Vice President to Dwight Eisenhower was Asia, was an intense interest in the fate of Indochina, for example, in 1953 and 1954, and in the Taiwan Straits crises later in the Eisenhower administration. So Nixon comes into office as president, as a person conditioned to a constancy of interest in Asia and with a lot of knowledge and interest in America's traditions there.

So, why normalization occurred when it did? Yes, there's an American factor, Nixon being important, but also very important to look at the Chinese variable, perhaps even being the critical variable. But as that variable changed, the opportunities for normalization opened and we turn to my second subject.

What did the United States seek from normalization? Or to put it even more plainly, what did we want from them? Kissinger remarks that, “For the next 15 years we have to lean towards the Chinese against the Russians. We have to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now we need the Chinese to correct the Russians and to discipline the Russians.”

And then going on in the very same conversation, Nixon makes some remarks about the Chinese reception for a visiting African leader, Kissinger comes back to his main subject: “Our concern with China right now, in my
view, Mr. President, is to use it as a counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy.” President Nixon says he agrees. Kissinger adds, “As a counterweight, to keep it in play in the subcontinent for the time being, but above all as a counterweight to Russia. And, the fact China doesn't have a global policy is an asset to us, that it doesn't have global strength yet, and to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russia dominates China, that would be a fact of such tremendous significance.”

Nixon said to [Marshall] Green, “We simply cannot go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the PRC grows in military power.” That point is important because it brings us to the third one. If you think about the great aberration, you think that, for Nixon, in a way he was returning to a sense of good relations with China that, for him, was part of the natural, normal American context. He was returning to normalization, not creating it new. Then you really capture the sense of the continuity of American hopes for China, which I think is worth dwelling on in some detail.

Of course, America did so to serve America's interests. But America conceived of its interests in rare harmony with the long-term interests of the Chinese people. And America thus played, again and again, an indispensable historical role in the evolution of a strong and independent China. Which then brings us back to the issues of the 1970s. For America in the 1970s, there was a constancy of interest that now seemed enabled and possible in new ways. And the question is whether that constancy is now coming to fruition. Therefore, I want to turn fourth to the consequences of that normalization and that constancy today.

In August 1969, the State Department paper responding to NSSM 14\(^2\) posed the following question, which I think was probably written by Marshall Green, John Holdridge and their colleagues, Holdridge at State before he then went over and received the paper on the NSC staff: “A question can legitimately be posed as to whether or not it is in U.S. interests for Peking to become more engaged in the international scene. If Peking should choose to pursue a more pragmatic and moderate foreign policy, pressures by the nations of Asia for accommodating Peking and for accepting the PRC into international organizations would build rapidly. Peking's emergence from its self-imposed isolation would thus pose new

\(^2\) National Security Study Memorandum
challenges for U.S. policy in Asia and would probably result in certain short-
term losses to ourselves and our allies.”

The answer then offered in August 1969 was that over the long term, however, evolution of Peking's policies toward moderation would offer the prospect of increased stability in East Asia, since it does not lie within the United States' power to prevent Peking from breaking out of its isolation, the issue posed for the U.S. is whether this evolution will take place in spite of U.S. resistance or whether the U.S. will be seen as willing to accept and live with Peking's entry into the international community and do what it can to take advantage of the change. Those words do indeed ring true today.

As the further cautions in that same memorandum, cautions about limited U.S. power, to what extent, one can ask, can America actually influence the way China approaches the international system if it has these new opportunities? Here again, the study's authors in the summer of '69 wrote, future Chinese leaders' perspectives may be altered, however, by considerations of domestic political control, by the need for economic development and by China's relations with third countries. U.S. actions to alter what Peking perceives as the U.S. threat could contribute to this. This need not be hostile to U.S. interests in the long-run if it allows for continuing U.S. political and economic relations with these countries throughout Asia even though at a reduced level of intimacy than previously, because we would sacrifice some quality of intimacy, because of the growing role of China, and their decreasing reliance on us as protection against Chinese influence.

In other words, America made the choice that was forecasted for it in the summer of 1969. It made the choice to embrace the growth of Chinese power. So, for example, when Zoellick gave his speech a year ago, he said that, for the United States and the world the essential question is, how will China use its influence? To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China's membership into the international system. We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.

The address that we gave a year ago on behalf of the Administration made it clear that the argument about whether the United States wanted to contain Chinese power or encourage Chinese power had been settled. The paradigm that we put forward cannot be reconciled with the paradigm of
containment. It is a paradigm that welcomes the growth of Chinese power and urges the Chinese to take on their role in strengthening the international system that has enabled its success.

Now the choice is that of China. China has choices it will make about how it approaches its own historical record and its own view of its past. But China also has important choices to make about the future.

(Applause)

MR. SUSSER: All right, we’re going to get started. We are fortunate to have with us several men who were, in Secretary of State Acheson’s phrase, present at the creation, during the key turning points in U.S. policy toward China, during the period between 1969 and 1980. We’ve asked each of them to provide us with some initial impressions for no more than 10 minutes each and then we hope that they will both engage in an informative dialogue with each other as well as respond to some questions from the audience.

Ambassador Lord, would you like to start off?

WINSTON LORD: Let me begin by explaining why I’m going first on this panel and, in so doing I will annoy my fellow panelists who have heard this story before, but this is a conference on scholarship in history and there’s a gaping hole in the volume’s release, namely it does not demonstrate that I was the first American official to go into China after 22 years of mutual isolation and hostility. Most people know it was not Nixon, they figured it was Kissinger, it’s absolutely false. I was with Kissinger along with Smyser on the plane, a Pakistani plane, flying from Islamabad to Beijing, and as we got close to the Chinese border, no American having been there for 22 years, I went to the front of the plane, and as we crossed into China, I was first. (Laughter)

So now that we got that straight, let me do the following in 10 minutes. We have a huge amount of material to cover, so what I will do is focus on the ’69 to ’72 period and, with brushstrokes, try to give us a framework for subsequent presentations and discussions.

One week after his inauguration, President Nixon, on February 1, sent a memo to Kissinger saying, in effect, he wanted to move ahead with the Chinese. What were our motives? What was China’s rationale? Our
motives, and Zelikow touched on this; I disagree with some of his emphasis, but in any event, there was a variety of reasons we wanted to move toward China: generally, give us more flexibility on the world stage, including with the communist world so Moscow wouldn’t be the only spokesperson to deal with one-quarter of the world’s population; to improve relations with the Soviet Union; to help end the Vietnam War; and to promote stability in Asia. The Chinese, in turn, were isolated during the Cultural Revolution. Diplomatically, they sought security by dealing with the far barbarians to balance off the near barbarians, above all, the Soviets, but also the Indians, the Vietnamese, the Japanese, other traditional hostile neighbors. And they wanted to move ahead, figuring if they moved with us, other countries would follow.

We faced two challenges to move ahead, one public and one private. The private one was how do you communicate with the Chinese since we were totally cut off? And here we tried several secret channels including Romania and France and ended up with Pakistan, a mutual friend. The public problem was to send an audience, send signals to various audiences, the American audiences and also other around the world, that our policy was indeed shifting. So in addition to statements in foreign policy reports and toasts and speeches, we unilaterally lifted some trade and travel restrictions as a signal to the Chinese they didn’t have to respond immediately. We took our ships out of the Taiwan patrol and we made clear that we would not support Soviet pressures against the Chinese. The Chinese, in turn over months and years, responded. They released a couple of American yachtsman who had drifted into their space; the Edgar Snow interview, the famous one about inviting Nixon; and of course the Ping Pong diplomacy in April 1971.

It was decided through the Pakistani channel that Kissinger would be the one to go, that it would be secret that he would go to Beijing, and I can elaborate on all of these points. The big sticking point to fix on a secret trip was to make sure that the agenda went beyond Taiwan, which the Chinese first insisted upon, to broader issues. And once that was settled, we were off. It was a public trip to Southeast Asia and South Asia, and the cover story for Kissinger’s secret journey to China was he was going to get a stomach-ache in Pakistan. The problem is he got a stomach-ache before he got there in India, and he had to keep that secret so as not to mess up his later cover.
On the way to Pakistan, I got a call from the deputy national security adviser Al Haig telling us that, once again, the Soviets had turned us down for a summit. We were prepared to go to Moscow first. They didn’t know we were going to China, of course, and so that clinched the sequence of the summits. On that plane, you may think that Kissinger was worried about dealing with Zhou Enlai, the James Bond secret aspects, the geopolitical earthquakes. No, he wasn’t. He was worried about the fact he had no shirt. His assistant forgot to pack any shirts for Henry. I, of course, quipped to him that he hadn’t even sat down to negotiate with the Chinese and he’d already lost his shirt. So he borrowed one from John Holdridge who is about 6-foot-three, and he went around looking like a penguin. And the shirt, of course, said in the collar, made in Taiwan. (Laughter)

We spent 48 hours in Beijing: over 17 hours with Zhou Enlai, four more hours on a communiqué announcing the president’s forthcoming summit, 110 pages with Smyser, Lord, and Holdridge taking notes. We agreed we would go ahead; there was mutual interest. We went over the agenda for the president’s trip and we worked out the announcement, very sparse because it was dramatic in and of itself. But that was delicate negotiations for the Chinese. They wanted to make clear that Nixon was eager to come to China. We wanted to make clear that China was eager to have Nixon. We split the difference and we also made sure that the communiqué said that we would talk about issues of mutual concern, and not just normalization, i.e. Taiwan.

On the way back from this trip, by the way, we stopped in Paris for secret negotiations with the Vietnamese. The announcement was made in mid-July at San Clemente. The reaction was overwhelmingly positive in America, although some on the right were concerned. Obviously, it shocked Taiwan and Japan. And from then on, we began to communicate with the Chinese both through Paris and through the UN Ambassador in New York.

This brings us to the October ’71 public trip. We went back again for two reasons: to arrange the logistics for the president’s February ’72 trip, security, media, where he would go, what he would do, and also substance, again, further elaborate the agenda, and above all to begin negotiating what became known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

We went in with the usual traditional draft of stressing harmony and agreement. Zhou Enlai almost literally threw this on the floor and said this
is ridiculous. It’s got no credibility. We’ve been enemies for 22 years. This will shake up our friends. It will confuse our domestic audiences. Let’s each state our own positions, and then when we can agree on certain areas, then they’ll have more credibility. He was, of course, right, and as a result that communiqué is still invoked today after 22 years, which is very unusual for a diplomatic communiqué. It involved some hair-raising drafting overnight in which I stayed up to 3:00 to redraft entirely the communiqué, and then Kissinger took it at 3:00 AM. But it came out quite well, leaving aside, of course, the key issue of Taiwan where there is still a major gap.

By the way, there was heightened security in Beijing in this October trip. We did not realize at the time that the Lin Biao incident was going on. And as we left China, unfortunately, in terms of timing, the UN vote admitted China and kicked out Taiwan.

This brings me to the Nixon trip itself in February ’72. It was a period of great drama in U.S. diplomacy generally, a Moscow summit a few months later, ending the Vietnam War, et cetera. I’ve worked with several presidents. I’ve never seen any president prepare as hard or as thoroughly for a trip as Nixon did on this. We put together six huge briefing books. He marked up every page. He kept asking questions as we flew across the Pacific.

Mao asked to see us within an hour of our arrival, putting his stamp of approval on the process. I was fortunate enough to be in that meeting, but I was cut out of all the pictures in the communiqué, because unfortunately and wrongly, Secretary Rogers was not at the meeting, and this would have been a further humiliation. At first, the discussion with Mao, which lasted an hour, seemed a little disappointing to us. It seemed casual. He was using brushstrokes and allusions and anecdotes. We didn’t quite get everything he was saying. But as we reflected over the coming days and hours and hours of talks with Zhou Enlai, we realized that Mao in a seemingly casual way had established the strategic framework on all the key issues, most notably that the Taiwan issue could wait, and that we had a mutual concern about the polar bear to their north.

In the remainder of the summit, we fleshed out the rest of the communiqué, including the key issue, on Taiwan. And we can come back to that but the point is that both sides made concessions here. The Chinese had to put off the resolution of this issue. We maintained diplomatic relations, a
defense treaty, and arms sales. And the Chinese had to live with that; we in turn had to make some assurances. And then the other key aspect of the communiqué was the anti-hegemony clause, namely our common concern with the Russians.

So let me conclude with the impact of this trip or series of trips. It’s fair to say that even flying back from China, Kissinger and Nixon were worried about the reaction in the United States. We didn’t realize how dramatic and positive the television images were. And it was overwhelmingly well received in the United States. Other countries began to move quickly in our wake, most notably Japan. And of course, this helped Nixon get reelected, but it was not a major portion of that, I don’t think, and that certainly wasn’t his reason.

But for the United States, the most immediate impact was dramatic improvement with Moscow. Within weeks and months, a Berlin Agreement, an arms control agreement, another summit meeting with the Russians. Taiwan was shocked, of course, and it was painful for all of us. But in subsequent years, thanks to their own efforts, they became a flourishing economy, a flourishing democracy, and they have a defacto security independence. And meanwhile, we’ve moved ahead and established an extensive relationship with China. I think seven presidents of both parties have performed a significant and very skillful balancing act to promote both of these objectives.

With Japan, it was a shock, but I would point out that we convinced in our conversations, Zhou, that the U.S.-Japan alliance was in China’s interest in terms of stability in Asia, and generally, the U.S. military presence was in China’s interest. So that was a plus; Asia was more stable. Vietnam, modest help, but it did help us somewhat in the agreement. And psychologically for the American people, this dramatic opening put in context the necessarily and inevitable sloppy close to the Vietnam War, which was a downer to say the least. So while we were extricating ourselves from a corner of Southeast Asia, we were opening up with this great power and one quarter of the world’s people. China, of course, got security out of this, stability around its borders, allowed it to concentrate on its economy, and you now see the fantastic results as a result of that. And we both got out of this a more stable Asia and a very rich relationship.
So in close, I would say that the opening to China, I think will stand as one of the three or four most important and most positive geopolitical events since World War II. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. SUSSER: Professor Smyser, you were also on that plane. I won’t ask if you were second into China, but maybe you can give us your thoughts.

MR. SMYSER: I wasn’t counting. I was not even anxious to be the first or the second. I was quite comfortable sitting in the plane. And when Win [Winston Lord] moved up to the front of the plane, I said to Henry, is he trying to cozy up to Mao’s niece who was sitting at the front. And Henry said, we never know what Win is up to. (Laughter) As it turned out, of course, his purpose was even more sinister, and so we always have congratulated him on that. But I don’t even know that I was the second or third or fourth. But I did know, and I remarked on this to Kissinger, that the fact that Mao had sent his niece to meet us in Pakistan and to accompany us on the plane, even though, I should tell you she said very little and did very little on the plane, I thought was of great significance. And Henry, obviously also took that on.

For your amusement, I did have a chat with her, sort of as casual as one could be. And I said to her, I hope that all this means that some day, you will visit the United States. And do you have any particular places you would like to go? I was kind of intrigued to see what she would say. And she replied, I am sure a program will be made for me, which is a very interesting kind of comment on the kind of tension that still existed in the relationship. She had to be very, very careful what she said.

Now, I had a special role for Henry in this particular thing. And that was that he wanted me along in case Vietnam came up. He was going to talk about Vietnam and about the war in Vietnam, and he wanted me to be there to help, of course, with any comments and also to answer any questions that Zhou Enlai might have. The latter purpose turned out to be not so necessary, because all the questions could be answered by Dr. Kissinger himself. But still, it was a kind of reassurance. And I think, if you don’t mind, I’m going to talk mainly about the Vietnam aspect of this trip, which was, I thought, an important aspect.
At the time that we took this trip, the U.S. had been involved heavily in a war in Vietnam for a number of years. To you this is ancient history, to those of us who were involved in it at the time, it was a pressing issue that occupied all television stations every night and all our concerns every day. And we had been trying to find a negotiated settlement. In Paris, there were some talks, negotiations, which were mostly fruitless because there was a delegation led by a man called Xuan Thuy who was kind of a Vietnamese version of Andrei Gromyko, if this gives you some idea of how useful it was to talk to him.

But from time to time, somebody else would appear. His name was Le Duc Tho. Le Duc Tho, whom we called Ducky, was a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo. He was one of its principal ideologues. And he would appear in Paris from time to time. And we decided, and Henry and Nixon decided, that they would want to meet with him. And so, beginning in 1970, we began meeting with Le Duc Tho. And those meetings had two marks to them. First of all, of course, the discussion was much more open, much more frank. And secondly, you had the feeling that you were talking to somebody who was serious and who was in a position to take on what you said and to do something about it. One of the interesting things about this negotiation is that after we had been doing it for about, oh, six to nine months or a year, all of a sudden, instead of sitting in easy chairs like these opposite each other in the living room of the Vietnamese residence in the suburbs of Paris, we found ourselves sitting around a green table, which was a sign that the Vietnamese were beginning to realize that the negotiations were serious.

Now, the problem for us was the relationship to all this of the Soviets and of the Chinese. At least, this was one of the problems. And the Soviets were playing a double game. They would come to us and say, oh yes, we want to help you negotiate. We’re trying to do everything we can. We’re using our influence. They said this consistently to Ambassador Averell Harriman who for a long time tried to lead the negotiations, and who thought there might be an opening there. But at the same time that they were doing that and making nice noises, they were also providing the Vietnamese, the North, with the weapons that destroyed our aircraft, and with the weapons that enabled them to conduct massive warfare in South Vietnam. They had the anti-aircraft missiles, the SAMs, and other weaponry, which enabled the
Vietnamese to continue the war, and also of course enabled them to inflict heavy casualties upon us.

This was a double game. The Chinese were not playing a double game. The Chinese message was very simple: This is people’s war. Lin Biao even wrote a booklet about it, which everybody read for a long time in the State Department. People’s war meant a war that would end when the people won because their enemies got too exhausted; they could no longer fight. And Mao and everybody in China said consistently, publicly, privately, in every way, this war cannot be ended by negotiations. Anybody who negotiates is a traitor to people’s war. The only way to end this war is to win it and to fight.

That was the Chinese mind. We had the impression as we were flying across to Peking, as we then called it, and as we discussed the meeting in advance, that the Chinese were becoming increasingly uncomfortable with this position. Because the longer the war went on, the more Soviet weapons poured into Vietnam, and the more the Vietnamese relied on the Soviets for weaponry. So we felt that there was perhaps an opening here to ease the Chinese resistance to negotiations. And so Kissinger in the meeting with Zhou Enlai, and I frankly don’t know whether this is going to be in the FRUS [Foreign Relations of the United States] documents that you are releasing or not, said the war can end in two ways. One way is by continuing the fight. And that will last a long, long time. The other way is through negotiations, and that will be shorter. It is clear that Zhou Enlai, whose eyes were always interesting to watch, took this on and understood exactly what it meant.

Now, what he said, of course, was what we knew he would say, which was the Vietnamese make their own decisions; we support them; they are fighting in a just cause; you are not fighting in a just cause; you should leave. But nonetheless, we had the distinct impression that Zhou Enlai knew exactly what we were talking about and knew exactly what the implications would be for the Chinese position in Indochina, for the Chinese position in North Vietnam, and for the Chinese position in the world.

Now, obviously, nothing changed overtly. But interestingly, when the negotiations, the serious negotiations, actually did begin later, the Chinese eased their opposition. Now, this may have been because as they said, well, the Vietnamese want negotiations. We will support them. But we also felt
that it was because they understood that a shorter war, a war which the Soviets would not be able to dominate by the weaponry that they could supply and that the Chinese could not, would be in their interest.

Curiously enough, there are a couple things that might be amusing in this, which I want to mention. I’m not sure that they’re amusing in a funny way, but interesting. One thing that Zhou Enlai said to Kissinger was that he did not know of the negotiations that we were conducting through Le Duc Tho. I’d never known whether he was conducting what some people call the classic diplomatic obfuscation campaign or whether it was true, but I suspect it may well have been true, because the Vietnamese, knowing of the great Chinese opposition to any negotiations, might well have felt that the best thing to do was not to tell them about it.

The other question that it raises, of course, was whether in fact Chinese intelligence was not terribly good, because these talks were going on in Paris. They had a mission in Paris. And while, of course, we were able to keep them from the press and from associated other people, nonetheless, I should have thought that the Chinese, if they had a really good intelligence service, would have known about them. But they didn’t.

We did meet with Le Duc Tho in Paris after coming out of Beijing. It was arranged by Dick Walters, General Walters is known to most of you, and will be in the FRUS, I’m quite sure, who used a very simple ploy. We all went to the ambassador’s residence for lunch and then the word was that Dr. Kissinger was going to rest. And the press were told, oh, you can leave. And they said, ha ha ha ha, we’re not that stupid; we’re going to watch him when he leaves. And so a team of press stayed at the front door of the residence. But the residence had a back entrance, which was a garage. So Dick Walters arranged for a car to come into the garage; Henry slumped down on the floor between you and me, you may remember that, because they figured you and I were not recognizable to anybody but Henry certainly was.

Speak for yourself. (Laughter)

MR. SMYSER: I’m merely saying what they thought, not necessarily what you thought. But nonetheless, we were able to get out, have a meeting with Le Duc Tho, and then afterwards, return to the residence. And that evening, Henry had dinner with a young lady, an NBC correspondent, as I
recall, in a Paris restaurant, and was accused by some woman who shook her hand at him of not doing enough for peace. So this shows about how things are.

I don’t want to cover any more, because I don’t have much time. But I just want to mention that one of the most interesting things to all this was the Japanese reaction. And it was a reaction, which I can best describe as real genuine concern as to what this meant for the stability of Asia, and also really genuine concern that their principal ally, the United States, had done this and not told them about it earlier. I remember in the ensuing weeks I had several conversations with Japanese diplomats who came to my office who wanted very, very much to talk about this subject. I’m sure you had the same. And this was a genuine concern of our allies about things that we had done, which they thought we should have told them about. Obviously, we couldn’t tell them for all the reasons that you know. But there we are. Thank you very much.

(Appause)

MR. SUSSER: Why don’t we move in general a little bit chronologically. General Scowcroft, could you give us your thoughts?

BRENT SCOWCROFT: Sure. I figured I would sort of be last, but –

MR. SUSSER: Well, you didn’t like sitting on the left, so –

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, yeah, let me tell you a little bit about my involvement. It started, I arrived at the White House the day before the advance trip to China left to prepare for President Nixon’s visit. And I was on that. So I started out, my introduction to the White House was identical with my introduction to China. I was not an august colleague of either Win Lord’s or Dick Smyser. However, I had an administrative job in the White House. I was the military assistant to the president and in charge of logistics: Air Force One, Camp David, the motor pool, the mess hall, all the kinds of things that Defense used to support the president, so that was the reason I was on the mission. I also provided the aircraft for Dick Smyser to go to Paris quietly without anybody finding out what they were doing. So that was my involvement in the early days.
But principally, it came later on in the administration of President Bush and especially related to Tiananmen Square. When Bush came into office, relations with China were pretty good. In fact, they were quite good. As Win Lord said, we’ve had seven presidents reaffirm the general direction of our relations with China. But they didn’t all start out that way. Reagan, for example, started out when he campaigned, as a strong proponent of Taiwan, so strong that he sent his vice-presidential candidate who was then George Bush over to Deng Xiaoping to explain that this was just campaign rhetoric and so on and so forth. And actually, Bush was in the meeting with Deng Xiaoping and an aide came in and gave Deng a message. And after Bush had just explained this didn’t mean anything, he says he’s done it again. So this was an education process for several of our presidents to the realities of the relationship and how fundamental it was. And that says a lot.

So when Bush came into office in 1989, one of the first things we wanted to do was to meet with the Chinese, because just before inauguration day, it had been announced that the Soviets, Gorbachev, was going to come to China in March, I think it was, for a state visit. We wanted to get there ahead of time, but how can you do that with a president brand-new, just inaugurated to jump on a plane and go to a trip to China. Well, the Japanese emperor obliged us by succumbing, and we went to the funeral. And immediately after the funeral, we went on to China. And it was a great visit. Win, you should have talked about that. Win was the ambassador at that time.

But one special thing, President Bush wanted the Chinese to know how close he felt to them, so he brought a special dinner along, a Texas barbecue, complete with the checkered tablecloths, the whole thing was flown in. Well, I don’t know about you, but the Chinese I sat with looked at it, poked at it, and pushed it around, and didn’t touch it.

Anyway, shortly after that came Tiananmen Square. It was a serious crisis in the relationship. We had to respond. It was an outrageous act. But President Bush felt he had to respond, but he did not want to sever this relationship, which had been gradually built up and gradually deepened. So we imposed sanctions, but they were primarily sanctions against the military relationship, military supplies, and things like that, on the grounds that it was the military who had moved into Tiananmen Square, and therefore they should bear the brunt of it. But at the same time, he was deeply worried that this relationship would be destroyed.
So he tried to call Deng Xiaoping on the telephone. Well, the Chinese said, our leaders don’t talk on the telephone. So what to do? So finally, he asked me to go over to the embassy, and I did. And there is a little park in front of the embassy here as some of you know. And there was a big statue of the lady of freedom from Tiananmen Square, you know, up there and all kinds of placards and so on and so forth. It was like walking through a bomb field. So I went in and explained to the ambassador that we didn’t like what they did. We had demonstrated we didn’t like what they did. But nevertheless, we wanted to sustain a relationship. And if the Chinese leaders were amenable, we would be prepared to send an emissary quietly to talk to them. In less than 24 hours, a note came from Deng Xiaoping – yes, be happy to.

So Larry Eagleberger, who was deputy secretary of state, and I went over there. We went on a C-141 with aerial refueling, so we didn’t have to land anywhere between Washington and Beijing. The Chinese president told me later that as we were approaching the entryway in through Shanghai that he got a call from the border patrols that an unknown aircraft was approaching; should they shoot it down. And he said, no, let it through.

So we got there and there were a fascinating set of discussions with both Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. And Deng Xiaoping says, I’m no longer in the government; I agreed to meet with you because you’re an old friend. But I wanted to tell you, Tiananmen has absolutely nothing to do with you. It’s an internal issue and you are interfering in our business. So I said, yes, you’re right; it’s an internal matter, absolutely. But the external effects of what you have done are of great concern to us, and that’s why I’m here. So we had a long discussion for two days. It was not a negotiating session. But what it was is a demonstration of the depth of the relationship, and that somehow, we needed to get past this bad chapter.

Move ahead six months. We wanted to see if we could get something going with the Chinese again. So President Bush took the opportunity of the Soviet summit at Malta to tell the Chinese he would be happy to send somebody to report to the Chinese about that summit. So the Chinese said yes, we’d like that. And I went again, this time publicly. And then we did engage in negotiations. It was still a difficult time. When I got there, there was an American film crew in China. I can’t remember why they were there. But anyway, the Chinese asked if they could film our proceedings.
And I said no, but it’s all right; you can film the opening session, which is, you know, you sit down and have tea and exchange pleasantries and then you adjourn. So they said fine.

Well, they filmed that, and then as we were having our first dinner, as a part of the first dinner, of course, the Chinese custom is that you have toasts. Well, just as I was lifting a glass to respond to the Chinese toast, in came the camera crew. And I thought, what do I do? Do I put my glass down, refuse to toast, destroy my mission, or do I go ahead and toast and be, in return toasted by the American press? Well, I chose the latter, and boy was I toasted.

Anyway, that session in negotiating principally with Qian Qichen\(^3\), we came up with the roadmap to renormalize our relations. They would do something, we would respond. Then we’d do something, they would respond, and so on. But after the first couple of steps came the Romanian coup against Ceausescu. And I think the Chinese, up to that point, had been fairly relaxed about what was going on in Eastern Europe, because a lot of the other leaders were sort of not pure Communists. But Ceausescu, a real down-to-earth Communist, he would survive. Well, when he didn’t, I think they panicked. And the roadmap stopped, and then it was a very slow gradual process to get back to normal relations.

I think what it shows is that despite ups and downs, and Philip Zelikow didn’t mention all of the downs; he made it sound sort of easy. There have been some really, really rough spots in this relationship. But I think the fact that it has endured shows that it is deeply important, both to the United States and to China. And it won’t survive any blows that either side can strike at it. But it is strong enough to endure most of them. So I am probably optimistic for the future. Thank you.

(Appplause)

MR. SUSSER: I understand, unfortunately, that Dr. Brzezinski is going to have to leave us a bit early too, but maybe you could go now.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Okay, thank you very much.

\(^3\) China’s Foreign Minister from April 1988 – March 1998.
I’m a little baffled by the chronology. We started off by talking about the early ‘70s, and then we moved to the late ‘80s, and now we’re moving back to the second half of the ‘70s.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I just had to talk about something I knew.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I suppose that is a device to keep everybody alert and wondering what is happening.

I very much agree with Brent that the American-Chinese relationship is not only important, in all probability enduring, but it is also susceptible to ups and downs, because it is an important but delicate relationship with a lot of sensitivities, and not always entirely identical national interests. Beyond that, I think that it is also important to recognize that that relationship has been evolving, over now more than 30 years. And it hasn’t become what it is today all at once as a consequence of the first Kissinger trip to China. Winston, in summarizing the significance of that trip, recounted all of the beneficial consequences that subsequently followed. But I think that it is important to recognize that the trip opened the doors to these beneficial consequences, but didn’t cause all of them. There was a great deal left still undone after that visit, and the beginning of the political relationship that it initiated.

To some extent, one might think here of the difference, at least in the old days, between a romantic first kiss, and going to bed. Now, I realize that these days the two are conflated, but there was a time when there was at least a decent interval between the two. And I think that going to bed actually occurred in fact in the second half of the ‘70s. We had, by then, a political relationship with the Chinese, a very important accomplishment, historically significant accomplishment. But that’s what it primarily was. And by the middle of the ‘70s, there was a sense, especially among the Chinese leaders, but also to some extent here that it either had to move forward or it was facing the risk of, in some fashion, receding.

And that brought up the question whether to move from a political relationship that was fruitfully important to formal normalization, which would resolve some of the still highly unresolved issues that the political relationship had created. The Ford administration in the first year hesitated. It was inclined to pursue normalization, but it decided that with the Panama Canal Treaties coming up, with the SALT negotiations ongoing but difficult
that perhaps it would overload the circuits to try it. But after some hesitation, it nonetheless sort of half-heartedly decided to explore the possibility of normalization, and that was the purpose of the secretary of State’s visit to China in August of ’77.

But because it was somewhat half-hearted and unclear, it did not produce the progress that had been hoped. And that led then, in 1978, to the president sending me to China, not without some prior encouragement to that effect, of him by me, which took a little time and required building some coalitions within the administration, particularly with the vice president and the secretary of Defense, because the secretary of State was not particularly enthusiastic about the idea of my going to China.

But ultimately the president decided, early in ’78, that I should go to China and that I should push the process of normalization forward, and then as he became engaged in discussing the modalities of my trip, he became quite enthusiastic and really insistent that a complete breakthrough in relationships be sought as the purpose of the mission, and perhaps even more than that.

And that led, actually, to my visit to China. It was unclear whom I would see, whether it would be the Chinese foreign minister or whether I would be received by Deng. But as it turned out, I spent a great deal of time with Deng, both formally and then later more informally in a private supper that he gave for me. And we’d begun to establish somewhat of a personal relationship, even. At one point, he whimsically said to me that perhaps he’s already too old ever to contemplate the possibility of visiting the United States, but still he hopes that maybe that will come to pass. And I told him that if the relationship that we are now beginning to undertake to construct actually bears fruit, I would hope he would come to the United States and come and have dinner with me in my house.

We then initiated a secret negotiating process controlled largely out of the White House. And that took the next few months. The Secretary of State submitted a memorandum urging that it be finished by December ’78. I mention that quite deliberately because it is sometimes alleged that this normalization was artificially accelerated for other reasons by me. But it was a date actually agreed to by the president on the basis of the Secretary of State’s recommendation.
In the course of these negotiations, we were able to work out some arrangement for Taiwan that would, in fact, insure its continued existence. We made it very clear to the Chinese that while we expected to reduce, perhaps at some point even terminate, arms sales to Taiwan, we reserved the right to continue selling arms to the Taiwanese. An issue, which even on the day before formal announcement produced a last-minute attempt by the Chinese to reinterpret that part of the agreement. And we also made it clear to the Chinese that while Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair, in keeping with the protocols which were undertaken in Shanghai by Nixon-Kissinger, that we would not be indifferent if force was used in the Taiwan straights against Taiwan because it would affect our interests in the Far East.

In effect, the agreement to normalize the relationship reversed the existing situation. Heretofore, the United States had no diplomatic relations with China in a normal fashion, but only a political presentation. And it was recognizing Taiwan, in effect, as the government of the Republic of China. We had somewhat limited commercial relations that were beginning to open up, but were still lacking a formal context and the benefits of full normalization. And most important of all, we did not have a strategic relationship of any substance. And that emerged as a consequence of normalization and a kind of reaction to the existing strategic context, both of the United States and of the Chinese.

The Soviet Union was on a roll, or so it seemed. It was becoming more assertive. And in different ways, the Chinese and we were concerned about it. The Chinese also decided for us to use normalization of relations to exploit their own specific interests in Southeast Asia. When Deng Xiaoping and his wife came to have dinner at my house, and your reference about the Texas cookout that the president sent over to Deng reminded me of what happened at that dinner. Namely, that my children were serving caviar, and my little daughter, who was at the time barely 10, deposited a lot of the caviar on Deng Xiaoping’s trousers, right on his knee. (Laughter) And I remember he kind of flicked it off very, very skillfully.

MR. SUSSER: Was it Russian caviar?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: It was Russian caviar. It was Russian vodka. (Laughter) And I told Deng Xiaoping that we’re celebrating the new strategic relationship with Russian vodka and Russian caviar, which he welcomed.
He, incidentally, was very quick in conversations. At one point the conversation kind of lapsed a little bit, became a little stale, formal. So to lighten it up I said to him, you know, the president of the United States has a lot of political problems normalizing relations with you because there’s a lot of political opposition in the United States centering on the issue of Taiwan. Do you have any political problems normalizing relations with us?  

(Laughter)

I thought I was kind of tweaking him. And he looks me in the eye and just like that he says, of course; there was a great deal of political opposition in the province of Taiwan.  

(Laughter) He was quick. He was quick. The next day when the president, at a formal meeting, brought up the question of emigration from China, kind of parallel to the Soviet Union, I kind of sat there and looked at him. Then he leaned forward and says, fine, next year I’ll allow 10 million to emigrate. Will you take them?  

(Laughter) And we kind of decided to go on to the next item on the agenda.  

(Laughter)  

(Inaudible)

He requested the night before a private meeting with the president. And I told the president next day that he wants a private meeting. And the president asks me, what do you think he wants? And I said, I suspect it’s going to be about Vietnam. So the president said I should be there, and I was. And Deng Xiaoping then told the president that he’s going to shortly undertake a punitive expedition against Vietnam, similar to the one that China pursued in the early ’60s against India. And I remember the president was not too happy because he thought the normalization of relations with China, in addition to a strategic relationship, was a contribution to world peace. And he wasn’t enamored of the thought that for Deng, it was an opportunity to undertake a military campaign.

So he said to him, well you know, this could produce very serious reactions. The Soviet Union could react, and very, very adversely. There could be serious problems. And Deng looked at him, kind of in his very steely fashion, and says, we have thought about it. What can the Soviets do? Well, they can send arms to the Vietnamese. That’s no problem because we’re going to do it for just five or six weeks. We’ll go in. We’ll go out, so those arms will have no effect.

Secondly, if that isn’t enough, they might stage intensified border incidents between us and the Soviet Union. We have thought about that.
That doesn’t worry us. Since 1969, there have been 5,000 border incidents with the Soviet Union, some of them lethal, so some more won’t bother us.

Thirdly, we have contemplated the possibility that they may actually use their armored divisions. They have 22 poised on the Sino-Soviet frontier, a lot of them in Mongolia, so kind of pointed towards Beijing, into China, in order to intimidate us, in which case we will wage a people’s war and drown them.

And last, they may use nuclear weapons against us. We don’t have many nuclear weapons, he says. But we have enough, for example, to take out Bratsk, which is the huge hydroelectric dam, or maybe a city like Svedlovsk or maybe Moscow. The president, I felt, was somewhat less enthused at that moment (chuckles) about the relationship. But nonetheless, it survived and continues to thrive.

Let me conclude by adding that it not only thrived on this sort of general level, but it produced immediately afterwards a very extensive intelligence relationship between the United States and China which was extremely beneficial, extremely beneficial, especially in view of the loss of the intelligence facilities that took place at the time in Iran. And it was more than a replacement for that. And this produced also an intelligence cooperative relationship which previously had not existed. And second, and subsequently, it produced American-Chinese direct collaboration in generating efforts to make the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan very costly to the Soviets. We and the Soviets [Chinese] worked closely on that.

A final point. Very much like the early opening, this was a politically sensitive undertaking, the normalization of relations with China, the abandonment of the security treaty with Taiwan, the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It was sensitive, much like the initial Kissinger mission. And for that reason, it could not be entrusted, and I hate to say it in this building, to the State Department. (Laughter) And that was an explicit presidential decision, very much as in the case of Nixon and the first opening. It was run out of the White House, confined just to very few people. And I dare say, it probably wouldn’t have been successful if it had been undertaken otherwise because the issue was so politically charged. When we were doing it, it was certainly charged. When Nixon and Kissinger were doing it, they probably wouldn’t have been successful in pursuing it had it been done openly through normal diplomatic channels.
And we certainly would have been paralyzed by opposition, and the conditionalities involved in establishing the relationship might have been much more difficult for both sides to accept.

Thank you.

(Appause)

MR. SUSSER: Mr. Freeman?

CHAS W. FREEMAN: General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski have said just about everything I wanted to say, but before you get your hopes up and think I won’t I say anything, I’m afraid this leaves me with no alternative but to address the topic of the conference, so I will. (Laughter)

I would start by saying that I wondered why I was invited to this, if not for comic relief, then perhaps because I probably have the greatest continuity of involvement with China and this relationship of any Chinese language officer in the Foreign Service. I became interested in the opening to China in the fall of 1964 when I was attempting to find reasons to leave the Harvard Law School and discovered strategic geometry. And it seemed obvious to me that if there were three powers, two of which, A and B, were at odds, and C was at odds with both, that A and B would have to attempt a new relationship with C. And I decided I wanted to be there when that happened. And by a stroke of great luck, I was, as a worker bee and as interpreter, mostly for Secretary Rogers.

So I was involved for 15 years off and on during the Nixon period, later opening the liaison office in Beijing as director for Chinese Affairs here; as chargé and DCM in Beijing; and later in 1993, 10 years after that, as assistant secretary of Defense, re-opening military dialogue with the Chinese.

I’m going to speak about three basic points in light of this. First, underneath the very large relationships and issues that are discussed in the foreign relations volume and which have been discussed today, of course, there is a great deal of texture and detail. I counted 41 separate signals to the Chinese bureaucratically in preparation for the opening that Kissinger and Nixon brokered. When you work in the government, the last thing on earth you want to have happen is somebody notice you, and so I wrote an article
about this and felt very good that no one ever noticed it. But for anyone
who’s interested, all 41 moves are detailed in something called “Sino-
American Normalization and its Policy Implications,” which was a book that
came out in the mid ’70s.

This was an interesting process. When you try to turn the ship of
state, a lot of people have to run around and pull lines and re-set things, and
it doesn’t happen easily. And I think, in my case I was called back from
home leave early in April of 1971 for reasons which were not explained on
the telephone, but I ended up basically working full-time for Dr. Kissinger
without his being aware of that. Because the boss in the office at that time,
Al Jenkins, claimed he was doing all the work on his own, and I had to
pretend to my colleagues that I was doing special projects. At any rate, it
wasn’t the case, I think, that Kissinger didn’t know how to use the State
Department or didn’t. He used it a great deal. But he used it outside the
chain of command. What I did never went up to the seventh floor, nor did
what Jenkins did go up to the seventh floor.

In fact, in preparation for the Nixon trip, to jump ahead a little bit, I
looked at a fitness report for that year. It says that I wrote 47 percent of the
material that was supplied to the president. Not all of which was recognized
by the White House as originating at the State Department. There was a
habit of our colleagues in the White House of taking State Department
produced material and re-typing the front page (laughter) so that it would
appear that it had been produced there.

As a result of this, something called Department of State briefing
paper, which is still in use, was invented by Nick Platt, then the head of the
Secretariat. In those days, you actually had to re-type things, and this
managed to insure that both front page and the back page and everything in
between had to be re-typed, which was too much work for our friends to do.
And also, I should say, somebody at the last minute decided Mrs. Nixon
needed a briefing book, and I had 48 hours to write that. I wrote the whole
thing with a lot of help from Nagels Encyclopedia Guide, which I commend
to your attention.

But some of the things that happened are really quite interesting. We
were asked, for example, after the president made a statement about
changing controls on the use of the U.S. dollar by China to find out why the
Treasury hadn’t implemented this. And I had the head of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control to lunch, and I gave him the presidential statement and explained it to him. And he said, this is very interesting. He said, that may be the president’s policy, but it’s not the Treasury’s. (Laughter)

So, you shouldn’t, anyway, I’m just saying this is a very complex process, and I’m very pleased that some of this material, at least apparently, is made available on an Internet supplement to the volume, which undoubtedly will be interesting.

Two further points. I went on this trip, not as the producer of material, but as interpreter. But nobody ever told me that I was going to go in any capacity. I found out, this is a very secretive White House we’re dealing with, I found out when luggage tags were shoved through the mail slot on my front door at home. And nobody told me what I was to do. I remember meeting this skinny guy on a beach in Hawaii, Brent Scowcroft, I think a newly promoted brigadier, and asking him is he had any idea what I was to do. And he said, no, no, no; ask Pat Buchanan, who was the speech writer. And I did, and I learned from Pat Buchanan that he’d put some of Chairman Mao’s poetry, with Dick Solomon’s help, into the banquet toast. That was useful information, but I didn’t find out what I was to do.

And in fact, when we arrived in Beijing, I still didn’t know what I was to do. And the president didn’t tell me, although we met. He went off to see Chairman Mao. The banquet occurred. An hour before the banquet, I was called over to the president’s villa by Dwight Chapin, and told, the president wants you to interpret the banquet toast tonight. And I said, fine, may I have the text please? And he said, well I don’t think there is a text. I think he’s going to do it extemporaneously. (Laughter) And I said, I think you’re quite wrong about that, but (Laughter) you know, really, this isn’t French or Spanish and I really would like to look at the text if I could.

So he went back in to see the President, came out and said, the president says there is no text and he orders you to do it. (Laughter) And I said, well, mind you, I’m 28 years old, I said, I think there’s a mistake here; I don’t think you talked to the president. He said, I did. He went back in, came out and said, the president orders you to interpret the speech. I said, Mr. Chapin, it might interest you to know that I wrote the original draft for tonight’s toast, and I know that some of Chairman Mao’s poetry is in it but I don’t know which stanzas, and if you think I’m going to get up in front of
the world and ad lib Chinese poetry back from English, you’re out of your, and then I used a foul word (Laughter) mind.

Well, Mr. Chapin never explained why, but two days later the president did. He apologized, with tears in his eyes, again, quite an experience for someone who had expected the end of his career, and explained that he liked to memorize speeches and appear to be giving them extemporaneously, and that he understood I’d done a fine job and it wasn’t personal and so forth.

There are many other anecdotes I won’t mention. And I’ll just say one final thing. I, at least, partly because I come from a family with a long involvement with China, a great-grandfather who was the original designer of the Three Gorges Dam for Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Beijing University Social Science Department, and one of the co-founders of the Chinese steel industry in the 19th century, whose ring I wear. As we drove around Beijing, I thought long and hard about what the impact of this visit was likely to be. Never in my wildest dreams did I believe it would have the long-term impact on China that it has had. And I must say, I was absolutely stunned, Dr. Brzezinski has left, but I was absolutely stunned about six years ago in speaking with some people at the Central Party School in Beijing who showed me documents from the normalization period, to discover that Deng Xiaoping’s motivations for normalization, although they were in part foreign policy-related, were mainly to introduce an American influence that would help a reform process inside China that he sought to inaugurate.

The result, of course, has been that from that 1972 Nixon visit period, when China was a cultural desert, when it was a colorless and lifeless place, we’ve seen the lights come on, the people dress up and the return of the traditional philosophy of the Chinese philosopher Confucius, who said: (phrase in Mandarin). That is, gluttony and lust are what it’s all about. This is something the Chinese have rediscovered, with a policy and a program that are based on pragmatism, eclectic borrowing from abroad, and now more and more, innovation.

Meanwhile, the Taiwan issue, which was the principal focus in 1972, seems to me to be moving toward resolution. This is an extraordinary story, and it’s not over yet. Thank you.
(Applause)

MR. SUSSER: Thank you. Why don’t we start by allowing each of you to comment on what your colleagues have said. And let me please encourage members of the audience, if you would like to pose a question to the panel, please write it on the card and hand them in.

Ambassador Lord?

MR. LORD: I wanted to comment on something Zbig said, and unfortunately he’s had to leave. I caught him briefly, but I mentioned that seven American presidents of both parties have carried this relationship forward. And that is indeed true. And in fact, Zbig and Carter did play a crucial role. I, of course, was only commenting on the ’72 period. The fact is that after this dramatic opening, Nixon indicated to the Chinese he would normalize relations in his second term, and then Watergate, of course, intervened and that proved impossible. And then Ford indicated he would normalize relations in his next term, but he was constrained leading up to that election because he was being challenged by Reagan on the right, including on the Taiwan issue. And meanwhile Deng Xiaoping was spotting a succession struggle in China. This was in the mid ’70s with the Gang of Four, so he couldn’t be flexible. In fact, the Ford trip to Beijing, through no fault of the president, was not one of the more crowning successes because both sides were constrained by their domestic environment.

So what led the Carter administration to take and bite the bullet on normalization? Both the strategic dimension, which Zbig mentioned, the Afghanistan and the cooperation vis-à-vis the Soviets and the intelligence field. Regarding normalization, which came under some attacks, I and others certainly supported it. And I think it was remarkable that the Carter administration managed to get in as part of that agreement the fact they could continue to sell arms to Taiwan. So I just wanted to make clear that important as the opening was, as I indicated in my remarks, the Carter administration and subsequent presidents, including Ford and people after Carter, certainly carried this forward. Thank you.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I’d like to make one general comment, and that is it’s important to remember what an emotional issue Taiwan has been through all this. Not just for the Chinese, but for the United States. The Taiwan issue came up in the late ’40s, really, with the Chinese Civil War
and Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists moving over to Taiwan. There was a domestic repercussion; big debate about who lost China that was carried over into, for example, the McCarthy hearings about communist infiltration of the State Department, and so on. And that plus the 20 years of hostility and alienation have left an emotional overcharge, and that has infected over and over again our ability and our freedom of action on China. And that’s one of the reasons many of these things were done in secret.

And I remember after Tiananmen Square, when Congress came back into session, they passed a resolutinal law, really, to allow the Chinese students who were in the United States, and there were thousands of them, to stay indefinitely. Well, we decided that would shut off all the students coming because the Chinese would not permit that. So the president vetoed it. And we did a head count – it was hopeless in the House. We did a head count, and in the Senate, we counted five Senators of the 35 you needed that were on our side. I’ve never worked so hard in my life. He sustained the veto, but that sort of gets overlooked in the kind of drag that there has been on this relationship. It is a very emotional issue in this country, and residually still so.

MR. FREEMAN: I just wanted to make two footnotes on subjects that, actually, Dick Smyser mentioned. One was the Japanese shock at the Nixon trip. The fact is, that long before the July 15, 1971 announcement that Kissinger had been in Beijing, the United States had embraced the theme, some of the themes that Phil Zelikow was talking about earlier, of inclusion versus exclusion. And I distinctly remember a very intelligent and now very famous Japanese diplomat Sato Yukio coming to me right after that announcement and saying, I could kick myself. You and everyone else have been saying things that made it logical for this to happen, so the overall policy framework had, in fact, not been anywhere near as secretive as people imagined. The overall policy framework had shifted. There had been these numerous signals, and if people don’t take policy frameworks seriously and then are surprised by things that happen as a result of them, I’m not sure that that’s anybody’s fault but their own.

Second point is this, that when you read the volume, you will find that, as I think some of the introductory material suggests, there was quite an effort during this entire period to keep our friends in Taiwan informed of the general process and to offer reassurances about what we were not doing. I would say it’s very interesting; there was a comparable effort on the part of
the Chinese with regard to the Vietnamese. And some years ago, the Vietnamese apparently on their own, published the entire record of those briefings and discussions between Beijing and Hanoi as this diplomacy that we’re talking about unfolded. That has been translated into Chinese, and I have seen copies of that book in Beijing. And my point here is that even as this material is made public and accessible here, one must realize there is an enormous amount of material that has been made available in China as well. And this is a story with several narratives, all of which have to be read to understand what happened.

MR. LORD: Let me comment further on the Japanese dimension, which gets into the whole question of the secrecy of the trips. Zbig maintained that what some of the stuff that his administration did as well as the Nixon-Kissinger opener had to be secret. Other people have challenged that. Let me just give the rationale. It might not be totally persuasive for why this was secret, at least secret from the world.

We didn’t know when we went to China in July that in fact it was going to be able to move forward as it did. We thought we would, but it was a risky gamble. It looks easy in retrospect, but it really was uncharted territory. And therefore, to have public announcements or a public trip would raise expectations and there would be a tremendous diplomatic fall-out if it, in fact, didn’t succeed. So we wanted to be sure in secret that it would work before it was unveiled. But more fundamentally, and Zbig alluded to this, if you indicate in advance you’re doing something as dramatic as a trip, first you have the conservatives and the Taiwan lobby here, who have some genuine concerns. We try to keep that into account as Chas mentioned.

Nevertheless, there’d be a tremendous backlash and political firestorm, after all Kissinger’s bedrock support was often from this general area. And other countries, including Japan and others, would be weighing in and locking us into positions before we could even explore with the Chinese. So these are the reasons it was kept secret. One can debate them, but I think on balance it had to be done.

Now, with respect to Japan, which is the most painful because we had held Japan back for a decade or more saying, you can’t go ahead with China, and then we leapfrog them, and it was very embarrassing and we suffered greatly in the short-term. We did repair the relationship. Kissinger kept
going back there, and over time, the Japanese moved quickly, of course, and the relationship was repaired and the U.S.-Japan alliance, as I said, was sold to the Chinese as a stabilizing factor. So this was all a plus.

Nevertheless, and this was retrospect; I did not argue this at the time, I think after the secret trip and before the announcement a few days later, Holdridge or I should have peeled off and been sent to Tokyo to at least tell the Emperor in advance, not the Emperor, the Prime Minister, in advance what was coming. He could at least, then, save face and said he knew about it. He’d be in a tough position because would he tell his Cabinet there’s a leak out in the Japanese press? Nevertheless, I think that might have been done. You could even argue, maybe send one of us low profile in advance of the visit, but then again, everyone was worried about the leaks for the reasons we mentioned. So we paid a price, temporary, with Japan. That is the rationale for it.

MR. SUSSER: Okay. Let me start. Actually several of the panelists referred to I guess what Dr. Brzezinski described as something that was too sensitive to be entrusted to the State Department. And we are in the State Department now. But, General Scowcroft, I guess, from your perspective did this change, I assume it would, once Dr. Kissinger took over both positions simultaneously as National Security Adviser and Secretary?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it changed. I don’t know if it changed with the department as a whole, because Dr. Kissinger was Dr. Kissinger. And, you know, he had his group inside the State Department the way he had in the NSC. But I don’t, you know, on this issue there was no fundamental difference between the NSC system and the State Department. So I don’t see that. I don’t know. Win maybe?

MR. LORD: Yeah, let me comment on the issue of the State Department in the opening. And Chas Freeman has made his own comments on this. Again, in retrospect, I think it would have been better, it would have to be closely held for reasons I’ve already mentioned. But we certainly could have trusted, say, Marshall Green and one or two of his colleagues to work with us. Let Rogers know. I think it could have been kept secret and we would have benefited.

Having said that, the State Department did contribute to the preparations, even for the secret trip, even though they didn’t know about
the trip. We commissioned, Holdridge and I commissioned many papers – I’m sure some were written by Chas. I hadn’t realized he’d done absolutely everything, which is quite amazing. (Laughter)

MR. FREEMAN: Only half.

MR. LORD: Yes, only half. Okay. Well, that’s quite amazing, too.

But in any event, we got some very useful stuff, including the Taiwan issue past historical stuff. And we would commission that; Holdridge knew a lot about China. We had CIA reports, and we had outside experts ranging from a professor from Michigan to André Malraux. So there was considerable preparation, including the State Department, once removed, getting ready for the trip.

Then once the secret trip had been taken, there was full collaboration on the Nixon trip, and of course opening up the liaison offices. So it was a temporary thing. Now the one other sore spot, again, no one’s proud of, including Henry Kissinger himself in his memoirs, is cutting the State Department out of the communiqué drafting in Shanghai. Now, the October part, we did a lot of it, but then we had to finish it off in China. I happen to think it was a brilliant communiqué the way it came out, but there was a very awkward moment in Hangchow [Hangzhou], the last stop on the president’s trip. I was with Kissinger and the president comes in and says, we’ve got a real problem. Secretary Rogers and Marshall Green think the communiqué is lousy. Now, it wasn’t quite that strong, but partly out of some concerns, partly out of understandable pique at having been cut out and having their expertise, they wanted to re-open the negotiations. So, Kissinger was less than enthusiastic about this. All he had to do was go to the Chinese, and Zhou and I said, look, I know Mao has approved this communiqué personally. I know the entire Polit. Bureau has approved this communiqué personally. We’re now down in Hangchow, but we’d sort of like to re-open the negotiations.

This was awkward. The Chinese let us save face. We got some changes, the most important of which I think Marshall Green put forward, which was a good suggestion. Some of the others, we just couldn’t fundamentally change at that late stage. We had some phrasing in there reaffirming all our alliances like Japan, but of course leaving out Taiwan. Marshall pointed out that this exception would obviously be known and
underlined and so, I think he suggested or Kissinger agreed or in any event we worked out, we dropped all references to alliances so that it wouldn’t single out Taiwan.

And then Henry, in his press conference in Shanghai took the remarkable step, which he foreshadowed to the Chinese, of reaffirming our defense alliance with Taiwan on Chinese soil, which is a good trick. So that’s just a long way, because I gather what you want to look at is the history and the chronology here of saying that the State Department did play an important role, and some of the being cut-out was less than seemly, but in any event it came out extremely well in terms of substance and long term relations.

MR. FREEMAN: Can I make a comment? I think that is a very accurate description of the course of events that Win has given. I would say as a general rule, when foreign policy decisions have a very high impact on domestic politics, there is a natural instinct in the White House to manage those directly, and I think that is correct. And that certainly was the case with the opening to China.

The second point I’d make, however, is that sometimes institutional rivalries are a problem. And I would cite here the transition between the Carter administration and the Reagan administration, when it suddenly dawned on people that the only official who was going to be left after this transition who knew the inner history of the U.S.-China relationship was me, country director for China. But I had not been briefed on and knew only fragments of what had been going on directly between the National Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski, and the Chinese. And some of the programs and areas of cooperation they had agreed to were quite important and quite complex.

And so I was brought over to the White House to read all the files and bring myself up to speed, which was a good thing. Otherwise, the government would have, once again, administered a frontal lobotomy to itself with the predictable results.

MR. SUSSER: It’s a well-told story that in 1954 when Zhou Enlai met John Foster Dulles in Geneva and Dulles refused to shake his hand, that Zhou held that grudge for the next decade and a half. Could you guys
comment a bit about the personal dynamics between Mao and Zhou and Nixon and Kissinger when they each first met?

MR. LORD: Let me take a crack at that first. Precisely because of this history of the handshake, Nixon was determined when he got off the plane in February ’72 to stride toward Zhou Enlai and put out his hand. It was very carefully choreographed, and of course the Chinese picked that up immediately.

Briefly on Mao and Zhou, and this could go on forever, and I don’t want to hog this podium here. When we walked in with Mao, you were immediately struck by his physical presence. I don’t mean he was Arnold Schwarzenegger, but I do mean he was exuding authority. Now, how much of that is you figure in advance, this is a great historical figure and you sort of assume that. I don’t think it can be quantified, but I think we all felt that you’d get this sense even if you didn’t know who he was when you walked into the room.

The interesting thing was that Zhou Enlai in his presence, here’s Zhou Enlai, the most charismatic foreign diplomat I’ve ever seen. Kissinger says the most impressive he’s ever met along with DeGaulle, who dominates by his intelligence, by his humor, his sense of history, his tactical sagesse, et cetera, every meeting he’s in. In the presence of Mao, was totally subservient; close to obsequious in his body language. Now, you could argue that’s why he survived. He was always number three and not number two. And he was an actor in his youth. But we were struck by the contrast of Zhou in the meeting with the Chairman, as opposed to being on his own.

The contrast between Mao and Zhou was extraordinary. First of all, the conversations, and I was in every one between Nixon and Mao and Zhou and Kissinger and Zhou and Mao, I do think will go down as some of the most extraordinary diplomatic exchanges in American diplomatic history. But they were totally different. Mao spoke in brushstrokes, and as I said, we were initially sort of disappointed because he seemed very, sort of, casual. And he just would sort of go to allusions. For example, in a later meeting, he said as Brzezinski I think mentioned, he wanted to send us 10 million women to the United States, and we couldn’t figure out what that was all about. I asked my wife, who was born in Shanghai, and she says he’s having trouble with Madame Mao, and that’s of course exactly what he was
saying. But, that’s the kind of thing you’ve got to sort of figure out with Mao.

And so, in a seemingly casual way in that one hour, he hit enough points, particularly as I said on the Soviets and Taiwan and a few other things, like I haven’t changed China as Nixon said, I’ve only changed a few things around Beijing, indicating the problems he had. So that we realized in the course of the following week and talking to Zhou that he had gotten the framework he needed. But he was rough; he could use scatological language and wasn’t at all elegant, more like a union dock leader, but impressive in that sense, whereas Zhou Enlai, and now I’ll stop, was an extraordinarily elegant Mandarin, and extremely polished and extremely skillful and clever.

Finally, I’ll make the point that we had no illusions, however impressive these gentlemen were, that they were not ruthless. Of course they were ruthless, and of course it was a very grim society that they were presiding over. So we had not illusions about who we were dealing with, but they were impressive in their own way.

MR. FREEMAN: Two quick comments. The interesting question to me is not so much Mao and Zhou, but Nixon, who had no small talk, but was probably – when you read the transcripts you will see the quality of the man’s mind in foreign affairs, which is superb. But he could not handle a dinner conversation. As a result, I got a lot of conversation in with Zhou Enlai at the dinner table on my own. So that’s the first point.

The second point I’d make is that you need to look, as you read these documents, look at the structure of this meeting, which is not unprecedented, but which is entirely appropriate. Actually, FDR pioneered this during World War II, that you reserve for your discussions at the summit those things on which you may reach agreement. And all the disagreements, to the extent you can, you shove off on the foreign ministers in a separate meeting and let them yell and scream at each other and register all the points that you have to go tell your allies and friends you registered. But you don’t introduce this negative tone into the discussions at the top. And as I said, I ended up interpreting for Secretary Rogers and they were very contentious discussions. But I think all of us there understood why we were having them while other discussions went on elsewhere, at least I did.
MR. SCOWCROFT: Just very quickly, in ’72 I was not in the meeting with Mao. Zhou Enlai was obviously extremely impressive. I went in with President Ford though in 1974. Mao had had several strokes and he looked, for all intents and purposes, like a huge sack of rice sitting in the chair like this. He would growl something. He had an interpreter, two nurses, and a doctor. And they would all put their heads together and converse and then decide what Mao had said and tell us all. But in that meeting, he made an elliptical comment about Deng Xiaoping, which in retrospect, said you’re purged, buddy. You may not know it, but you’re purged, which was quite astonishing. But even then, when he was half a vegetable, he exuded this kind of majesty, which certainly didn’t come from his look, from anything. He was a very remarkable individual.

MR. LORD: One quick comment again about the Ford meeting with Mao, and in fact, the last couple meetings with Mao that Kissinger had as well. He was extremely physically weak and could only grunt a few words. We got a little suspicious though. He would grunt maybe three or four words, and then we got a five-minute translation from the interpreter. So we figured he was saying, number one is my Taiwan policy, number two is my Soviet policy, and please take it from there. But I do want to underline, it took great physical courage on his part to get through these meetings. But he clearly was fading at the end, and of course, had a very tense relationship with Zhou Enlai as well as Deng at the end.

MR. SUSSER: In the approach, both to the Chinese initially and then as we moved on towards normalization, were there, I guess, contingency plans, plans made for exactly how to break this to the Taiwanese, or was it just winged on the fly when the news came out, or was this carefully thought out in advance?

MR. LORD: Okay, well, that obviously was the most painful dimension of this whole opening was what it would do to Taiwan. But as I have said earlier, they have rebounded magnificently from this diplomatic shock. No, a great deal of thought was given to this. The general strategy followed first by Kissinger and then by Nixon was, in the meetings with Mao and Zhou, they were to make some general statements of policy and assurances going forward like no independence, we would not support independence; we wouldn’t support Japan moving in, one China, one Taiwan kind of thing, but to say nothing that committed us to an actual act.
People like to think that a lot of concessions were made by Nixon and Kissinger on the Taiwan issue to the Chinese; that’s true.

It’s equally true that the Chinese made a lot of concessions. When we first arrived in July ’71, Zhou Enlai said the president can’t come unless he’s established diplomatic relations with Beijing and broken them and the defense treaty with Taiwan before he comes. Well, I don’t think he was serious about that, but he certainly pushed us on it. For years, they had said in Warsaw talks and elsewhere that they wouldn’t do anything with us unless we resolved the issue of Taiwan, or at least Taiwan had to be the only item on the agenda. And we finally resolved that through the Pakistani channel, as I said, when we enlarged it, or in the short communiqué where we included not just normalization but issues of mutual concern.

So Nixon and Kissinger did have Taiwan’s concerns in mind. There was no way to do this without hurting Taiwan. But the strategy was figuring that the Chinese, because of their desire for balancing the polar bear and their general isolation, would be willing to postpone the hard decisions on Taiwan. And indeed, Zhou Enlai said, we recognize the courage of your president coming here. We won’t embarrass him for now on this issue, although it remains a matter of strong principle. And throughout, as I think Chas mentioned, we did keep briefing the Taiwan authorities and reassuring them on the basic elements of diplomatic relations, defense treaty, and arms sales, and rounding off the edges on the general long-term assurances.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Just a quick anecdote to show that not everything went smoothly on this whole thing. When debate went on in the UN about transferring the seat from Taiwan to the Communists, President Bush was our ambassador the UN. And he was vociferously defending the right of Taiwan to maintain the seat at the very time that he was having the rug pulled out from under him in Washington.

MR. FREEMAN: It’s interesting that, Dr. Brzezinski really should be here to address this question, because I think the most notorious slip-up was the informing of Zhiang Jingguo when normalization was announced. And as you know, very unusually, the communiqué issued here on the 15th of December and in Beijing on the 16th of December 1978, was dated January 1, 1979. It was effective only two weeks later. And it was put out in large measure because of concern about possible leaks. But the means by which Taipei was notified were not elegant, to put it mildly. And I take this
as an example of an issue that somewhat undercuts Dr. Brzezinski’s assertion that secrecy had to be followed here. In my experience, the NSC can be, at its best, very good at coordinating policy. It is usually miserable at implementing it.

And I could give you multiple examples from the course of my career, and I’m sure every other Foreign Service officer could find others, where we had to behave like the little guy in the Bullwinkle cartoon after the elephant, sweeping up what only polite people would call debris. So when our government works well, I think it works very well. It did not work well in that instance, and I think it’s a management caution for the future.

MR. SMYSER: I’m not going to respond. (Laughter)

MR. LORD: One further comment on Zhou and Mao and their style, because I think it was quite indicative of Zhou Enlai’s skill I wanted to add. On the secret trip, we saw the Forbidden City all by ourselves. They closed it off. And then we went and had a Peking Duck lunch at Zhongnanhai, at the Great Hall of the People, I think, well, it doesn’t matter, with Zhou Enlai. In the course of the lunch, he talked about the Cultural Revolution. Now, this started in 1966 and technically wasn’t over until 1976, so it was still going on, although by far the most rabid dimensions were subsiding by ’71. Zhou had been locked in his own office. He had seen many of his colleagues persecuted. He had saved some people and some artifacts and he was a very pragmatic person who made the trains run a little bit on time in Mao’s chaotic China. So obviously, the Cultural Revolution wasn’t nirvana for him.

On the other hand, he had a chairman, and he always wanted to survive with his chairman who was going to read the transcript and hear about the meeting and a discussion of the Cultural Revolution at lunch. So how did Zhou square this circle? It was something along the following lines. I don’t have it verbatim, but it’s in the volume, I’m sure. You know, Dr. Kissinger, the Cultural Revolution has been full of turmoil here, and I have to say that I didn’t fully understand the purpose of this. It seemed to me that a lot of excesses and people were hurt, and it really had some unpleasant aspects. But that just shows you how shortsighted I am compared to the chairman. Because the chairman understood that the bureaucracy in China was ossifying our revolution; that we were going to become another Soviet Union. We had to shake things up, and therefore, he
saw much further than I did the need to go through this terrible turmoil and all of the terrible things that happened, and he was a very wise man to do this.

So of course, he was telling us he thought the Cultural Revolution was a horrible mistake, but if Mao read the transcript, he’d still be safe.

MR. SUSSER: And how would you put the personality of Deng Xiaoping in the mix compared with Mao and Zhou?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, as I say, I can’t compare them too well, because I just had one meeting with Zhou Enlai and one semi-meeting with Mao. But I think Deng Xiaoping was, to me, a very uncharacteristic person for the Chinese. Usually, when you meet with the Chinese, you meet in a U-shaped, the chairs are in a U-shaped room. And you and your interlocutor are sitting side by side facing out. And typical of the Chinese, they talk to the wall in front of you. Well, Deng instead would sit on the edge of his chair and lean right over in your face and make his points. He was very lively and so on, very animated. He chain smoked, I mean, literally chain smoked, light one off the butt of another, and he had a spittoon by him, always had a spittoon, and every once in a while, he’d make a comment and he’d turn around and, pow. So he was a remarkable individual.

MR. LORD: Let me add a few comments on that. I was at very many meetings with him. He was sort of a transition figure from Mao to Deng’s successors, in the sense that Deng was the last of the Long Marchers, the charismatic revolutionary leaders and/or military leaders. And so, he still had those credentials, unlike Jiang Zemin and others who have come since then who have ascended through managing the economy or through bureaucracy or through technical skills. They don’t have these credentials by virtue of chronology. So he was a figure that had the history and the resonance and the prestige to a certain extent of Mao and Zhao, but he also had some of the technocratic skills that his successors had.

And of course his greatest contribution was opening up China starting in 1979, a man of remarkable resilience who was up and down about three or four times in the course of his political career. And so he had the personality that Brent has mentioned, and he always was stressing the importance of U.S.-China relations, and warning about both the Japanese and the Russians. And if there was difficult times, and we’d had them on our trips to China,
usually we’d see Deng last, and the atmosphere would greatly improve. He would make sure these other bits of underbrush were cleared away by others.

So he will go down in history with a mixed record in my opinion. Great credit for the opening; we see the results even as we sit here today; great credit for promoting U.S.-Chinese relations. But always a dark stain on his legacy of Tiananmen Square, which after all, he ordered the army in. And it’s against the backdrop of political repression, generally, on Deng. He was Mao’s front man for the ’56 anti-writers campaign. He purged Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang who were relatively moderate, and he ordered the tanks into Tiananmen Square. So he’s got a mixed legacy.

MR. FREEMAN: I have a couple of things to say. First, Deng Xiaoping, blunt and direct as he was, and engaging as he was, had an extraordinary sense of what he was trying to accomplish. And I can recall, I’ll give you one anecdote with maybe a little bonus. In August of 1981, I was charge in Beijing. I took in several visitors to see Deng Xiaoping, one of whom was Charlie Wick who was the head of USIA at the time. The other was Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court. Deng Xiaoping, in the course of the conversation, said flatly, when the history of our country is written, Mao Zedong will be seen as my precursor. The real revolution began three years ago. And he had a sense of destiny and his role in it. And I think history will be kinder to him as the architect of modern China than Win suggests.

The second anecdote is Charlie Wick, for some reason, was trying to get radio transmitters installed in Xinjiang to broadcast all over Central Asia and the Soviet Union, and in order to persuade Deng Xiaoping of this, proceeded to try to convince him of the evils of Soviet communism. And Deng Xiaoping interrupted him, and this is the blunt part, and said, young man, Charlie was only in his 60s, I think, he said, young man, at age 23, I was secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, and I was purged because of my opposition to Soviet communism. And that happened to me two other times. And there is no need for you to tell me about the evils of Soviet communism. Now, what do you really want? And then we had a discussion. But the man had a way of cutting through what a lot of people don’t and coming straight to the point and letting you know exactly where you stand.
MR. SCOWCROFT: If I could just add one point, I do agree with Win that he’s a mixed record figure, but I think my sense is he is the true revolutionary in China, not Mao. Mao was a sort of continuation of the imperial thing. Deng changed things. And when he decided that the stability of the country, the stability of the regime, depended on economic progress, on giving the average Chinese a sense that his life was getting better, his standard of living was going up, that was the real revolution in China. And when he said, you know, to get rich is glorious, they have followed through on that. And that is why China is the powerhouse it is now. Now that is creating its own problems because the Communist Party out in the field and so on still believe his dictum, to get rich is glorious, so they’re cooperating with the local government people to seize land and sell it to developers and so on, because they’re being judged on how much is your province producing in terms of increased GNP. So he’s creating enormous problems now. But I think he, more than any other individual, is responsible for the China today.

MR. SUSSER: Just a more general question. What were, I guess, your expectations before you made these trips? Before the first trip, before the normalization trip? And how did the results measure up with your expectations beforehand? From your perspectives were these total successes, or did it not quite go as you had expected, or did you have any expectations?

MR. LORD: Well, if we could start chronologically with the first secret trip, the Nixon trip, it certainly exceeded everyone’s expectations, and they were quite large, of the positive reaction, not only around the world, but in the United States. As I said earlier, Nixon and Kissinger were still fretting on the way back on the plane how this was going to be received in the U.S. And so, in that respect, although I thought they figured it would be very positive generally in the world, they were worried about the domestic reaction. And that was very positive. There were some people worried about it, but on the whole, as I said, it put Vietnam into context and it was a dramatic way to show that we were not crippled by that war, et cetera.

Japan’s reaction, I think, was predictable and I think could have been moderated somewhat, but sort of like Taiwan, that was inevitable. I think the biggest positive impact which we didn’t predict by any means, fully, was the impact on the Soviets. We were trying to open up with China precisely to improve relations with the Soviets, not to hurt them. But I don’t think
anyone thought that within a matter, literally, of months, in some cases weeks, we just moved ahead across the board with the Soviets, on Berlin, on arms control, on economic agreements, and on a summit meeting.

Finally, on Vietnam, the other key issue and expectation, I think the president always put more weight, particularly with the Russians helping us, on Vietnam. And to a certain extent, the Chinese and Kissinger, who thought they probably wouldn’t. So I think the results in Vietnam were about what we would have expected, namely that they wouldn’t cut off aid to their lips-and-teeth ally. We didn’t realize fully just how bad relations were, and they were in a competition with Moscow.

But we did feel, and I think they did weigh in and it helped modestly, in Hanoi, along the following lines. Look, the Americans have made an offer to get out, and we made this offer of a cease-fire and withdrawal unilaterally and prisoners of war were being returned in May ’71. We kept emphasizing to the Chinese, and I think they relayed to Hanoi that this was a significant achievement for them. The Chinese felt, I think, and we would tell them this, Kissinger explicitly and Nixon, that if we go further and overthrow Thieu and put in a coalition government, which was the Vietnamese demand until late ’72, and then they finally moved because they saw McGovern wasn’t going to get in and Nixon was going to be there again. This would humiliate the U.S. We’d be less able to balance the Soviet Union and China’s own interest. Furthermore, as Smyser pointed out, it was in China’s interest to get this war over with. Competition with the Russians, and it was ideologically awkward for us to be fighting their supposed ally right near their borders.

So for all these reasons, we hoped that China would help. It was a modest help, but not insignificant. And therefore the expectations, I think, were mixed. In some cases, we did better than we thought. Other cases, not as well. But over the long run, of course, the full promise in the distant horizon of this relationship has been more than fulfilled in a very positive sense.

MR. FREEMAN: Just one comment. Counselor Zelikow in his talk quoted the State Department drafted response to NSSM 14. That was actually drafted by the late Paul Krissburg. And as you will recall, the point was to speculate in August of 1969, contrary to the conventional wisdom at
the time, that the United States might actually benefit by the end of Chinese isolation, and the inclusion of China in the regional and international system.

I think it’s fair to say that the greatest success and the greatest surprise of American policy going back to those early days is the amazing extent to which that happened. China, which in 1971 and ’72 was full of billboards announcing that the people want liberation and revolution and whatnot, which was involved with the Puerto Rican independence movement and all kinds of other troublemaking all over the place. And with the Khmer Rouge, as well as with the Vietnamese communist party, and which was an enemy of the status quo, explicitly demanding its overthrow, has been peacefully integrated into the global system; is now a member of every major international organization. And somewhat ironically, if I may make a comment in 2006, it is more of a defender of the global status quo than the United States, and therefore, less of a source of international stability.

So this peaceful integration of China, or the transformation of China from outlaw to supporter of the status quo, given the weight of China in world affairs, and particularly its weight as it has grown in recent years, is an amazing, absolutely amazing, achievement that no one would have predicted, however much, whatever we smoked back in 1972.

MR. SUSSER: A little more general. How would you compare – several of the panelists mentioned Mao’s tendency to speak in broad strokes with kind of poetic allusions, and Ambassador Freeman, you referred to the 41 signals being sent between Beijing and Washington. How would you compare dealing with the Chinese as opposed to dealing with the Russians or West Europeans, or so on?

MR. LORD: Well, during this period, as I mentioned with the Chinese, we had very dramatic developments with the Russians as well. The difference in the two relationships was with Russia we had a lot of concrete issues to negotiate: arms control, economics, principles of international relations, and so there was an actual full agenda. With the Chinese, it was more, as Brzezinski said, first kiss. I won’t carry that any further. (Chuckles) He’s exhausted that subject. (Laughter)

But, the fact is, it was more conceptual and we had to sort of reassure each other what our mutual interests were and sketch the longer-term trends. So, by definition, you didn’t have concrete agreements. That’s one reason
we kept briefing the Chinese on Soviet relations with us. One, to reassure them that we weren’t doing anything behind their back, but also to make the Chinese nervous that we had a lot of concrete agreements with the Soviets and we didn’t have them with the Chinese. So it was designed to spur the Chinese to have good relations, even as it worked the other way with the Russians.

Now in terms of style, this may be somewhat exaggerated, and certainly is no longer true today, necessarily. But, in the early ’70s, there’s no question that Kissinger and Nixon found the Chinese style much more pleasant and attractive and easy, not easy, but at least reliable to deal with than the Russians. With the Russians, the feeling was you were dealing with rug merchants. And they would come in and they would inflate greatly their opening position from what they really needed, and bargain, like in the bazaar, until you got down to your bottom line. So you never quite knew when you got to the bottom line (Chuckles) of the other side. It could be unpleasant. There were instances when we’d reach an agreement, for example on arms control in May 1971, and it was published. The Russians would do their own translation and sort of stick it to us a little bit in ways that were not very pleasant.

With the Chinese, and again, this maybe has been romanticized in retrospect, it certainly is no longer true, but at the time, the general approach was to lay out what they really needed at the beginning, their bottom line, and in effect say we have these principles. We’ve got to respect these principles. But then to be flexible on details and tactics within that framework. Can’t have a two China policy, can’t have two embassies in Washington. Fine. You have an embassy and a liaison office, which is an embassy in everything but name.

And so Kissinger and Nixon felt that with the Chinese it was a more pleasant process than with the Soviets. That you could figure out what they really needed and get quickly to a possible compromise, in contrast to the Russians.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Now, I would just add that I think with the Chinese, there was no common background. We were coming out of two decades of total isolation. We had no communications with them. So we didn’t know what they were like; they didn’t know what we were like. So a lot of it, I don’t disagree with anything that Win has said, but it was this kind
of feeling our way and getting acquainted with each other. How did each one feel about this problem and the other?

With the Soviets, on the other hand, it was a fundamentally hostile approach. We didn’t like each other. We made it clear we didn’t like each other. We were there because we thought there were practical things we could do to improve and reduce the dangers and tensions in the relationship. But there was no fundamental spirit of give and take. There was no trust, anything. This was the hardest of hardhead negotiations.

And of course, for the Europeans it was different from either one of those. We had common backgrounds. We worked with each other over, and over, and over again. So it was a much more congenial kind of approach.

MR. FREEMAN: With China we had an arranged marriage. That marriage, that relationship was not driven by affection at the outset. There was no affection. It was a very cold-blooded decision on both sides. But as we began to interact, we discovered affection, and maybe more than that. Because as Tiananmen showed, we emotionally had too much invested in China. You have to have illusions to be disillusioned.

The second point I’d make is that the Chinese have a very distinctive negotiating style. In fact, I was reminded of this the other day. I met someone in the intelligence community here who told me that a memo I’d written during this period on Chinese negotiating style was declassified. And apparently it was sent, it was one of the things that was re-typed, rather than be on Department of State briefing paper. And the basic points that I made were precisely those that Win and Brent have made, that the Chinese approach principles quite differently from concrete arrangements.

Principles are strategic goals, which are immutable. Concrete arrangements are ways to accomplish common purposes consistent with those strategic goals. It is a very distinctive style, and I think described later by Dick Solomon in a book done through Rand, and it has really nothing in common with European or Russian styles. And Americans tend to find it rather appealing.

MR. SUSSER: Speaking of the Russians, how much do you feel the Chinese feared the Soviets? Were they, in effect, using us to move the Soviets, the way we were using the Chinese to move the Soviets?
MR. LORD: Well, the quick answer is yes and no. Yes, the Soviets were a factor, and they wanted, as I said earlier, the (unintelligible) to help balance them off against the Soviets and to restrain the Soviets around the world. But theirs was more defensive vis-à-vis Russia, because they’re so much weaker. In our case, we were using the Chinese to try to make progress concretely with the Russians. So that’s the major difference. But clearly, that was in the Chinese mind, and the Soviet factor and the anti-hegemony clause in the Shanghai communiqué was the single most motivating force. But there were many other reasons on both sides that I mentioned earlier.

While I’ve got the mike on, the negotiating styles, one of the strengths of Nixon and Kissinger, and they had their flaws like everyone else, but their ability, particularly because Kissinger had more detail negotiations, to adjust to their interlocutor style, culture and history, even if they weren’t experts. Henry was essentially a European expert. He didn’t know that much about Asia. But he quickly stole the Chinese style that we’ve described. He knew how to deal with the Russian style, and then if he’s with the Arabs, it would be more romantic and you’ve got to save face. With the Israelis, understandably given their history and their insecurities, were like Talmudic scholars going over the last detail to make sure they got what they needed.

I remember once in the shuttle, we were with Golda Meir and the others, and they gave us 10 compromises to get out of Sadat. We went to Cairo, got nine out of 10, came back and the Israelis complained about the 10th the entire time.

And the Vietnamese, of course, just try to wear you down. And they didn’t negotiate at all, until they saw that they had to deal with this madman Nixon for another four years, and not McGovern, and they suddenly got more flexible.

MR. FREEMAN: I think the Chinese, and particularly Deng Xiaoping, became increasingly uncomfortable with our use of them to put pressure on the Soviet Union. And as the 1980s began to increase Chinese leverage in its own right, they began to play the same game using us more and more against the Russians. Fair enough.
MR. SUSSER: Time’s just about up. Would you each like to take a minute or two just to sum up? Final observations.

General Scowcroft?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I’ll make just one comment I haven’t made before, and that is about the whole Chinese negotiating style. The Chinese came out of a period of almost total isolation. They were autarkic by nature. They were autarkic by design. They thought they were self-sufficient. They didn’t need any outside communications and so on, so we started the relationship on purely bilateral kinds of affairs and issues. And that has gradually changed, but I think as Philip Zelikow said referring to Bob Zoellick and the responsible stakeholder. What is happening now is the Chinese are beginning to engage us on issues that are not purely bilateral, that are general, worldwide or regional issues. This has been a gradual development over this entire period. And I think that while you can look at the Chinese as being reluctant negotiators, I think they’re gradually moving out and gradually becoming a stakeholder in the world as they become more dependent for both imports and exports and other things on what goes on in the world. They are a long way from there, but I think that’s the evolution that’s taking place in Chinese diplomacy.

MR. FREEMAN: I think when you read this record, and when the record of subsequent negotiations, particularly those bearing on the Taiwan issue are released; I mean, the normalization negotiations; I mean, the August 1982 communiqué negotiations, you will draw the conclusion that the United States has broken almost every commitment we made to the Chinese over the course of the succeeding period. The fact that there has been great progress on the Taiwan issue and that, as I said in the outset, I believe it is moving toward resolution, owes a great deal to Chinese statecraft and patience, and less to our fidelity to our friends or our word. So, there are interesting things to be discovered in these documents, and I’m sure you’ll enjoy them.

MR. SUSSER: Ambassador Lord, you were the first one into China. You get the last word.

MR. LORD: Okay. I was going to make some other comments, but that was a real bombshell at the end, and maybe we can pursue it. I don’t know whether Chas is going to be here tomorrow. I don’t want to leave it at
that. I think that’s unfair to seven American presidents. I think it’s wrong. I think we have stretched some commitments, particularly arms sales to Taiwan. No doubt about that. We did somersaults to continue to justify the quality and quantity of arms sales. But to sit here and say that America has not kept its word, is not only inaccurate, I think it’s very damaging for an audience like that to hear that unsubstantiated.

So we ought to continue that. Of course we stretched it. So have the Chinese. But I continue to believe that seven presidents of both parties have pursued remarkable diplomacy, with all the inevitable ups and downs. This is always going to be a sweet and sour relationship. The fact is, we’ve moved ahead with China and Taiwan has flourished. And we’ve done it by sticking to basic principles, occasionally stretching it. The Chinese, in turn, have done the same. And I think we should leave this on a much more positive note than suggesting the United States has not kept its word.

MR. SUSSER: Thank you, gentlemen. A fascinating two hours. Thank you. We are adjourned today.
Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations: New Strains and Changes

Kerry Dumbaugh

Importance of Taiwan for U.S. Interests

Taiwan has importance for U.S. political and security interests that is greater than might be expected given its lack of official relations with the United States. The political and international status of Taiwan has remained a key issue for U.S. foreign policy and a critical point of contention in U.S.-China relations. In important respects, what happens in Taiwan and between Taiwan and the PRC has direct impact on U.S. policy decisions and on U.S. security interests.

The fundamental framework of U.S. policy toward Taiwan was laid down decades ago, beginning with the Nixon opening to the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 that resulted in the severing of official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1979. U.S. policy toward Taiwan since then has been defined by four primary documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8, enacted in 1979); and three U.S. communiques with the PRC: the Shanghai Communique (1972); the Communique on Normalization of Relations with the PRC (1979); and the August 17 Communique on Arms Sales to Taiwan (1982). In addition, U.S. policy has been shaped during these decades by a combination of other factors. Among these are a set of six policy assurances the United States gave Taiwan in the 1980s; the precedents set by a collection of sensitive “guidelines on Taiwan” that the executive branch has adopted to define and constrain its actions; a variety of statements by successive U.S. Administrations about the nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the PRC; and periodic initiatives by Members of Congress intended to affect U.S. policy in some way.

But while this fundamental framework remains the basis of U.S. policy today, many other aspects of the relationships have changed dramatically. U.S. economic and political relations with the PRC have grown more sophisticated and more strategically complex. The PRC itself is
a rising global economic power that scarcely resembles the country it was at the Nixon opening in the 1970's. Taiwan, once an authoritarian government under martial law and one-party rule, has become a fully functioning democracy with political pluralism.

The dramatic evolutions in China and Taiwan are posing challenges to the long-standing precepts that still serve as the bedrock of U.S. policy toward both governments. Many hold that the very constancy of the U.S. policy framework itself is crucial in managing the increasingly complex U.S. relations with both governments; they argue it needs to be maintained. Others have suggested that as the PRC and Taiwan have evolved, the original U.S. policy framework has stultified and grown increasingly irrelevant; they argue it needs to be reassessed.

This report will examine U.S. policy toward Taiwan within the context of the challenges now confronting it.\(^4\) The resources used in this analysis include news media reports within Taiwan, the United States, and the PRC; official U.S. government reports and press statements; and studies from think tanks and other policy analysts. Additional analysis was obtained from a series of discussions with senior government officials in Taiwan at the highest levels and a series of discussions with relevant parties in the United States. The latter included meetings with current and former U.S. government officials with direct responsibility for Taiwan policy; with various political representatives of Taiwan in Washington; and with noted experts at Washington think tanks and in academia.\(^5\)

The Taiwan issue in U.S. policy is extraordinarily complex and nuanced, and the analysis in this report may not portray the entire range of views, variables, or options that exist about Taiwan and its relations with the

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\(^4\) Other aspects of Taiwan as a political issue are covered in other CRS reports: current developments in Taiwan in CRS Report RL33510; the political history of Taiwan’s situation in CRS Report RS22388; and the evolution of the “one China” policy among all 3 governments in CRS Report RL30341.

\(^5\) Discussions for this report included meetings in Taiwan with members of the Legislative Yuan, with senior government officials at the highest levels, and with U.S. officials at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei. Meetings and other input from sources in the United States included: Jeff Bader, Richard Bush, Nat Bellocchi, Coen Blaauw, Michael Fonte, Bonnie Glaser, Mike Lampton, Randy Schriver, Robert Sutter, John Tkacik, Steve Yates, Jason Yuan, current U.S. government officials, and current House and Senate staff.
United States. Nevertheless, this report does convey important findings of direct relevance to U.S. policy interests and to congressional concerns.

**Possibility of Cross-strait Confrontation**

Although the PRC frequently iterates that its intentions are to assure a peaceful resolution to the ultimate status of Taiwan, Chinese leaders have not foresworn the possibility of using force to unify Taiwan with mainland China. To drive home this point, the PRC on March 14, 2005, adopted an anti-secession law to bolster its assertion with statutory authority. Moreover, PRC anxieties over Taiwan’s status increase whenever either the Taiwan or U.S. governments takes an action that Beijing feels impinges on its sovereignty claims over Taiwan. This dynamic, combined with China’s threat to use force against Taiwan, the growing economic and strategic importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and continuing U.S. security interests in Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), make cross-strait conflict between Taiwan and the PRC a dangerous possibility for U.S. and global interests.

While the TRA does not mandate the U.S. defense of Taiwan, it does specify that an attack on Taiwan would be of “grave concern” to the United States, and it provides for continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for its own defense. In addition, Japan’s growing security concerns have prompted it to join the United States in outlining a more comprehensive vision of the U.S.-Japan alliance that for the first time includes peace in the Taiwan Strait as a “common strategic objective.” This suggests that a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait could expand to include not only the United States but other regional powers.

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4 Reportedly former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that the decision on whether to commit U.S. forces to the defense of Taiwan will rest with Congress. “U.S. defense of Taiwan would be Congress’ decision,” *Taipei Times*, December 22, 2004, p. 1.

8 The goal of peaceful resolutions in both the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula was mentioned as joint U.S.-Japan objectives at the “2 + 2” meeting in February 2005. See CRS Report RL33436, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*, p. 12.
Two further uncertainties are now complicating U.S. policy on the cross-strait stability issue: the matter of where a provocation to cross-strait hostility may come from, and questions about Taiwan’s commitment to its own self-defense. In terms of the former, the traditional focus — one that is implied in the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act and in Department of Defense reports on cross-strait stability — is on hostile PRC intent that culminates in unanticipated and unprovoked PRC military operations against Taiwan. Under this scenario, many observers anticipate that U.S. military involvement at some level would be likely. But in recent years, Bush Administration officials increasingly have been willing to shift part of this burden to Taiwan, warning both the PRC and the Taiwan governments against taking unilateral provocative acts. This shift has led some to question potential U.S. military involvement in a cross-strait crisis that is perceived to be caused by Taiwan’s own political processes.\(^9\)

The second uncertainty — Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense — arises from Taiwan’s inability so far to pass a defense budget that accommodates the sizeable weapons sale President Bush authorized in April 2001. Many U.S. observers tend to see passage of the defense budget as a test to prove Taiwan is sufficiently committed to self-defense.\(^10\) Some U.S. officials have expressed disappointment that the U.S. desire to help Taiwan defend itself appears to be outstripping Taiwan’s own.\(^11\) In addition, U.S. military experts have grown more concerned about the prospect of conflict scenarios in the Taiwan Strait that unfold faster than the United States’ ability to respond — scenarios that place further importance on the preparedness of Taiwan’s own military forces.\(^12\)

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\(^9\) Such speculation, for instance, has been voiced in Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, March 7, 2006; House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Asia Subcommittee hearings, March 8, 2006; and HIRC hearings on May 10, 2006.

\(^10\) Taiwan observers, on the other hand, question the appropriateness and cost-benefits of the U.S. weapons systems offered, and appear to view positive action on the proffered package as a political necessity to ensure good relations with the United States. Interviews with Taiwan officials in 2006; “Security through procurement? The debate over Taiwan’s defense spending,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 27, 2005.

\(^11\) “Perhaps because America has moved with speed to meet the new [PRC military] challenge, many of Taiwan’s friends in the United States regret that Taipei has failed to respond in kind.” Statement by Clifford Hart, Jr., Director, Office of Taiwan Coordination, Department of State, in remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, September 12, 2006.

\(^12\) Interview with former U.S. Government official, July 5, 2006.
Taiwan’s Importance as a Viable Democracy

Some U.S. and Taiwan observers also cite more strategic policy grounds for the United States to support Taiwan’s importance and viability as a distinct political and democratic entity. A failure of the Taiwan polity or the effective absorption of Taiwan by the giant PRC economy would mean the loss of U.S. military contacts with Taiwan. It might also lead to a loss of the leverage the United States now enjoys with the PRC because of the Taiwan issue, and would complicate the U.S. “hedging strategy” with Beijing.\(^\text{13}\)

Both U.S. and Taiwan observers also emphasize the political importance for the United States of Taiwan as an Asian model for democratic development, particularly as a model for future PRC governance. For this reason alone, they say, the Taiwan democratic state cannot be allowed to fail, nor can the United States afford to allow the PRC to denigrate Taiwan’s democratic government into mere populism. In their view, such an event would undermine U.S. credibility about its commitment to democratic principles.\(^\text{14}\) Taiwan officials themselves profess bewilderment that the United States does not more assertively defend Taiwan democracy, given the emphasis of and the resources committed by the Bush Administration to “global democratization” efforts.

Taiwan’s Importance for U.S. Leadership in Asia

Relatedly, how effectively the United States handles the Taiwan issue with the PRC could have important consequences for continued U.S. leadership in Asia and possibly around the world. The U.S. commitment to democracy, its history of relations with and support for Taiwan, and Taiwan’s importance as a U.S. “defense and intelligence partner,”\(^\text{15}\) according to some, significantly raise the stakes of a U.S. policy “failure.” If U.S. officials are seen as unable to manage the cross-strait issue in a way

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\(^\text{13}\) The U.S. “hedging strategy” is commonly defined as the cultivation of a middle position to avoid having to choose between one side or the other.

\(^\text{14}\) Coen Blaauw, Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA), September 20, 2006.

that avoids a coercive PRC approach to Taiwan, then U.S. regional leadership might be questioned and support for it undermined.

Likewise, if the United States is seen to be accommodating to PRC interests in absorbing democratic Taiwan, U.S. friends and allies in Asia could view the United States as a weaker power and less reliable than in the past. Asian democracies and smaller Asian nations could decide that the United States is not likely to be there for them in the event of hostile action from China. They and American Asian allies may be inclined to recalculate their own political and economic alignments in such a way that would give more weight to PRC concerns, creating a “geopolitical realignment in the Western Pacific.”

For instance, PRC absorption of Taiwan might well spur Japan’s military rearmament — possibly including the consideration of building nuclear weapons — and possibly raise others questions in Japan about the reliability of the U.S. shield. Taiwan’s absorption into the PRC also would expand the PRC’s naval-air projection into the Western Pacific and potentially key sea-lanes important to Japan.

**Changing Environment for U.S. Policy**

The basic components of the U.S. policy framework regarding Taiwan were adopted when Taiwan was still under martial law and the Taiwan government remained a one-party system. But Taiwan’s situation began to change in the late 1980s when the government ended martial law and legalized opposition political parties. In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, a contest won by Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese and the leader of the long dominant Nationalist or “Kuomintang” (KMT) Party. But the real change in Taiwan politics occurred in 2000, when a hotly contested three-way presidential race ended in the election of Chen Shui-bian, a member of a new opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The DPP’s electoral success in Taiwan has presented the Bush Administration with some unique challenges. President Chen’s stunning

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16 Tkacik, John, Ibid.
upset of the long dominant KMT in a true democratic contest is viewed by many as a resounding validation of the U.S. Administration’s ideals and hopes for democratic development in Asia and elsewhere around the world. On the other hand, as the DPP is a party that supports Taiwan’s independence from the PRC, key aspects of its political platform conflict with long-standing U.S. policy statements in the three U.S.-PRC communiques and elsewhere — policy statements that oppose unilateral changes in the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, that appear unwilling to support Taiwan independence aspirations, and that base the U.S. “one-China” policy on the “acknowledgment” of Chinese claims that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it.17 As such, the positions and actions of the DPP at times have complicated U.S. policy toward both Taiwan and the PRC.

Along with these changes in Taiwan have been equally important changes in the PRC that have further complicated U.S. policy. While in 1979 the Chinese military had little capacity to threaten or attack Taiwan, its military modernization since then has given it a range of new coercive options, any of which might lead to military confrontation between U.S. and PRC forces. The PRC’s growing global role and increased importance for U.S. interests suggest to many Americans that the U.S. future will be tied to the PRC economy, for good or ill, and affected deeply by PRC economic, political, and strategic interests. This also represents a significant difference from the dynamics of U.S.-PRC relations at the outset of their official relationship in 1979. The PRC also has remained an authoritarian, one-party state under Communist Party rule, with PRC leaders unwilling to brook criticism or permit political opposition. The changes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have contributed to complications for U.S. policy.

**New Factors Affecting U.S. Policy**

While the rise of China and its growing importance for U.S. interests has clearly presented a challenge for U.S. policy toward Taiwan, it is not the only factor doing so. Many factors now vexing U.S.-Taiwan relations are a consequence of political developments in Taiwan, while others are the result of changes in the United States.

17 The history of interpretation of the U.S. “one-China” policy is a nuanced and complex one not easily described here. For details, see CRS Report RL30341, *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei*, by Shirley Kan.
Problems Between Bush and Chen Administrations

For U.S. policymakers in the Bush Administration, what they view as President Chen Shui-bian’s unpredictable political style reportedly has become somewhat problematic for U.S.-Taiwan relations and for the White House’s view of the Taiwan government. This represents a change from the early months of the Chen Administration, when initial U.S. concern over the new government’s independence aspirations was eased by President Chen’s moderate tone, his apparent openness to engagement with the PRC, and his embrace of the “five noes” to encompass Taiwan’s policy toward the PRC.¹⁸

Differing Definitions of the “Status Quo”. U.S. and Taiwan officials routinely and publicly state that their primary interest is to maintain the status quo between Taiwan and the PRC. But the Taiwan and U.S. governments have fundamentally different interpretations of what the status quo is, making mutual reassurances on the subject of questionable significance. U.S. official statements are interpreted as maintaining that: the “status quo” means Taiwan’s political status remains unresolved pending a solution mutually reached by Taiwan and the PRC; that the PRC will not use force against Taiwan; that the United States will continue arms sales and military contacts with Taiwan; and that neither the PRC nor Taiwan will make unilateral changes that could destabilize the situation in the Taiwan strait. When U.S. officials warn Taiwan against changing the status quo, it is this set of factors to which they are referring. But to the Chen Administration in Taiwan, the “status quo” is that Taiwan is already an independent, sovereign state. The Chen government’s assurances that it is indeed adhering to the status quo are based on an assumption that the issue of Taiwan’s political status is already settled.¹⁹

¹⁸ President Chen Shui-bian’s Inaugural Speech, May 20, 2000. The so-called “five noes” pledge is the following: “Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue.”

¹⁹ President Chen is not the first Taiwan president to make this assertion. His predecessor, President Lee Teng-hui, now head of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, the DPP’s coalition partner, also asserted that Taiwan was a de facto independent sovereign state. President Chen has continued and elaborated on this assertion during his tenure.
The “Credibility” Issue. According to U.S. experts interviewed for this report, the positive atmosphere in Bush-Chen Administration relations began to melt away in August 2002 when President Chen gave a video conference in which he stated that there was one country on either side of the Taiwan Strait — or “yi bian, yi guo,” (“one side, one country”). The Bush White House at this juncture reportedly began to see the Taiwan leadership as more inclined to put personal political interests ahead of more strategic objectives and U.S. concerns.

For U.S. Government officials, President Chen’s “yi bian, yi guo” statement of August 2002 was only the first of a series of Taiwan statements and decisions issued unexpectedly and without apparent regard for U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{20} The surprises included President Chen’s announcement on September 28, 2003, that he planned to hold a referendum on a new constitution for Taiwan; a 2004 New Year’s Day speech in which the President defined the territory of the ROC as encompassing only 36,000 square kilometers and including only its 23 million residents;\textsuperscript{21} the holding of an island-wide referendum in March 2004 on aspects of Taiwan’s defensive strategy against the PRC; a 2005 New Year’s Day speech in which the President toughened the Taiwan position on cross-strait contacts; and the President’s January 2006 decision (and its subsequent implementation) that the symbolically important National Unification Council (NUC) would be abolished or would “cease to function.” According to several former U.S. Government officials, the Chen Administration’s relationship with the Bush White House was “fatally hurt” by Chen’s “yi bian, yi guo” statement and his subsequent statements and actions.\textsuperscript{22}

The NUC cessation case appeared to spark additional concern for U.S. officials, who had worked to persuade Chen to scrap or modify his proposal.\textsuperscript{23} The softer formulation of the language in Chen’s final February

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Under the “one China” scenario, the claimed territory and jurisdiction of the ROC on Taiwan includes all of mainland China and its 1.3 billion residents. Suggesting that Taiwan’s boundaries and authority instead are limited to the island’s territory itself and its 23 million residents suggests Taiwan independence under a “one China, one Taiwan” scenario.

\textsuperscript{22} Interviews on May 22, 2006 and on June 7, 2006 with former U.S. Government officials.

\textsuperscript{23} For further details on the NUC case, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
27, 2006 decision — that the NUC would “cease to function” instead of being abolished — was regarded as President Chen’s compromise with U.S. concern about the decision’s cross-strait implications. After months of U.S. pressure, President Chen in June 2006 publicly reaffirmed his repeated assurances to maintain the status quo.\textsuperscript{24} But despite these renewed assurances, some U.S. observers perceive some subsequent statements and actions of the DPP and President Chen himself to be outside the spirit of the status quo pledges. These statements and actions include: repeated public references that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country totally separate from the PRC; public support for seeking full membership in the United Nations under the name of “Taiwan” (from the President’s public message addressing a DPP gathering on September 28, 2006, the party’s 20th anniversary); and the DPP’s support for a new Taiwan national anthem and national flag, which would change the current anthem and flag from those of the Republic of China.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Perception of Mixed Messages.} According to officials in Taiwan, relations between the Chen and Bush Administrations at this juncture also were plagued by what many in the Chen Administration saw as confusing and mixed U.S. messages to Taiwan that included both words of caution and expressions of support.\textsuperscript{26} While a number of observers tend to agree that U.S. policy toward Taiwan was not served well in 2002-2003 by the ambiguous U.S. messages, some also say that Taiwan shares the blame for emphasizing the more favorable parts of the U.S. message and downplaying the less favorable parts.\textsuperscript{27} Still, after the “yi bian, yi guo” statement, many of the public messages that U.S. officials were conveying to Taiwan turned decidedly cautionary, a change in tone that Taiwan officials apparently

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} “Senior Taiwan officials’ comments on National Unification Council,” State Department press statement, March 2, 2006. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/62488.htm
\item \textsuperscript{25} President Chen publicly took a contrary position to this DPP view at an event in Taiwan in May 2006, singing the current national anthem and bowing to the national flag. Ko Shu-ling, “Chen comes out in support of anthem...”, \textit{Taipei Times}, May 14, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Examples in 2003 include a strong statement of support for President Chen by AIT Chair Theresa Shaheen and an apparently misinterpreted message by NSC Asia Director James Moriarty.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Interview with a former U.S. government official, June 7, 2006.
\end{itemize}
either missed or chose to ignore. In Washington on December 9, 2003, standing next to visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, President Bush used unusually blunt public language to criticize Chen Shui-bian, saying “....the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally that change the status quo, which we oppose.”

The tough U.S. statements continued with comments in April 2004 by Vice President Dick Cheney, who while visiting the PRC stated, “We oppose unilateral efforts on either side to try to alter the current set of circumstances...” Also in April 2004, pointed language on Taiwan was delivered in congressional testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly in April 2004, aimed at both Taiwan and China. By most accounts, the mixed signals have stopped and Bush Administration officials have regained control and consistency of the U.S. message being communicated to Taiwan. Despite the new message clarity, however, some see Taiwan as continuing to ignore U.S. concerns.

**Other Communication Problems.** A related theme affecting U.S.-Taiwan relations is the broader issue of the level and extent of bilateral communications, an issue on which Taiwan and the U.S. executive branch appear to disagree sharply. Officials of the Chen and Bush Administrations also have differing views of the symbolic implications of some communications with Taiwan.

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28 According to one former U.S. government official, Chen felt “betrayed” by President Bush’s December 2003 comment in light of the positive messages he felt he had been getting from other U.S. sources.

29 The Vice President’s comments were in response to a question about Taiwan during a speech he gave at the PRC’s Fudan University in Shanghai on April 15, 2004.

30 Testimony by James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, in hearings before the House International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004.

31 This was the case, for instance, over the March 2006 visit to Washington by KMT head and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou. According to the Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Joseph Jaushieh Wu, many in the Taiwan government thought Ma had been given a higher level reception than President Chen or other Taiwan government officials, implying that the United States favored the KMT head over the DPP government. Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, refuted this charge in congressional hearings, saying that under the “one China” policy the United States can work more easily with Taiwan citizens who are not government officials.
The Taiwan View. Senior officials in the Taiwan government believe that the United States needs to establish more routine higher-level contacts with Taiwan, along the order of the visits of Mike Green (a National Security Council, or NSC, specialist who met with a Taiwan official in Washington in January 2006) and Dennis Wilder (an NSC Asia specialist who reportedly made a secret visit to Taiwan in mid-February 2006). U.S. visits, according to Taiwan officials, should be conducted at a level higher than that of the Director of the State Department’s Office of Taiwan Coordination. Taiwan officials say that Washington needs to establish better and more direct channels specifically with President Chen, although Steve Young, the new U.S. AIT director who assumed his post in 2006, appears to have been given high early marks for establishing such contact. Many on the Taiwan side appear anxious that U.S.-Taiwan communications have eroded in some ways through a combination of circumstances; they are concerned that Taiwan now has an “image problem” in the United States.

The U.S. View. U.S. officials, on the other hand, paint a very different picture with respect to U.S.-Taiwan communications. They maintain that Taiwan’s assertions that the United States does not communicate regularly and clearly are disingenuous at best. U.S. officials see themselves as communicating with Taiwan constantly, at every level of government but the very highest. According to a U.S. State Department official, U.S. communication with Taiwan, including the bilateral military dialogue, compares favorably with — and in some cases is better than — U.S. diplomatic and military communications with its own formal regional allies.

Moreover, say U.S. officials, U.S. messages to Taiwan officials are portrayed clearly as being from the “very highest level” of the U.S. Government and are conveyed “unambiguously.” For instance, according to one U.S. official, “there is no possibility — none” that the Taiwan government missed the content or the level of the U.S. message of concern about President Chen’s National Unification Council decision. That message reportedly was conveyed clearly early in 2006 by a delegation of U.S. Government officials sent to Taiwan by the White House. This

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32 One Taiwan official referred to the Green and Wilder talks in positive terms, saying the two had been “happy” with the official explanation of President Chen’s policies. This view was not shared by an AIT official. In 2006, the State Department Director for the Office of Taiwan Coordination is Clifford Hart.
delegation reportedly included Dennis Wilder (National Security Council), Clifford Hart (Department of State), and according to one account, two other senior U.S. officials from other U.S. Government departments. The problem, according to some U.S. officials, is not that Taiwan officials are not hearing the U.S. message, it is that they do not like the message they are hearing.

PRC Military Buildup and Taiwan Self-Defense Commitment.
The inability so far of Taiwan to take full advantage of a substantial U.S. military support package approved for sale in 2001 has become another increasing irritant in Taiwan-U.S. relations. To date, political infighting and finger-pointing has blocked legislative consideration of the arms procurement budget for purchasing much of the U.S. arms package. In 2002, U.S. officials began voicing concerns over what they described as weaknesses in Taiwan’s self-defense and a lagging pace to Taiwan’s arms purchases. According to a DOD report, Taiwan’s self-defense deficiencies include an “opaque military policymaking system; a ground force-centric orientation; and a conservative military leadership culture.” As the defense budget stalemate in Taiwan has continued, some U.S. officials have begun to question Taiwan’s level of commitment to its own defense, implying that perhaps U.S. policy should be reassessed accordingly.

33 The “Wilder/Hart” visit has been referred to in private conversations by both Taiwan and U.S. Government officials and was widely reported in the press. (See, for instance, Cody, Edward and Culpan, Tim, “Taiwan scraps council on unity with China,” Washington Post, February 28, 2006, p. A16; Tkacik, John, “Chen lets off steam,” Wall Street Journal Asia, March 1, 2006, p. 13; and Ko Shu-ling, “Chen to chair NSC meeting over NUC...” Taipei Times, February 27, 2006.) Despite the press reports, the “Wilder/Hart” visit has never been confirmed by the U.S. Government, nor has mention been made of the reported participation on the delegation of other U.S. Government officials.

34 In 2003, Taiwan’s legislature did approve $800 million for the purchase of the four Kidd-class destroyers. On December 8, 2005, the first two of these (now designated Keelung class) arrived at the Suao naval base in northeastern Taiwan after having been refurbished in South Carolina, reportedly by a Taiwanese work crew. The two destroyers were commissioned in a December 17, 2005 ceremony in Keelung. Taipei Times, December 19, 2005, p. 3.

35 The text of the 2003 DOD report can be found at: [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf].

36 In a 2005 speech to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council-Defense Industry Conference 2005, Ed Ross, Director of DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, strongly criticized Taiwan’s foot-dragging on passage of the defense budget, saying it was reasonable in such a situation to question the level of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense. Agence France-Presse, “Pentagon official warns Taiwan on defense spending,” September 21, 2005.
U.S. defense officials are especially concerned given the extraordinary and continuing PRC military buildup opposite the coast of Taiwan. In a May 2006 annual Department of Defense (DOD) report on PRC military power, Pentagon officials warned that the PRC’s continued military buildup created a “sense of urgency” that Taiwan military efforts did not seem to appreciate. The U.S. arms package, according to the report, had been specifically designed to “correct imbalances” in cross-strait military power. Given U.S. security interests in the defense of Taiwan and the possibility of U.S. military involvement in event of a PRC attack, Taiwan’s own stalling on the military budget appears to have become a significant problem for Bush Administration officials.

Taiwan Corruption Scandals. A new U.S. concern is the corruption scandal enveloping the Chen Administration, particularly after April 2006. President Chen is seen to have been grievously wounded by allegations of corruption, including allegations about members of his family and instances of malfeasance by government officials close to the President. The scandals have helped worsen Chen’s abysmally low approval rating, put at 16% in one survey on May 19, 2006, and have led to 3 recall efforts against him in 2006, all unsuccessful.37 In an effort to limit the damage, Chen on June 1, 2006, delegated authority for “day-to-day control” of the government to Premier Su Tseng-chang and has accepted the resignations of a number of his key advisors.

The Constitutional Reform Question. Constitutional reform has also proven a difficulty in recent years for Bush-Chen Administration relations. Reforming or amending the constitution is also controversial in Taiwan, with some defending it as a critical necessity to improve Taiwan governmental structures and others seeing it as a vehicle for consideration of sovereignty issues. While U.S. officials have expressed support for constitutional reform that would make Taiwan’s government processes work more effectively, they are concerned more broadly about the direction that constitutional reform in Taiwan may take. In particular, U.S. officials are concerned about what they see as the continuing aspirations of senior

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37 This result was obtained in a survey by Shih Hsin University. According to two separate polls conducted by the Chinese language daily the China Times and by Taipei’s United Daily News in late June 2006, Chen’s approval rating hovered in a 19%-22% range.
Taiwan officials and President Chen in particular to include in a revised constitution issues relating to sovereignty and Taiwan’s political status. In Taiwan, amendment of the constitution must be approved by two-thirds of the Taiwan legislature. Some U.S. officials have expressed concern that a sensitive constitutional proposal that fails in the legislature might be offered for public consideration in an island-wide referendum, circumventing the results of the legislative process and potentially antagonizing the PRC to take some retaliatory action.

**Fragmentation of the “Taiwan Lobby”**

In addition to tensions between the Bush and Chen Administrations, a second major factor affecting U.S.-Taiwan relations is the dissipation of the once powerful “Taiwan lobby” — which according to several knowledgeable observers is a pale shadow of its former self. The “Taiwan lobby” refers to the network of interests, dominated by the KMT and including influential members of the Taiwanese- and Chinese-American communities that maintained a sophisticated and unified lobbying effort in the United States on behalf of Taiwan government concerns.

Ironically, the decline of the Taiwan lobby can be traced to the development of full democracy and political pluralism in Taiwan, which began the erosion of the organized, unified KMT “machine” that once acted on behalf of Taiwan’s interests in the United States. As a consequence of political pluralization, there is no longer a single, coordinated “Taiwan” point of view presented to U.S. officials and Members of Congress. Now there are multiple Taiwan messages from a variety of messengers — often seeking to denigrate the requests or messages from the other sources. These multiple sources include: the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative office, or TECRO, Taiwan’s official representative in the United States; official representatives or consultants for each of the two major party coalitions in Taiwan; and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), which promotes international support for Taiwan democracy and independence. According to some congressional observers, the lack of a

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38 Such concern was expressed in a State Department briefing, for instance, on September 25, 2006.

39 This was a view generally shared by former and current U.S. government officials.
unified Taiwan message and the carrying on of Taiwan’s domestic political infighting in the congressional arena has had a negative affect in some congressional offices.

**Factors Within the U.S. Government**

A third set of factors influencing U.S. policy toward Taiwan involves circumstances within the U.S. Government and in the U.S. Congress. Critics and observers of U.S. Government policy toward Taiwan find fault with what they see as the “secretiveness” of U.S. policy actions toward and contacts with Taiwan. A few suggest that the various cabinet offices of the U.S. Government appear to have differing approaches to Taiwan and differing interpretations of U.S. interests there, based in part on their natural political missions and on their varying agendas with the PRC. Others point to waning congressional activity on Taiwan as another factor in U.S. policy now.

**Disagreements Over the Low Transparency in U.S. Policy.** The U.S. Government continues to embrace the efficacy of the fundamental U.S. policy framework on Taiwan — defined by one observer as “one-China, peaceful resolution, U.S. arms sales, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the 3 communiques.” The fundamental framework is the one constancy in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations; tamper with it, according to this observer, and you have a “disintegrating policy.” But other observers, including former U.S. officials and some Members of Congress, have criticized as excessive and unwarranted the U.S. secretiveness and substantive “inflexibility” on Taiwan issues. The U.S. Government maintains that senior U.S. officials are unable to have any contact with senior Taiwan officials because the United States does not recognize the government in Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese

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40 Several of those interviewed suggested that the Pentagon and the U.S. Pacific Command might be pursuing a “separate agenda” from the rest of the U.S. Government (in the words of one) or an “independent policy” (in the words of another) on Taiwan. (Interviews on June 5 and June 6, 2006). This concern appears to date from the reinstatement of active duty U.S. military officers in Taiwan in 2005, giving the U.S. military greater access than before to the Taiwan military from the Defense Ministry down to the unit level. Other observers, however, have remarked that the Pentagon’s relationship with Taiwan has significantly cooled due to the island’s failure to purchase the 2001 U.S. weapons package and to Taiwan’s development of offensive missile capabilities that some U.S. officials see as inherently destabilizing in the Taiwan Strait.

41 Interview with Jeffrey A. Bader, Ambassador and former U.S. Government official.
government — Taiwan’s claim when the Nixon Administration normalized relations with the PRC.

The “Taiwan Guidelines.” Some critics of this low U.S. policy profile mentioned in particular the secretive set of “Taiwan Guidelines” — a lengthy and closely held State Department memo written in 1979-1980 purporting to govern what U.S. officials can and cannot do or say with respect to Taiwan after the severance of official U.S.-Taiwan relations. The only acknowledged modification of the “Guidelines” since their original inception occurred during the Clinton Administration in 1993-1994, the principal change being the initiation of U.S. high-level engagement with Taiwan for economic entities.

The only public issuance of these modifications was given in the 1994 testimony of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Issue of Substantive Inflexibility. Some of those interviewed believe that there is room for more flexibility on the logistics of daily U.S. interaction with Taiwan. In their view, the United States could ease the constraints on U.S. interaction with Taiwan and make clear that routine practical interactions — such as higher-level working visits and permitting Taiwan officials into the State Department and the NSC, or more overt encouragement of cross-strait dialogue — have no implications for the U.S. “one China” policy. Some U.S. Government officials have attempted to test the limits of U.S. flexibility on Taiwan — such as inviting Taiwan representatives to more routine and personal events like swearing-ins. Even these small changes, however, were said to be difficult.

According to one former U.S. Government official interviewed on July 5, 2006, much pertaining to the “Guidelines” is simply commonly understood practice — such as that high State Department and other senior U.S. Government officials cannot go to Taiwan.

Some observers point out that the Taiwan Guidelines seem to have been bent on at least two other occasions without official modification — when U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, a cabinet officer, went to Taiwan in December 1992 to discuss U.S.-Taiwan trade ties, and when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in 1995 became the first Taiwan president since 1979 permitted to make a landmark “unofficial” visit to the United States.

Hearing on Taiwan Policy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee/East Asian and Pacific Affairs, September 27, 1994.

Interview with Randy Schriver, former U.S. Government official.
Reduced Congressional Role. Members of the U.S. Congress long have championed Taiwan’s democracy, economy, and international status as important for U.S. interests. Successive Congresses often pushed a more reluctant White House and executive branch agencies to go farther than they otherwise might have in supporting Taiwan’s interests.\(^46\)

But the congressional role on Taiwan issues overall is seen now to be less than it once was. U.S. State Department officials in 2006 report that they are feeling “less pressure from Congress” on executive branch decisions concerning Taiwan.\(^47\) Congressional staff following Taiwan issues have commented on the “drop-off” of congressional hearings on the subject and the mild congressional response, particularly in the Senate, to the U.S. decision in May 2006 to restrict President Chen’s transit stop to Alaska rather than allow stops in New York and San Francisco as he requested.\(^48\)

Some observers point out that the two FTA bills have not been acted on by the Committees they were referred to in either house and are sense-of-Congress resolutions rather than bills mandating action. In addition, Member and congressional staff delegation visits (codels and staffdels) to Taiwan — once a mainstay of Taiwan-congressional relations — now are significantly down while visits to the People’s Republic China are up.\(^49\)

There is no shortage of possible explanations for this reduced congressional role on Taiwan. One principal explanation is the continued failure of Taiwan to act on defense spending measures that would allow it to purchase U.S. weapons made available for sale in 2001. Over the years, Congress has been particularly active in pressuring U.S. officials to offer greater support for Taiwan’s self-defense.\(^50\) Many Members, then, strongly

\(^{46}\) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, (P.L. 96-8).

\(^{47}\) Interviews with State Department officials on May 23, 2006.

\(^{45}\) In May 2006 hearings before the full House International Relations Committee, Members did raise the transit issue with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick.

\(^{46}\) Quote from a congressional staffer interviewed on June 5, 2006.

\(^{47}\) Some in the 106th Congress raised special concerns about the consistency and credibility of U.S. defense commitments. Members introduced the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (S. 693, H.R. 1838 – not enacted), legislation declaring that to strengthen Taiwan’s security, the United States needs to sell higher-level weapons and enhance U.S.-Taiwan military communication and cooperation.
approved of the Bush Administration’s 2001 decision to approve a large weapons package for Taiwan. But Taiwan’s failure to act on this offer has effectively removed the arms sales issue as a regular vehicle for congressional leverage with executive branch officials on Taiwan matters.

Undoubtedly, reduced congressional attention also can be explained by the rising importance of China for U.S. interests. The range of the PRC’s conversation and interaction with the United States has expanded greatly from what it was in 1979. In comparison, the U.S.-Taiwan conversation and Taiwan’s practical involvement in day-to-day U.S. affairs appears smaller. Other explanations for declining congressional interest may include the disappearance in 2000 of the annual congressional debate over extending to China most-favored-nation status (MFN, now permanent normal trade relations, or PNTR), which occasionally served as a vehicle for expressions of congressional interest in Taiwan. Another factor is the 2004 enactment of P.L. 108-235, which made it a permanent annual requirement for the U.S. Government to support Taiwan’s accession to the World Health Organization. Until this, Members had raised the issue each year with one-year support requirements, resulting in annual congressional attention and regular pressure on U.S. Government officials. The fragmentation of the “Taiwan message” that has come with changes in the “Taiwan lobby” offers another possible explanation.

PRC/Taiwan Receptivity to Enhanced U.S. Role. The United States constrained its involvement on cross-strait matters in the past primarily because both Taiwan and the PRC insisted that it do so. But some aspects of this Taiwan-PRC dynamic appear to be changing. According to U.S. officials, both governments in recent years have changed the way they talk to Washington about Taiwan. U.S. officials now are under subtle and perhaps increasing pressure from both governments to become directly involved in some aspects of cross-strait issues.

According to U.S. officials, the PRC now suggests that Beijing and Washington cooperate to manage controversial Taiwan issues. PRC officials late in 2003 began quietly urging the United States to pressure Chen Shui-bian into shelving plans for an island-wide referendum. In 2004, they pressed U.S. officials to avoid sending the “wrong signals” to Taiwan —
defined as those encouraging independence aspirations. On the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in 2005, PRC President Hu Jintao said “I hope that the United States will join the Chinese side in safeguarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and opposing so-called Taiwan independence.” For their part, members of the Taiwan government have begun suggesting that the Taiwan Relations Act needs to be strengthened or reevaluated. They have sought U.S. support for Chen’s constitutional reform plans and more visible and routine U.S.-Taiwan official interaction. As a result, some observers in both Taiwan and the United States suggest that the time may be ripe for the United States to step up its rhetoric and activities to promote cross-strait dialogue.

**Volatility in Taiwan’s Democratic Environment**

Finally, the volatility in Taiwan’s own democratic institutions and political environment constitutes another factor influencing U.S. views of Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations. In contrast to its authoritarian past, Taiwan’s several decades of reforms have made its political environment today both more democratic and less predictable, characterized by immense political divisions on ideology and substance. Some of this political volatility has been attributed to the natural growing pains of Taiwan’s new democracy. Others have argued there are more systemic problems characterizing Taiwan’s evolving democratic institutions—in particular to structural weaknesses that dilute authority and do not sufficiently empower either legislative or executive entities.

**Deep Political Partisanship.** Political partisanship in Taiwan appears even deeper and more rancorous than is apparent when reading press accounts in the United States. The pan-Green (DPP/TSU— or Taiwan Solidarity Union) and pan-Blue (KMT/PFP— or People First Party) coalitions appear to have little use for and not much to say to one another. In the nearly evenly divided legislature, the two coalitions are said to have no interaction except when necessary to consider legislation. According to some observers, the rancorous pan-Green/pan-Blue split in Taiwan extends

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48 Some critics of U.S. policy suggest that the PRC’s search for U.S. involvement is a “united front” tactic designed primarily to isolate Taiwan from some of its U.S. support.

to — and is sometime even stronger among — the Chinese- and Taiwanese-American communities in the United States. To a different extent, political division also characterizes internal debate within each party coalition, so that neither coalition speaks with a unified voice.

**Divisions in the Ruling DPP/TSU Coalition.** While the “deep-Green” coalition base appears solidly in favor of the party’s independence aspirations, many in the coalition — the so-called “light Greens” — appear uncomfortable with their own party coalition’s more aggressive and confrontational tactics on issues of sovereignty. Some in the DPP argue that the focus on sovereignty issues distracts from other important policy matters. They say that the party needs to lessen its emphasis on divisive matters of sovereignty and independence and get back to its root issues: care for the concerns of common people, provision of social services, and an emphasis on clean government.\(^5\) One commentator opined that this would be the DPP’s focus in the 2008 presidential election.

In addition, there are what were described as three different DPP views on cross-strait economic issues. Some advise caution and the continuation of Taiwan’s current restrictions on private sector investment in the PRC. They fear that too much economic interdependence with China could erode Taiwan’s democracy and destroy its independence of action. In a second view, some favor relatively unfettered economic liberalism and interaction with China as the best way to benefit Taiwan’s economy. They believe that the restrictions Taiwan maintains on cross-strait investment force much of Taiwan’s capital into foreign banks, making it impossible for Taiwan to regulate or tax.\(^4\) Still others seek a middle path of “normal” economic relations with China as long as that comes without political pre-conditions (such as defining cross-strait trade as domestic trade.)

One self-criticism of some DPP members was that the party coalition, although now the governing party, still has an “opposition party” mentality — a quality that excites the party’s traditional base but doesn’t necessarily

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\(^{50}\) Although not explicitly stated, this debate appears to reflect the deeper debate within the party between those advocating the “back to our roots” position and those emphasizing priority for constitutional reform and issues of sovereignty.

\(^{51}\) While official Taiwan statistics hold that Taiwan has $50 billion invested in the mainland, unofficial accounts place this closer to $280 billion.
result in efficient governance. According to these observers, this tendency has been partly to blame for the party’s low rating in opinion polls. Internal party corruption also was blamed for low DPP numbers, although corruption was portrayed more broadly as an endemic problem permeating political life at all levels.

**Divisions in the Opposition KMT/PFP Coalition.** Like the DPP, the KMT/PFP coalition appears plagued by internal disagreements, particularly on matters involving the appropriate action on the defense budget, on which the DPP is portrayed as being entirely in favor, the PFP entirely against, and the KMT “somewhere in the middle.” Other observers stress that generational conflicts plague the KMT coalition. Long-time party heavy-weights in the coalition — such as Lien Chan and James Soong — are said to be reluctant to relinquish the reigns of party power to a younger generation of party leaders. The latter includes the popular KMT party chairman Ma Ying-jeou, whose integrity is respected but whose leadership skills, some observers suggested, may not be strong enough to offset the continued clout, financial resources, and political maneuvering of these “old guard” members.

One criticism observers raised about the KMT/PFP coalition is that a combination of the DPP’s low opinion poll ratings and the “Ma Ying-jeou phenomenon” (referring to the widespread popularity of KMT chairman and Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou) has made the coalition arrogant, as if the 2008 presidential election will be an “anointment.” In another criticism, the KMT/PFP coalition is portrayed as disingenuously having withheld financial, political, and diplomatic expertise from the ruling DPP, then accusing that party of being unable to govern effectively.

**Possible Sea-Change in KMT/PFP Thinking.** In another trend, some observers state that the United States has greatly underestimated the importance of the sea-change in KMT thinking brought about by the PRC visits of KMT chairman Lien Chan and PFP chairman James Soong in 2005.\(^{55}\) Those visits, according to this view, have given pro-China interests in the KMT/PFP coalition a new, alternate vision for Taiwan’s future. One of the consequences of this new KMT/PFP vision is the growing inurement of the pan-blue coalition to U.S. pressure — in particular, to U.S. pressure to

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\(^{55}\) This was a view offered by one U.S. AIT official in Taiwan.
increase military spending or take legislative action on the defense budget — on the grounds that such expenditures are too high, too confrontational, and likely unnecessary in light of improvements in cross-strait interactions. This perception has caused a few American observers to speculate on the degree of the pan-blue coalition’s future support for a security relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{56}

**Policy Options**

The complex and dramatic changes in both Taiwan and China have resulted in periodic speculation about whether the current U.S. policy framework for relations with Taiwan remains appropriate or whether the U.S. Government should re-examine its policies and perhaps revise them. Given developments in U.S. relations with Taiwan since 2001, policymakers who are concerned about current trends and the U.S. ability to meet future challenges may consider a number of various options for U.S. policy.

**Maintain and Reaffirm the Current “One-China” Policy**

The official U.S. policy view is that the “one-China” policy and the fundamental framework surrounding it is an important constancy in an otherwise dangerously fluid and evolving U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relationship. Any alteration or apparent flexibility in that policy would lead to a “disintegrating policy” damaging to U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{57} In addition, according to this view, the current policy framework helps protect the United States and U.S. policies from becoming greater factors in the domestic Taiwan and PRC policy environments. The slightest deviation from U.S. policy formulations and actions — an off-the-cuff comment, the use of different wording beyond that already approved, a visit by a more senior U.S. official — can be and has in the past been seized upon by actors from either side to further domestic political agendas, inevitably creating nettlesome diplomatic problems for U.S. policy. Moreover, these proponents say, those who advocate scrapping the “one-China” policy and other aspects of the U.S. policy framework are recklessly discounting PRC resolve on unifying

\textsuperscript{56} This view is also shared by John Tkacik, at The Heritage Foundation.

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with former U.S. Government official, June 22, 2006.
Taiwan with the mainland and irresponsibly advocating actions that well could lead to the use of U.S. military forces in a U.S.-PRC conflict.

**Abandon the Current “One China” Policy**

A strongly held but minority view places greatest emphasis on the political aspirations and democratic rights to self-determination of the people on Taiwan. The current U.S. policy framework on Taiwan is completely out of step with the American emphasis on global democratization, according to proponents of this view. They hold that as the PRC and Taiwan have evolved, the original U.S. policy framework on Taiwan has stultified and grown increasingly irrelevant. The “one-China” policy itself, they argue, originally was based on the U.S. acknowledgment that both Taiwan and the PRC held there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of it.\(^{58}\) They contend that this U.S. policy has become untenable; it no longer reflects the reality in Taiwan and it is based on a faulty premise that perpetuates more-or-less continual deferral of a resolution to Taiwan’s political status. Therefore, they say, the “one-China” policy needs to be abandoned and replaced with a “one-China, one-Taiwan” policy in which the United States would work toward gradual normalization of relations with Taiwan.

Some who advocate this viewpoint believe that the costs of such a policy change for the United States would be minimal. They believe that PRC actions and statements on Taiwan are just “saber-rattling,” and they doubt that the PRC will attack Taiwan should Taipei declare independence.\(^{59}\) Even if the PRC should attack Taiwan, these proponents appear confident that for political and strategic reasons, the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid.\(^{60}\) To do nothing, they say, would seriously damage U.S. credibility and influence in Asia.

\(^{55}\) This was the formulation in the U.S.-PRC “Shanghai Communiqué” of 1972, which held that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The [U.S.] Government does not challenge that position.” In repeating this assertion, the Joint Communiqué of 1979 establishing official relations with the PRC eliminated specific mention of either government: “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” See CRS report 96-246 F, for full texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the 3 U.S.-China communiques.

\(^{56}\) Coen Blaauw, of FAPA, and John Tkacik, of The Heritage Foundation, are two proponents of this view.

A More Transparent Policy Within the Current Framework

Bracketed within the above two policy options is a steady but quiet flow of alternative policy suggestions. They tend to advocate various substantive changes in day-to-day U.S. relations with Taiwan that they believe would remain within the boundaries of the current policy framework and within U.S. understandings with the PRC.

Another “Taiwan Policy Review”. At the very least, some say, the United States needs to consider doing another comprehensive review of its Taiwan policy in order to revisit once again the 1979-1980 “Taiwan Guidelines” that govern U.S. Government interactions with Taiwan and with Taiwan officials. Reportedly, only one such review to update the guidelines has been conducted since 1979 — the 1993-1994 Taiwan Policy Review undertaken in the Clinton Administration — and that review resulted in a new approval for exchanges of high-level official visits in the economic arena. But even the high-level economic visits resulting from the 1993-94 policy review have not been pursued with vigor by the current Bush Administration, according to these proponents.

Furthermore, since the 1993-94 policy review, there have been dramatic developments in Taiwan’s democratization, including the first-time election of an opposition party candidate as President in 2000. In addition, since 1995 the PRC has undertaken a substantial military buildup along the coast opposite Taiwan, and in 2005 Beijing adopted the anti-secession law suggesting hostile intent against Taiwan. These significant developments since 1993-94, according to this view, justify another Taiwan Policy Review.

58 Apart from the Taiwan Policy Review, several other Clinton Administration decisions led to debates over whether the United States had changed its policy on Taiwan. In 1997-1998, the White House made statements that became known as the “three noes” — that the United States did not support a “one China, One Taiwan” policy, Taiwan independence, or Taiwan membership in international organizations requiring statehood. In 2000, the Clinton Administration made further incremental changes to U.S. rhetoric by adding the U.S. expectation that any resolution to the Taiwan issue would not only be peaceful, but decided “with the assent of the Taiwan people.” For these and other U.S. policy statements, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley Kan.

59 The only such contact in recent years was the Taiwan visit of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia in May-June 2006.
to make selected changes in U.S. policy. The importance of Taiwan for U.S. interests, and of peace and stability in the Taiwan strait, warrant such renewed policy attention. It is argued that such changes could bring a more rational policy process and improve communications. Among the policy changes that have been discussed are:

- More transparent and open interactions with Taiwan at the working level, including visits between U.S. and Taiwan officials in official U.S. Government buildings and invitations to Taiwan officials to attend special events such as swearing-in ceremonies
- Higher level U.S. Government visits and exchanges with Taiwan counterparts
- Greater coordination within the U.S. Government — including regular inter-departmental meetings involving the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury, among others — on policy and substantive issues involving Taiwan
- More open and active support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement, and greater support for observer status for Taiwan in organizations for which statehood is a requirement (such as the United Nations and World Health Organization)

**More Active U.S. Role on Cross-Strait Relations.** Among those suggesting alternative approaches, there appears to be greater sentiment that a more active U.S. role in cross-strait matters is both justifiable within the current policy framework and warranted by changing sentiments within the PRC and Taiwan. They maintain that U.S. officials should urge the PRC to enter into a dialogue with Chen Shui-bian as the democratically elected leader of Taiwan. They suggest that there is room for U.S. involvement in trying to moderate, re-shape, or suspend the contending positions of the two sides that remain the major obstacle to the initiation of dialogue. For the PRC, this position is that Taiwan first accept the “one China” principle or agree once again on the “1992 consensus” formula. For Taiwan, this position is an insistence on no pre-conditions but a stated willingness to discuss any subject.

**An Interim Agreement.** Other observers have suggested that the United States could use its influence and leverage with both sides to broker an “interim agreement” on the cross-strait issue that would defuse current tensions and cement in place the status quo for a specified number of years.
Such an agreement theoretically would require Beijing’s promise that it would not attack Taiwan and Taiwan’s promise that it would not declare independence. Supporters of an interim framework argue that such deep-rooted political obstacles exist between the current generation of leaders in each government that only future generations have hope of reaching a fruitful and mutually acceptable resolution. These proponents argue that the involved governments in Beijing and Taipei would have to determine what the specifics of an acceptable agreement might look like. But it is only Washington, they argue, that is in a position to facilitate and garner support for such an agreement.63

More Pressure on the PRC. Another policy view is that the United States has become too responsive to PRC sensitivities on Taiwan, and therefore unwilling to exert more pressure on the PRC government to reduce its hostile military posture toward the Taiwan government. According to this view, the U.S. stakes in maintaining a democratic Taiwan, along with the potential costs of a non-peaceful resolution to Taiwan’s political status, are too high for the U.S. Government to remain on the sidelines. The United States should use more of its considerable leverage with Beijing in an effort to bring about more conciliatory behavior and promote cross-strait dialogue. Proponents suggest that U.S. officials could seek:

- Reduction of the PRC missile and military buildup opposite Taiwan
- Willingness to engage in dialogue with Taiwan’s duly elected government and suspension of the PRC dialogue exclusively with Taiwan’s opposition political parties
- Re-visitation of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which has increased pressure on the Taiwan political debate

More Overt U.S. Support for Taiwan Democracy. Another set of policy suggestions supports greater U.S. support for and involvement in Taiwan’s democratic institutions. According to this view, Taiwan has already transformed itself by adopting a democratic system of governance; it

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60 Ken Lieberthal, formerly Senior Director for Asia on the staff of the National Security Council, is a chief proponent of the “interim agreement” idea. Lieberthal suggests a time-frame of 20-30 years for such an agreement. Lieberthal, Kenneth, “Preventing a war over Taiwan,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March/April 2005. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, visiting Washington on March 22-23, 2006, also proposed an interim peace agreement, with a time from of from 30-50 years.
is in the interests of all parties to have Taiwan’s government be as effective and stable as possible. But these proponents say that the very newness of Taiwan’s democracy and the infrastructural weaknesses of its political institutions are hampering Taiwan governance, contributing to cross-strait tensions, and posing problems for U.S. policy. Proponents suggest that the U.S. might pursue initiatives to improve the effectiveness of Taiwan’s governance, such as:

- U.S. support for limited constitutional reforms in Taiwan (such as movement to a parliamentary system or reduction in the multiple levels of government) that could contribute directly to more effective government institutions and a more workable balance of power
- Greater dialogue and more direct contact between the U.S. Congress and Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY), particularly to assist the LY’s current structural reform and committee structure and processes
- More definitive discouragement of de-stabilizing public comments and actions by Taiwan leaders
- Encouragement for Taiwan to use its political strengths and resources in a non-isolating way — by de-emphasizing divisive sovereignty issues, for instance, and instead emphasizing the global role Taiwan can play in democratic capacity building — such as in vote-counting and monitoring

In addition, say these proponents, the United States can and should be more open in offering rhetorical support for the statements and actions of Taiwan leaders, defending them as natural components of Taiwan’s democratic processes. The United States might feel obliged publicly to disagree with President Chen’s and others’ statements about Taiwan independence aspirations, according to this view, but U.S. officials should openly support the rights of Taiwan leaders to say such things as an essential part of the open debate that characterizes a democratic government.

Conclusion

While the basics of U.S. policy toward Taiwan remain in place today, many other factors have changed dramatically. The PRC itself is a rising global economic power scarcely resembling the country it was at the Nixon
opening in the 1970's. U.S. economic and political relations with the PRC have expanded and become more diverse, playing a more complex role now than they did then in U.S. calculations of its own interests. The PRC’s military has grown as well, with much of its strategic planning focusing on a Taiwan contingency.

Taiwan, once an authoritarian one-party government under martial law, has become a fully functioning democracy. In Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian’s upset of the long dominant ruling party in a true democratic contest was a resounding validation of U.S. ideals and hopes for global democratic development. But other aspects of the new government’s pro-independence views conflict with U.S. policies that support the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and are unwilling to support Taiwan independence. Taiwan-U.S. relations in recent years also have been plagued by other factors, including: mistrust between the Bush and Chen Administrations; mixed bilateral messages; a decline in the extent to which Taiwan is willing to fulfill U.S. expectations about its own self-defense; the fragmentation of the once-powerful “Taiwan lobby” in the United States; a perceived declining role for Congress; and the sheer volatility in Taiwan’s domestic political environment.

These changes are posing challenges to U.S. policy. Some observers suggest that as the PRC and Taiwan have evolved, the original U.S. policy framework has grown increasingly irrelevant; they argue it needs to be reassessed or scrapped. Others hold that the very constancy of the U.S. policy framework is crucial in managing U.S. relations with both governments; they argue it needs to be maintained. Bracketed by these two options is a quiet flow of alternative policy suggestions. These tend to advocate various substantive changes in day-to-day U.S. relations with Taiwan and China that appear defensible within the existing U.S. policy framework. These alternative views include: a more transparent U.S. policy and more open interactions with senior Taiwan leaders; greater U.S. support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations; a more active U.S. role in cross-strait relations; more pressure on the PRC to talk to the elected Taiwan government, withdraw its missiles opposite Taiwan, and renounce the use of force; and more overt support for Taiwan democratic institutions.

Faced with competing pressures from Beijing and Taipei and with changes in the PRC and continuing transformations in the Taiwan systems, U.S. officials are likely to continue facing new and more difficult policy
choices concerning Taiwan. In addition to raising the risks of political and economic instability, growing political polarization in Taiwan could further erode the quality of U.S.-Taiwan contacts. Pressure may build for U.S. officials to reassess all the fundamentals of U.S. China/Taiwan policy in light of changing circumstances. Finally, any policy developments that affect Taiwan have direct consequences for U.S.-China relations and could involve crucial U.S. decisions about the extent of U.S. support for Taiwan’s security. In the coming two years, it appears that actors from across the political spectrum — including governments, interest groups, political parties, and individuals — will continue efforts to push the United States into greater clarity or commitments on various questions involving Taiwan.
From the Archives

An Interview with former President Richard M. Nixon

By Fumiko Mori Halloran

Former President Richard M. Nixon, who opened the way to new relations between China and the United States in 1972, cautioned eight years later that China would succeed economically only if it shed the burden of Marxism. “Putting it bluntly,” Mr. Nixon told me, “we cannot expect China to repudiate the communist philosophy, the communist state. The leaders of China are communists. To the extent that they become less ideological Marxists in their economic policies, they will become a formidable economic power in the world. If they insist on returning to doctrinaire Marxist policies, there is no great hope for the future.”

My exclusive interview with Mr. Nixon came about this way. I had just finished my first book, Washington no Machi kara, a nonfiction work about Washington as a political city, and it had been published in Tokyo by Bungei Shunju, a major publishing house. The publisher had acquired the Japanese translation rights for Mr. Nixon’s latest book, The Real War. The contract included the right to an interview and the publisher asked me to be the interviewer. The New York Times Syndication Sales Corporation arranged the interview that was to have been one hour long, but because we were so involved in conversation, Mr. Nixon talked for two hours. He reluctantly ended it, apologizing that guests were soon arriving for Mrs. Nixon’s birthday luncheon. I translated the interview into Japanese and wrote a short essay from which most of these observations were derived. The article was published in the June 1980 issue of the monthly magazine, Bungei Shunju, with 600,000 circulation then and now. It is one of the most influential magazines in Japan.
On March 14, 1980, the day of the interview with former President Richard Nixon, snow was falling hard in New York and the street where Mr. Nixon lived was covered with melting snow and pools of water. When I reached the three-story town house, but before pressing the bell, a young man opened the door. He was polite as he asked for identification and checked my passport and tape recorder. Later he told me he was a Marine guarding the former president. A photographer, who had arrived earlier, and I were cleared; the guard talked on the intercom, then opened the door between the front door and the hall.

Mr. Nixon came out of the study to greet us. I was struck with a strange awe to see the former President of the United States. This was the man who became widely known as the young Republican congressman from California who investigated Alger Hiss, who was vice president under President Dwight Eisenhower; who was defeated by John F. Kennedy in the 1960 election and defeated again in the California gubernatorial election against Pat Brown. Finally, however, he was elected president over Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968. This was the man who changed the course of contemporary history with his economic policy called the “Nixon Shock” and his foreign policy called the “Nixon Doctrine,” with his journey to the
People’s Republic of China, which opened the way to diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, and with negotiations with the Soviet Union trying to achieve “détente.” This was the man who resigned because of the Watergate scandal.

Mr. Nixon, who was then 67, looked healthy. He had just returned from Europe and Africa. Mr. Nixon graciously showed us the artwork adorning the corridor leading to his study. Interestingly, many were Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian. I was attracted to a glass panel that Chinese leaders had presented to Mrs. Nixon. The figures inside the clear panel were made of fine silk yarn and depicted a white cat with green eyes staring at a small dragonfly. A pair of fine lacquer paintings of an Asian countryside, Mr. Nixon said, had been given to him by Vietnamese refugees.

In the study, a fire burned in the fireplace. Persian carpets covered the floor and the dark furniture gave the room a comfortable but somber mood. The bookshelves were filled and on his desk I saw the famous yellow pads. A Tchaikovsky’s symphony was playing quietly on an Akai stereo. Mr. Nixon mused, “You know, all of my life, I’ve been fighting communism and the Soviet Union. But to tell you the truth, I love Russian music the best.”

My interview covered a variety of international topics. For this article, I have chosen sections that focused on China, although Mr. Nixon’s observations about China often overlapped with those on the Soviet Union and Japan.

MRS. HALLORAN: I would like to concentrate on international questions. I have five major categories: one is about China, one is about Japan obviously, one is about the Soviet Union and another is about the Iran-Afghanistan issues. The last question is about concepts and values of both the free world and of the communist bloc.

Do you think China will establish itself as a major power in all aspects in the future?

MR. NIXON: Since I was in China in 1972, some very profound events have occurred in China itself that have changed the situation. Mao has died.
Zhou Enlai died. Hua Guofeng has come to power, and Deng Xiaoping has come to power. It is important, however, not to overemphasize the degree of change that has taken place.

For example, when the normalization [of U.S.-China relations] took place in January of last year, there were many in the U.S. and other parts of the industrial world who thought that now there would be an enormous amount of trade with China. I will use the term China throughout here, recognizing the fact that we have, of course, the government of Taiwan, which represents a considerable amount of Chinese, as well as the government of the mainland, which is the government now recognized by the United States and Japan.

Those high hopes for the enormously increased trade have been dashed. But anyone who examines the situation would know that China simply has not developed its own tremendous resources, human and natural, yet to the point where it has the foreign exchange that it can buy all of these products produced by the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Because businessmen who flock from the U.S. to China and some of those, for sure, who went from Japan to China were disillusioned by their failure to get the big contracts that they thought they were going to get, there is a tendency to say that because China has not developed up to this point economically, that it isn’t going to make it at all, in the near future, or even down the line.

My view is that it is a question of time, also of economic philosophy, and generally, foreign policy on the part of the government of China. As long as the present leadership is successful in concentrating on the development of the great Chinese capabilities for productive capacity, proficiency, as demonstrated by what Chinese have done outside the mainland, as long as they concentrate [in that] direction, China will move upward.

If within China they revert, however, to the pursuit of doctrine of the Cultural Revolution, et cetera, then China will not, in the foreseeable or even in the immediate future, become a significant economic power. Putting it bluntly, we cannot expect China to repudiate the communist philosophy, the communist state. The leaders of China are communists. To the extent that

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1 Hua Guofeng was Mao Zedong’s designated successor. When Mao died in 1976, Hua became Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. He ended the Cultural Revolution, but was forced into retirement by Deng Xiaoping.
they become less ideological Marxists in their economic policies, they will become a formidable economic power in the world. If they insist on returning to doctrinaire Marxist policies, there is no great hope for the future.

The other point I would like to make is that of comparing China to Japan. One reason why I am optimistic is what happened in Japan. Here is Japan, a country that was devastated immediately after World War II; a country, of course, with a very small population compared to China, maybe one-tenth, and with no natural resources whatever, and less arable land than the state of California. Here is Japan, in the past 35 years since World War II is over, and in the past 27 years since I first visited Japan back in 1953, Japan has become a major economic power. It is presently just passing the Soviet Union, probably, in GNP. By the end of the century, Herman Kahn has predicted that Japan will have a per capita income larger than the United States. The Chinese people and the Japanese people are different, but here is China with enormous natural resources. They have oil, they have coal, they have minerals down in the South. Here is a country with a billion people. If China can look to Japan and see what the Japanese formula---leave out the American and European formulas---has been to unleash the enormous capacities of an able people, then the ceiling for China is unlimited. It will become a very great economic power in the 21st century; but not if it reverts to doctrinaire methods.

**MRS. HALLORAN:** Do you think there is a possibility of rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union in the future, or, if it’s possible, then what would make them get closer together?

**MR. NIXON:** Yes, there is that possibility. Again, there is a superficial analysis of what Chinese leaders are saying about the Soviet Union today when they speak of the present leaders in the Kremlin as being international barbarians, or worse. There’s a tendency to assume that because there is personal animosity between the Chinese as Chinese and the Russians as Russians, because there are historical differences between the two, because there are geographical differences---they border on each other and they have arguments about borders---that it is impossible for the two to get together. In my view, that is incorrect. I believe that at the present time, the Chinese leadership will continue its rapprochement with the U.S. and with the West. But only as long as Chinese leadership believes that the strength, particularly of the U.S., is credible, and that the will of the U.S. is credible in terms of
holding the rein against the Soviets. The Chinese leadership is interested, above all, in the survival of China. They will make any foreign policy decision necessary for that survival.

The rapprochement with the United States in 1972 was not on the part of the Chinese leadership’s change of heart. When Mao and Zhou Enlai talked with me, they were very candid, honest and direct in saying they were dedicated communists, and as Mao used to jokingly say that I had a reputation as a very strong anti-communist and a capitalist. Why did we get together then? Because the Chinese, then at odds with the Soviet Union, needed the relationship with the U.S. as a buffer against, and as a deterrent against, the Soviet Union.

Now, if the Chinese lose confidence in the U.S. due to U.S. weakness, due to U.S. lack of will or due to U.S. turning isolationist, then China will make a deal with the Soviets. Not because they want to, but because their heads tell them what their hearts do not want, that that’s the only way to survive.

**MRS. HALLORAN:** Do you think they think that they are all Chinese and then communists?

**MR. NIXON:** Yes. I would say this and this reverts to your earlier question. In the last 20 years of this century and in the 21st century, if the people on the mainland and the government on the mainland become more Chinese and less communist, to that extent they have a great future. And I believe that the Chinese background, the Chinese culture, is very deep. I remember, for example, Lee Kuan Yew telling me in Singapore one time when I saw him in 1967. He said, “Mao is painted on a mosaic as far as China is concerned. When the rains come, it will wash away. And there will be China.” Whether he is correct or not—he is, of course, Chinese in background—I am not prepared to say. But I do know this. The future of China will be greatly dependent on whether they become more Chinese—Chinese in terms of their pride, individuality, customs—if they do, they have a great future. To the extent that they become more doctrinaire Marxist-communist, they have a very dismal future.

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2 Lee Kuan Yew was first Prime Minister of Singapore from 1959-1990.
MRS. HALLORAN: The Japanese are afraid that if Deng Xiaoping goes, there may be this revival of doctrinaire philosophy, turning further left. Do you think this is possible?

MR. NIXON: I think that what comes after Deng, like what comes after Brezhnev, is very hard to predict. But I have confidence, and I don’t think it’s based on any false optimism, that the new Chinese leadership will not turn far away from Deng Xiaoping, due to the fact that what works is what he is advocating. As long as it works, I think they will go in that direction. Hua [Guofeng], of course, is a much younger man. I think that he is a pragmatist. Above everything else he is a communist, but he’s a pragmatist, and Deng is the ultimate pragmatist. But I think that Hua and the others around him will not revert to the errors, to the terrible disasters of the Cultural Revolution, and that’s a relief. But it is possible. I do not think it is likely because---let’s look at it in terms of the survival of China.

China, in order to survive, cannot continue to always depend on the United States, Western Europe, and particularly the United States, to protect it. China will want to develop its own ability, too. It cannot develop its own ability to defend itself quickly, unless it develops its economy quickly. It does not have the economic base. You can point to the Soviet Union and what happened there, but it took time. And it was a very different situation than what it is in China. In my view, the Chinese, I think because of their desperate need to develop more military strength, will not turn back to doctrinaire, Marxist-communism in so far as their economy is concerned.

MRS. HALLORAN: The Sino-Japanese relationship has been improving.

MR. NIXON: And I must say that I think that is very encouraging. But a little less than 100 years ago, Americans like Albert Beveridge, Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert Hoover used to talk about the “yellow peril.” They were referring to the Chinese primarily, and to a lesser extent the Japanese. And there are those, a few I suppose in the United States and Western Europe who believe that this apparently closer relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese is potentially dangerous. I do not agree. I have said for many years, and I said it when Sato [Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato] was here in Washington on his state visit at the time it was arranged for the return of Okinawa, that Japanese-American cooperation is the linchpin of peace and progress in the Pacific. I still believe it. I believe that Japan is a very important bridge between the West and the United States and
China. Japan is a Western-oriented economy, and a Western-oriented political entity today. Japan is also Asian. Japan and China have had their differences in the past, but I think the Japanese can play a very significant role in keeping China from reverting to its doctrinaire communism.

For example, I was impressed in my talks with both Zhou Enlai and Mao in 1972, and then again with Mao, although he was not well at the time, in 1976, and since that time with Hua and Deng in 1979. I was impressed with the fact that they all spoke of Japan with great respect, particularly in so far as the Japanese economy was concerned. So the example of what Japan has done is much more persuasive to the Chinese than is the example of what the U.S. has done.

MRS. HALLORAN: Can it be seen by other Southeast Asian countries as a potential threat in the future?

MR. NIXON: It can. We have to recognize the fact that many of the Southeast Asian countries have recollections of World War II. Fortunately, we have to realize that, and you [Halloran] are almost in this category yourself, born after World War II. So now there’s a new age, there’s a new world. Japan is going to play a very great role in building that new world and seeing what kind of a world it will be. This post-World War II generation will be the leaders. The next generation, even in the Soviet Union, will be post-World War II. Who knows as times go by? We’ll see.

But I will say that in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia will have some recollection of what happened. The Japanese were there in World War II. Others have recollections more recently of what the Chinese did when they were in an expansionist phase immediately after they took over in the mainland in 1949, and when they supported subversion in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, et cetera. And now at the present time, China, fortunately, is turning inward because it needs to in order to defend itself and to develop its economy. It is not engaged in exporting its revolution. I do not mean that it still is not supporting the concept that the whole world must be communist, but it isn’t doing that much about it in the way that the Soviet Union is. It is not in an aggressive stage. As long as China is turning inward and concentrating on the development of China’s economic strength and China’s defense and military capability, then the world will be a much safer place. And the nations surrounding China will
become less and less concerned. Again, too, I think the Japanese-Chinese relationship can tend to mitigate this fear that exists down through that area.

I found, for example, in my travels to Asia and the Pacific---I was there seven or eight times, I was in Tokyo seven times in the 60’s---I found that in the beginning of the 60’s, in 1963, there was very great concern and there was still irresolute bitterness towards Japan in the Philippines, in Taiwan, in Indonesia, and so forth. But each year it goes down. And I believe that today, as a result particularly of the great Japanese economic expansion and the contacts they have made in that part of the world, that these countries do not have the anti-Japanese feelings they once had.

**MRS. HALLORAN:** I read your memoirs, so I know what you feel about the Chinese leaders. But were you most impressed by Zhou Enlai?

**MR. NIXON:** Yes, I would have to say that I would rate Zhou Enlai at the top of the list of Chinese leaders I met. This is not to say that I agree with his politics, nor he with mine, it does say that in terms of sophistication, in terms of intelligence, in terms of shrewdness, toughness, he is in my view at the very first rank. The others were also able, Hua, Deng, of course, with his scintillating personality and so forth.

**MRS. HALLORAN:** What about your impression of Mao?

**MR. NIXON:** Well, Mao, of course, even in ’72 was beginning to fail, and in ’76, he had a stroke. I could see how he had been a very effective revolutionary. He was an aesthete, he had more charisma than Zhou Enlai. When you walked into a room, even though he was very old and sick, he was in charge of the room. There was not question about it, he was there. I would say, however, that in terms of sheer intellectual capacity, I would have to put Zhou Enlai ahead.

**MRS. HALLORAN:** In your memoirs, you said that Brezhnev, when you were talking about Sino-Soviet conflicts, said, “We Europeans do not understand Chinese.” Japanese never thought that Russians were Europeans. And I don’t think Europeans think Russians are Europeans. Why did he say that?

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Mr. Nixon: Well, I think Brezhnev was motivated, to a great extent, by his concern about the Chinese. The Chinese are Asians and he was trying to, frankly, make the point that the Soviet Union was, rather than being an Asian country, a European country. Of course, the Soviet Union is both; the western part of the Soviet Union is European, the eastern part is very Asian. In fact, the southern part of the Soviet Union is very much Moslem, as you know. Basically, what Brezhnev was trying to do was to “get a shot in” at the Chinese by pointing out that they were Asians, and that he as a Russian had more in common with the West, with the non-Asians, Western Europe and the United States, than he had with the Asian Chinese. He did not say this in relationship with Japan, he was saying it with relation to the Chinese.

Mrs. Halloran: People always talk about expansionism by the Soviet Union. Russians have the desire to have vast space. They may not know what to do with it, but it’s their drive. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Nixon: Yes, a major theme of my book, The Real War,⁴ is that if communism had not come to Russia, then communism would not necessarily have been expansionist. I don’t mean that it wasn’t expansionist with the Chinese, but the fact that communism took hold in Russia led inevitably, to simply a continuation of traditional Russian expansionism. Russia under the Czars was expansionist and imperialist. Russia under the communists has continued to be expansionist-imperialist, except more effectively because they used the ideology of communism to hoodwink the people and to accept them [communists] in the first instances rather than just having them [people] to be conquered.

Mrs. Halloran: Do you think communism’s ideology is still the backbone of the Soviets, or do you think it is becoming more receptive to the Western values, like human rights, or freedom of expression?

Mr. Nixon: Let me be candid about both China and Russia. At first there was disillusionment. The hopes were raised too high at the time Deng Xiaoping was over here and they were putting posters up on Freedom Wall, or Democracy Wall. The hopes were running too high that China was changing all of a sudden, that freedom was beginning to assert itself. It did not happen. It has changed somewhat, but not very much. Over a period of

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time it may change. But the leaders feel that they cannot let it change too fast because then their positions of leadership would be threatened. So I think China may change economically, significantly, and still keep their leaders in power. But to change, significantly, politically is much more difficult. And I do not foresee that happening. I don’t think we’re going to have much liberalization in China.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there have been some evidences of change. Let me put it this way, Stalin could kill his rivals. When Khruschev came in, he just sent Malenkov off to run a power plant. And then when Khruschev was overthrown, he became a non-person, but he didn’t lose his life. Now that is a change. However, it is still a very oppressive society. It’s a closed society. There is some movement, but one should not get the impression that it is very significant at this point. It isn’t. Because once so-called “liberalization” gets to the point that it unleashes forces that threaten the regime, then they will stamp it out. And that will be true in both China and the Soviet Union.

I wish that I could go along with those that say the Soviet Union has mellowed a great deal and has changed a great deal in so far as human rights are concerned. I cannot agree that that is the case. That may not mean that, particularly with regard to China, it does not serve the interests of the West to help China economically develop the strength it needs militarily for defensive purposes, because a weak China is a threat to peace because it invites aggression. A stronger China, provided it’s not so strong that it threatens its neighbors, contributes to peace.
I was a player in the normalization of relations with China, albeit a bit player in several off-off Broadway renditions of the drama. I still have a black-and-white photograph [shown above] from the Grand Hotel in Taipei, December 28, 1978. My colleague, Pat Corcoran, and I [on the left] are striding purposefully across the lobby, like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, serving to “swell the progress” of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher [at center]. Christopher had arrived in Taipei the night before to a violent reception at the hands of several thousand furious students. The next day he was in no mood to be waylaid by Chinese journalists lurking in the lobby of the Grand. So, Pat and I were summoned to provide an escort. In the picture we’re walking briskly on either side of the Deputy Secretary, our arms held well out from our bodies. Pat had worked for years as an usher at the Metropolitan Opera and assured me this was the best way to sweep aside anyone who wanted to join our little procession. In any event, only a few journalists were in sight, and so we quickly fulfilled our mission.

My journey to the Grand Hotel actually began 12 days before in the southern Taiwan port city of Kaohsiung. I was working there as the U.S. Information Service (USIS) Director, the head of two American libraries,
one in Kaohsiung and one in the nearby historical city of Tainan. This was the ideal job for a young Foreign Service officer. I was the only U.S. diplomat in southern Taiwan. This meant I not only did public affairs work, but also handled political, economic, trade and consular issues. And the best thing was I had no email, no cell phone, no fax, not even cable communication. I kept up with embassy developments via snail mail and the telephone. I gathered international news from short-wave Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts and two-week-old editions of the Sunday New York Times.

Thus I was blithely unaware when on December 16, I received a telephone call from George Beasley, my boss in Taipei: “Lloyd, turn on your radio and listen to VOA a couple of hours from now. You’ll be very interested in the broadcast. That’s all I can say.”

I was indeed interested. The broadcast announced that on January 1, 1979, the U.S. Government would establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Of course, that would mean breaking relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan and abrogating our mutual defense treaty with them. As part of the process, President Carter would send Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Taipei to explain our decision in person to President Chiang Ching-kuo.

Learning of Christopher’s impending visit, I volunteered to go to Taipei to help handle the press. This would also allow me to get a briefing on what was going to happen after January 1 to the embassy and to my posts in southern Taiwan. Immediate reaction in Taiwan to the USG announcement was muted -- no major anti-American demonstrations. Thus I felt confident enough to leave behind my wife, five-year old daughter and two-week old son in Kaohsiung and travel to Taipei for a few days.

Late in the afternoon of December 27, Ambassador Leonard Unger led our small motorcade to Song-shan Airport, where we would await the arrival of the Deputy Secretary. As we drove into the airport, a group of student protesters had already begun to gather. They were calm for the moment, but the tension was there, and I confess to a frisson of fear as we passed them by. John McPoland, security chief for the embassy, was also concerned and asked Chinese security if there were a way to avoid the protesters, a back road, for instance. The Chinese told him not to worry. Everything was under control.
Shortly after dark, Christopher arrived and was greeted by Ambassador Unger and by Vice Foreign Minister Frederick Ch'ien. "I meet you at this time with a heavy and pained heart," Ch’ien said. "Your visit here should be the first step in your government's efforts to mitigate the disastrous damage wrought by this mistake." And that was the high point of the evening.

By the time our motorcade rolled down the narrow road leading to the airport, the crowd of students had grown to the thousands. (Some later reports put the figure at more than 10,000, but who knows for sure.) They were no longer calm. They had screamed themselves into a full-flowing frenzy. Our motorcade tried to pass through the crowds, but then came to a complete halt. The protesters brought out their weapons: eggs, mud, paint and even clubs. Christopher was the main point of attack. They eventually broke the windows in his car and began poking around inside. Chinese security was trapped inside another car along with John McPoland. The Chinese insisted that McPoland kneel down on the floor of the backseat and cover himself with a towel so the protesters couldn’t see there was an American in the car.

Of course I learned all this in retrospect. Pat Corcoran and I were too busy with our own emergency to see, or even care about what was happening to the cars in front of us. Ours was an inconspicuous vehicle in the back of the motorcade. Our driver kept yelling, “We’re from the press! We’re from the press! Don’t blame us!” This ploy didn’t work. Our windshield was soon spattered with eggs and paint, making it difficult to see out. Then several demonstrators decided to dance on the roof of the car, which began to buckle. Fortunately, they jumped off before it caved in.

“I’m glad I have my clean underwear on,” Pat said. “That way my mother won’t be embarrassed when they bring my body home.” Then he stuck his tongue out at one of the mob. But they were already so angry, it couldn’t have made them any madder, and so we survived.

Finally, after about 45 minutes of this, the motorcade began to inch forward. Unfortunately, our windshield was so bespattered the driver couldn’t see out. I was afraid he was going to run over someone, and that would be the end of us. (I had just seen Steve McQueen in The Sand Pebbles, where a Chinese coolie is sliced apart by an angry mob, and that scene kept running through my head) Fortunately, after 15 very long minutes
we were able to inch our way past the mob and past the American television crews who were recording the moment unmolested. The protesters were just mad at the USG, not at Americans in general. Unfortunately, I was USG.

As the last car in line, we had become separated from the rest of the motorcade, which, after breaking away from the mob, drove directly to the Grand Hotel where the embassy had set up a control room. Not knowing where our colleagues had gone, Pat and I drove to the nearby American military base to regroup. Several hours later, we made it back to the Grand where we were greeted with a sigh of relief, because in the pre-cell phone era, we were cut off from the embassy, and no one knew what had happened to us.

While all this was going on, my wife and two kids in Kaohsiung were having their own, granted less turbulent, adventures. As the only USG office in town, the American Center represented a likely target for protesters. It was located on the first two floors of a six-story building in the heart of the city. The landlord was worried about his property. To protect it, he posted a big sign on the front door,

“This is the property of a Taiwan patriot. If you want to protest against the Americans, go to the home of Lloyd Neighbors, the American Center Director, who lives at 100 Hsin-tien Road.”

This could have been a disaster. But, thank goodness the Kaohsiung police were on the alert. They quickly tore down the sign, scolded the landlord and preserved the secret of my home address.

As for me, I was back at work early the next morning in our embassy control room. And that’s how I came to be striding across the lobby in the company of Warren Christopher, just two-degrees of separation from the momentous events taking place in Washington and Beijing.

Twenty-one years later, in late March 1999, I was back in Taipei, this time as Public Affairs Officer at the American Institute (AIT) in Taiwan. AIT is the unofficial U.S. representative office that took the place of our embassy in 1979. This time I was awaiting a visit from President Jimmy Carter himself. At the invitation of a private foundation, he was making his first visit to Taiwan. He came to speak about philanthropy, to encourage the people of Taiwan to do more for the needy. Of course, he couldn’t come to
Taiwan without talking about normalization. So he devoted about half his speech to that issue, making a strong defense of his decision to recognize the PRC. He argued persuasively that this decision played a fundamental role in preserving peace and promoting prosperity in the Pacific. He noted as well, that despite initial hardships, Taiwan had flourished under the circumstances, becoming a bulwark of democracy in the region.

While President Carter was in Taiwan, several members of the AIT staff had breakfast with him and Mrs. Carter to brief them on current events in Taiwan. Just before breakfast, I had the chance to speak to him alone and tell him, with lots of dramatic flourishes, my normalization story. He listened with interest. When I concluded, he looked across the room and waved.

“Rosalynn, come over here. This man was in the greeting committee for Warren Christopher!”
Introduction

In 1982 the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a book entitled The Motive Forces of U.S. Policy Towards China. Written by Y. P. Bazhanov, former Soviet vice-consul in San Francisco, it presents a fascinating Soviet perspective on the various groups and individuals that have influenced U.S. policy toward China over thirty years before its publication.

The book is divided into ten chapters. After two introductory chapters in which the author initiates a general discussion of the main forces and motives behind U.S. policy toward China, he devotes chapters to specific subjects. Chapter 3 evaluates the business community’s impact on U.S. China Policy; Chapter 4 concentrates on the role of Congress; Chapter 5 covers the influences of the federal bureaucracy; Chapter 6 assesses the impact of the media; Chapter 7 discusses the role of American China watchers – specifically, the political scientists; Chapter 8 discusses the China lobby and the importance of the “power peddlers” in the molding of American China policy; Chapter 9, entitled “Metamorphoses of Public Opinion,” examines the sudden fluctuations of American emotions toward China; Chapter 10 considers how all the above factors influence the presidents.

Obviously, the entire book would be of great interest to many historians, China scholars, and foreign affairs specialists. Here, however, I have decided to translate just the one chapter, chapter 7 that, many years later, should be of special interest to readers of any China journal. In the chapter enigmatically entitled “Geometrical Concepts of American Political Scientists,” Bazhanov discusses American scholars who wrote on U.S.-China relations in the 1960s and 1970s, where they stood on the “China questions” and the “Taiwan question,” and how that may have “adjusted” their views in accordance with changes in China and in the White House. The chapter can best be previewed by citing from the brief English summary at the end of the book:
The author dwells on an extraordinary advancement of China studies in the 1960s, which produced a formidable army of experts with a major potential for influencing government and public emotions with regard to the P.R.C.. Practically the whole of this army directed its efforts at shaping and developing the new China policy.

As background to the translation, however, readers need to understand why the Soviets were so interested in American research on China that throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s their embassies and consulates had bright individuals with China experience (like Bazhanov) devoting full time to actively pursuing both academics and bureaucrats working on China, attending open meetings and conferences on the P.R.C., and sending home all the published books, articles, and unpublished papers they could garner.

A Brief Sketch of Soviet Sinology

After 10 years of “brotherly cooperation” during the 1950s, the rapid deterioration of relations between China and the Soviet Union at the turn of that decade was accepted slowly and with some disbelief by outside observers. Strange as it may seem, in some ways, the Soviet Union itself was not prepared for the break. One of the startling indications of this unpreparedness, and completely contrary to Western perceptions, was the weakness of Soviet studies on contemporary China and their poor capabilities of assessing China’s strengths and weaknesses. This deficiency was evident both within the academic and the intelligence communities.

Prior to the October revolution, Russia’s studies of China were based in the Institute of Oriental Studies and focused mainly on history and Chinese classics. After 1917, the basic thrust of China studies remained, with the addition of a modest number of publications dealing with what can be referred to as Marxist Sinology – the study of the Chinese Communist movement, with all its battles and ramifications. Studies in classics and revolution carried Soviet China scholars till the establishment of the new People’s Republic.

The volume of Soviet publications on China, including translations from the Chinese, increased dramatically after 1949, but because the two countries were ostensibly bosom buddies, the writings were neither analytical nor critical. Throughout the 1950s, most of what was published repeated Beijing’s boastful claims and inflated statistics, while neglecting the many signs pointing to the very different direction in which Mao was taking China.

China’s conversion from a warm socialist ally to a bitter enemy occurred over a period of some two years and by 1960-61, there was a drastic drop in the number of Russian publications on China. What was printed quickly changed its focus from P.R.C.’s socialist successes to attacks on Mao Tse-tung’s Great Han chauvinism, as well as to laborious and tedious ideological analysis of the “serious contradictions” within the country. Moreover, most of the writing on China during the 1960s was tinged with a sense of hurt over Chinese ingratitude for all the assistance provided by the Soviet Union in the previous decade and intimated an expectation that China would soon see the light and “return to the fold.” For this type of polemic, knowledge of Marxism-Leninism was more important than a knowledge of China, so that Sinologists in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences played a relatively minor role in berating the P.R.C. and the volume of their publications dropped off sharply. One would expect that by the mid-1960s, some serious studies of China as a foe were initiated, but none were yet forthcoming.

It took the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) and the armed clashes along the Amur River, for Moscow to accept the unhappy fact that the tension between two countries was not a short-term phenomenon and is not likely to disappear in the near future. At the 1971 Moscow conference of Sinologists, it became clear to everyone that the Soviet Union finally decided to treat China as an antagonist. An obvious outgrowth of this decision was an acknowledgment that there is a critical need for the Soviet Union to up-grade its research capability on China and provide policy makers and the military with the objective information on their long-term foe and military and political competitor.

It was not easy for the Soviet Union to implement this decision. For all practical purposes, Sinology did not exist as an established discipline, there was little new blood coming into the field, and a social science base for
the study of contemporary China was also almost non-existent. Where to turn? The obvious answer was the United States.

Because throughout the 1950s and 1960s China was inaccessible to American academics, most China scholars, outside the foreign policy field, tended to pursue studies in history and the humanities. The U.S. government, however, needed up-to-date analysis and information and it needed it “now.” To satisfy this need, the government managed to develop a strong cadre of specialists to keep up with and analyze China’s political, economic, and military developments; and to provide them with the necessary data, large sums of money were spent in obtaining and translating up-to-date materials from and about China.

There were still other important reasons why the study of contemporary China in the United States was so advanced in comparison with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets “were there” in the 1950s and could observe China from the ground, they also had to overcome some inherent weaknesses and handicaps. In order to follow developments in China, a Soviet scholar or bureaucrat had to know the Chinese language, which required years of additional study and greatly limited the number of people available for the task. In contrast, the United States not only had the advantage of having the services of a large number of Chinese Americans with fluent Chinese, but the overwhelming proportion of government researchers, as well as scholars, had daily access to hundreds of pages of translated texts (newspapers, journals, radio broadcasts, and other materials) which covered day-to-day developments in China.

Another Soviet handicap was that they had a surprising shortage of Chinese sources. Because the two countries were on friendly terms in the 1950s and because so few individuals in the Soviet Union could read Chinese, the Soviets did not make a serious effort to collect Chinese publications. In contrast, in the process of studying a potential foe, the United States made a directed and systematic effort to obtain materials from the Chinese mainland in any way possible, mostly through dealers in Hong Kong.

Another Soviet weakness was the rigidity of the system under which research was performed. In the 1950s, neither the Sinologists nor the bureaucrats were permitted to say anything that would reflect adversely on their Chinese friend and neighbor; in the 1960s they were not permitted to
say anything complimentary. And in the 1970s, when Moscow decided it was time to provide the leadership with objective analysis, Soviet specialists discovered yet another system-related handicap. Unlike American analysts who often were able to compensate for inadequate and questionable Chinese data through imagination and creativity, such attributes were not developed within the highly structured Soviet educational system or encouraged within the existing political milieu.

All these reasons account for the diligence with which specialists in the Soviet diplomatic corps identified America’s most influential China watchers in the 1960s and 1970s and explain why they “sat on the doorsteps” of these individuals in the hope of obtaining the latest analysis and estimates on China.

Ironically, now that Russia has developed a relatively small but impressive cadre of scholars capable of doing objective, world-class research on the P.R.C., Moscow’s primary concern is national economic survival and, as part of it, an expansion of trade with China. Under these circumstances the professional future of Russia’s new Sinologist is difficult to predict.

A Note on the Translation

According to Benedetto Croce, the foremost Italian philosopher of the first half of the 20th century, “Translations are like women, if they are beautiful they are not faithful and vice-versa.” Although, no doubt, he was referring to literature, the statement has some validity for all translations. This translation was done in two stages: first, I made a very literal (and ugly) translation of Bazhanov’s chapter; I then went back to make it more readable (more beautiful?) to the English reader. I like to think that I accomplished this without in any way desecrating the author’s meaning, although I must admit that in some instances, I felt I had to leave the original awkwardness to not lose the author’s connotation.

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3 Throughout the text, Bazhanov uses only the initials for first names of the scores of people he mentions. Whenever I could, I provided the full name of the individual at least the first time it appears. If I could not identify the individual with certainty, I left the transliterated name and the initial.
“Geometrical” Concepts of American Political Scientists

American political scientists took a serious interest in China in the 1930s, when that country and the Far East in general began to be seen as an important part of the world. Prior to that, American Sinology found itself under the influence of European, especially French, Sinologists and was limited to Chinese history and culture. Contemporary political problems were not analyzed and American scholars did not take part in formulating American’s China policy. Neither did they influence public opinion which, for all practical purposes, was ignorant of scholarly tracts on China.

In the 1930s, the United States saw the first significant works on China, which immediately attracted the attention of the general reader in American, becoming, in their own way, best sellers. Among them, *The Good Earth*, by Pearl Buck, *Red Star Over China*, by Edgar Snow, *My Nation My People*, by Lin Yutang, were published in numerous editions and gave the American people a more solid idea about the “Middle Kingdom” and about the Chinese nation.

At the same time there appeared political science institutions: International Institute of Pacific Research and its American Council, Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and magazines: *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, *Amerasia*, *China Today*, etc., which were quickly transformed into important forums for scholars of the Far East. Demand for monographs and articles of China scholars continued to grow, and academics began to be asked to work in government agencies.

Most of the leading Sinologists in the pre-World War II period: Thomas Bisson, Derk Bodde, Dorothy Borg, Harold Vinacke, F. Jaffe, William Johnson, Owen Lattimore, Kenneth Latourette, William Lockwood, Nathaniel Peffer, Lawrence Rosinger, D. Stein, Charles Fitzgerald, Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, and others, propagated liberal views and supported the revolutionary events in China. Moreover, what attracted them to the Chinese revolutionary movement was not so much its progressive nature, as the nationalist, petty-bourgeois leadership (headed by Mao Zedong), which would, if it ever came to power, solidify China into the ranks of the “nonaligned”, i.e., anti-Soviet position. The attitudes within the academic circles coincide with the views of many government bureaucrats who dealt in foreign affairs. They also had a considerable influence on the China
policies pursued by the White House prior to, but especially during, World War II and the early post-war years when the government flirted with Mao.

In the beginning of the 1950s, however, the political environment shifted sharply to the right and academics became the targets of the cruelest type of persecution by McCarthyites. This extreme conservatism destroyed professional associations and editorial offices of journals on Asian studies, caused serious harm to activities of public organizations with which they cooperated: Foreign Policy Association, Union of International Relations, Social Science Research Council, etc., and to charitable funds which subsidized Asian studies.

As a result, the reputations of many sinologists was ruined, their role in the formulation of Washington’s China policy was significantly diminished, along with their access to periodic literature. Thus, between 1950 and 1955, *Nation* published 31 articles on China, only three of which were written by China scholars. During the same period of time, *New Republic* published 22 and *Harpers* 7 articles dealing with China, none of which were written by academics. Other journals and newspapers also almost completely stopped publishing articles by China scholars. Editorial offices accepted articles of those few Asianists, e.g. George Taylor and Franz Michaels, who held hostile, right-wing views of China. It should be noted that during these years, only five dissertations were written on China in the United States.

All this could not help having an effect on U.S. foreign policy. Having eliminated the influence of academics in Asian studies, the Taiwan lobby, with it supporters in Congress, in business circles, and in the Washington bureaucracy, could now, without any interference, press its own views on the government and the public.

With the demise of McCarthyism, however, changes occurred in the intellectual atmosphere within the scholarly community. Prominent scholars with the most diverse political views demanded a change in U.S. strategy and called for a recognition of principles of world cooperation, for implementing disarmament measures, and relaxing international tensions.

With the resumption of discussions on the “China question” in Congress and in the press, individual Sinologists subjected Washington’s China policy to criticism. At a Columbia University conference in 1956,
Sinologist Doak Barnett acknowledged the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and suggested the acceptance of the Chinese People’s Republic (P.R.C.) as a reality. He recommended repealing travel restrictions to China by American correspondents and scholars and the importation of some of the more important publications from China. Later, Barnett headed a seminar on U.S. and Chinese policies in Asia, organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, which resulted in the publication of his sensational book, *Communist China in Asia*.

In 1959, a San Francisco research organization, Conlon Associates, in collaboration with Asia scholars at the University of California, prepared a study for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia,” which expressed even bolder, for that era, ideas on the “China question.” The authors of the report noted the achievements of the P.R.C. and expressed the opinion that by the end of the 20th century “China, in all likelihood, will become one of the major world powers.” They came out against a hard line approach toward the P.R.C., and for a policy of “education and negotiation,” which, in final analysis, should normalize Sino-American relations. Similar thoughts were expressed by other academics at university forums, in articles, and in monographs.

As in earlier years, however, these positions were not void of danger. Representatives of the Taiwan lobby continued to attack those who dared express new positions on the “China question.” Richard Conlon, the head of the above-mentioned San Francisco organization Conlon Associates, was ruined and literally squeezed out of the city by the pro-Taiwan forces, headed by California Senator William Knowland. Individuals who sympathized with the P.R.C. were blacklisted in the book *The Red China Lobby*, and in hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles.

Nevertheless, Beijing’s growing anti-Sovietism gradually cleared the way for political scientists to introduce changes in the U.S. approach toward China. In the early 1960s a series of works were published, whose authors attempted to present an “objective” and “long-range” view of Sino-Soviet differences and what the consequences would be for the world at large. One of the first to analyze the reasons for Mao’s anti-Soviet policies was Donald Zagoria. After him, this theme was researched by Doak Barnett, Allen Whiting, Alice Hsieh, Robert Scalapino, and Robert North.
Along with these government-connected, conservative scholars, younger spokesmen in the socio-political life of the United States made their opinions known. After the mid-1950s, at the initiative of individual educational and private institutions, and later under the aegis of Congress, the United States introduced a “national defense education” program. Its goal was to train qualified cadres for government agencies dealing with foreign affairs who would have a broad knowledge of military strategy, international political and economic relations, and who would be able to work on the fundamental goals of American foreign policy, including the policy toward China. In 1954, such a program was started at Harvard University, followed by Columbia, California, and other universities. In 1958, the law about the training of specialists in the field of national defense was passed by Congress. China studies in America also started to receive large financial and organizational assistance from philanthropic organizations, such as the Ford Foundation.

Thanks to these programs the United States started to acquire a new and brilliant group of China scholars, whose very different views were formulated under conditions that were quite different from those which prevailed in the United States during the McCarthy period. The works of young China scholars clearly showed sympathy toward China and the policies of the Beijing leadership. They spoke of the “achievements” of the Chinese Communist Party in the field of socio-economic construction and made efforts to create a “more objective view” of China among their readers. The young specialists often slid into becoming apologists for the Beijing regime, especially stressing its anti-Soviet position in foreign policy. Several of their published works became popular and had a significant influence on the public, especially on university students and the young generation of scholars. In this regard first mention should be given to books by Robert Blum and Franz Schurmann.

Between the conservative and the liberal academic elites, basic differences appeared in their evaluations of the overall international situation, as well as the many specific events on the world scene. These differences reached a critical point during Washington’s Vietnam adventure. Scholars close to the government circles and leaning toward the “establishment,” supported Lyndon Johnson’s policies in Indochina. These specialists: William Barnds, Samuel Griffith, Dennis Doolin, Yuan-li Wu, William Whitson, Alexander Eckstein, and others, considered it imperative
that the White House take decisive measures in defending American interests in Asia.

On the other hand, Liberals, dubbed “revisionists” for their views, insisted that the United States decline the role of world policeman and stop interfering in the affairs of other countries. In the second half of the 1960s, “revisionists,” who were subjected to substantial radicalization during the anti-war demonstrations, broke off their relations with the East Asia academic establishment and created their own net of academic political organizations, such as the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Institute of San Francisco Bay Region, Indo-China Research Center, and others. Among the “revisionists,” a group of scholars quickly gained national prominence: Robert Barnett, B. Bershteyn, Robert Blum, D. Dauer, M. Raskin, Mark Selden, Edward Friedman, and Franz Schurmann.

Among the younger academics there were also those who, despite their disagreement with the post-war U.S. strategy in Asia, were ready to cooperate with government agencies because of career considerations. These young people accepted positions in the Department of State and other institutions in the Federal bureaucracy dealing with foreign affairs or accepted government contracts in various academic institutions. Gradually moving to the right as a result of their work in government agencies, they nevertheless contributed to the promotion among the American academic elite of points of view on the “China question” that had previously been considered to be seditious. Among the more prominent young China scholars who joined the establishment were: Richard Morsteen, Morton Abramowitz, Morton Halpern, Winston Lord, Richard Holbrook, Michael Oksenberg, Harry Harding, Anthony Lake, John Lewis, Ross Terrill, Richard Solomon, Richard Baum, and others.

Despite ideological and political contradictions that continued to divide Asian studies in the United States, by the end of the 1960s, American academics of all stripes actually came together in their conviction that an understanding must be reached with Beijing. It is noteworthy, for example, that when 198 Asian scholars called for a “two China” policy in the spring of 1966, none of their colleagues objected. And in 1971, when 114 China scholars placed a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, calling for transferring the China seat in the United Nations to Beijing, only two scholars signed a petition supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s representation in the international body.
Conservatives and liberal-“revisionists” of course saw the necessity of closer contact with the People’s Republic of China in different ways, but both groups headed in the same direction, focusing the leadership’s and the public’s attention on the “China question” and prodding Washington to re-examine the country’s policy of non-recognition of Beijing.

In the 1960s, Asian scholars’ ability to influence U.S. China policy increased considerably. In the first place, the United States was undergoing an ideological and political crisis and the ruling class was experiencing a burning need for fresh concepts and ideas; in the second place, both quantitatively and qualitatively, Asian studies were raised to a higher level.

Between 1951 and 1970, the number of large educational and research centers on China in the United States increase from 7 to 30. From the end of 1950 until 1970, government and private organizations in the United States invested about 70 million dollars in China studies and over 100 individuals received their PhDs in the contemporary political and economic problems of that country; all together, 400 people defended their dissertations in the field of Sinology. As a result, at the start of the 1970s, the United States had 200-225 political scientists in the China field whose opinions were listened to by the governing circles.

Representatives of the scholarly world were among the founders of the National Committee on the United States-China Relations in 1966. Its first Chairman was the conservative professor Robert Scalapino, but its executive committee included Sinologists Doak Barnett, George Taylor, Alexander Eckstein, and others. During the same year, the National Academy of Sciences, American Council of Learned Societies, and the Social Science Research Council joined forces to establish the Committee for Scholarly Communications with the People’s Republic of China.

Scholars were quickly brought in to work on Washington’s Far Eastern and Southeast Asian policies. The Department of State created a high-level group of China specialists, which included John Fairbank, Doak Barnett, Robert Scalapino, Lucian Pye, George Taylor, and others. These same individuals repeatedly testified at congressional hearings on the “China question,” and, as many lawmakers admitted, managed to change their conception of the P.R.C.. In the course of these hearings in 1966, Senator Wayne Morse, for example, told John Fairbank: “Doctor, I am speaking for
myself, but I think I can say for all my colleagues, that in the course of the lesson you gave us this morning, we became much more informed individuals.” At the same hearing, Senator Albert Gore noted that he was ready to listen to John Fairbank’s lectures for a whole year.

Political scientists found ever more occasions to express their views on the “China question” in the pages of newspapers and magazines, in public political forums, and on radio and television. In California alone, between 1966 and 1970, the press published more than 500 items on the “China questions” prepared by academics, who also appeared several thousand times on radio and television, and in every possible forum. China scholars published about 100 articles in leading magazines, including *Newsweek* and *Time*, which previously had ignored them. An October 1969 discussion on NBC had a significant effect on the country. Some of the more prominent Orientalists participated: Doak Barnett, John Burns, Roderick MacFarquhar, Lucian Pye, Edwin Reischauer, Allen Whiting, Richard Walker, and unanimously announced that China “is not a threat” to the United States and that China’s “main enemy” is the Soviet Union. Academics made full use of the Sino-Soviet differences.

Washington’s shift toward normalization of relations with China furthered the influence of Asia scholars in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. As early as in his inauguration speech, Richard Nixon had expressed a number of thoughts on Asian problems containing recommendations formulated by a group of professors-Orientalists as an assignment from the president’s national defense advisor, Henry Kissinger. The theoretical analysis of the new U.S. strategy in Asia, specifically regarding the “China question,” continued in the National Security Council, which was staffed by young political scientists chosen from the country’s leading research institutes and universities. Moreover, the close collaboration between experienced bureaucrats in agencies dealing with foreign affairs and scholars who remained in the academic world, provided all the necessary validation of the steps taken by the White House in the sphere of U.S.-China relations.

The influence of scholars on American foreign policy was also evident in unofficial channels. Many American authors note, for example, that China scholar Allen Whiting made a deep impression on Henry Kissinger in the course of a series of discussions held in August 1969. Whiting “opened Kissinger’s eyes” regarding the “real” underlying causes of Sino-Soviet confrontation; he explained that Beijing’s “objective” interest in
drawing closer to the West was grounded on China’s opposition to the Soviet Union; and, in this connection, pointed out the benefits the United States could achieve by taking advantage of the differences between the Soviet Union and China. During this period, when the United States was preparing for opening a dialogue with China, the president’s advisor consulted with a number of other specialists: Doak Barnett, Jerome Cohen, Lucian Pye, Edwin Reischauer, George Taylor, James Thompson, and John Fairbank. Henry Kissinger was also influenced by his former colleagues from Harvard University, political scientists: F. Bator, Seymour Lipset, Richard Neustadt, and law professor Abraham Yarmolinsky.

In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger notes that from December 1970 till April 1971, he met with three groups of scholars. These discussions were quite important in determining the goals, philosophical concepts, and actual problems in Washington’s policies toward the PRC. Books and articles by Edgar Snow, Ross Terrill, David Bloodworth, John Fairbank, and Stuart Schram were also useful to the National Security Council.

In truth, when it came to tactical steps towards the China policy, Henry Kissinger was more cautious in accepting the recommendations of political scientists who were not directly connected with the government. These academics, writes the former Secretary of State, “did not have their fingers on the current pulse of foreign affairs” and therefore, on occasion, gave wrong advice. Thus, some of them presumably attempted to convince Kissinger that Beijing’s primary concerns were Vietnam and Taiwan, and that without preliminary settlement of these problems it would be impossible to normalize Sino-American relations. They also argued that improved relations with China must be reached on the basis of cooperation in commercial and cultural fields, and so forth.

Even now many academics continue to participate in determining Washington’s policies toward the “China question.” Some of them hold responsible positions in the National Security Council, the State Department, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies dealing with international problems. Others have no official relation with the federal bureaucracy, but, working in research institutes and universities, they serve the government by preparing analyses, providing estimates and recommendations, taking survey trips to the P.R.C. and adjacent countries at the request of Washington, and so on.
As before, Orientalists are regular guests of Congress. Since the 1972 P.R.C. visit of the American president, more than 60 scholars have appeared at hearings of Asia-related Senate and House committees. Some of the political scientists serve as advisors to American lawmakers. Thus, Lucian Pye enlightened Senator Samuel G. Jackson about the “China question,” Jerome Cohen advised Senator Kennedy, and so on.

In the 1970s, American commercial circles created an impressive demand for China specialists. Large monopolies and medium and small firms literally buried China scholars with orders and offers. Every possible type of cooperation was developed between business and scholar-Orientalists. Many China scholars, especially of the younger generation, began working for companies and banks. Specifically, the Bank of America, one of the world’s largest, invited a large group of scholars into its research department, a number of China specialists staff the U.S.-China Trade Council, and so on. Other China specialists act as consultants for monopolies or as middlemen between the monopolies and Beijing. George Taylor “was used” by the Boeing Aerospace Corporation, Stanley Lubman represented the interests of the American petroleum corporations on the China market, Barry Richman helped Southern California industrial companies to penetrate the Chinese market.

Scholars are enticed by business to organize and lead conferences and round-table discussions dealing with prospects of trade with China. They participate in welcoming Chinese delegations in the United States, accompany business representatives on their trips to China, and, on orders from business circles, they prepare a variety of reference materials on the Chinese market. A large volume of work on China for monopolies is prepared by educational-research centers: Stanford Research Center, Hudson Institute, Brookings Institution, and the Los Angeles International Business Center. The latter, for example, before closing its doors in the mid-1970s, was financed by 60 banks and corporations interested in commercial relations with the P.R.C.

The media is also now using the services of China scholars much more frequently than in the past. For example, throughout the 1970s virtually all-important developments between the United States and the P.R.C. as well as domestic events in China, were covered by American television with the help of Sinologists. Some television companies placed China specialists on their payroll as commentators. Large national
newspapers and magazines, as well as small local ones, not only contract articles on China by academics, but rely on their opinions in preparing editorial positions. And it is not an exaggeration to say that in the United States, there is not a single China specialist in the field of political science who has not appeared on television or published an article on the “China question.”

The influence of China scholars on the general public occurred in other ways as well. The participation of Sinologists in various public-political associations has already been discussed, but beyond that, they are always interacting with a variety of audiences, starting with restricted high society clubs and ending with China seminars for ordinary Americans on the order of such propaganda organizations as, for example, councils on international problems. The more prominent Asian scholars appear up to 100 times a year in front of the most diverse segments of the American public. In states and cities, where there is a raised interest in China, as in the San Francisco Bay region for example, individual Sinologists have become full members of the local elite.

The rapprochement between Washington and China has increased the demands on China scholars. Publishers willingly print works by Sinologists and encourage them to prepare new books devoted to international and domestic politics of the P.R.C.

It must be said that with the broadening of U.S.-China contacts, scholars have found some competitors in journalists, columnists, and even tourists who, after spending some time in the P.R.C., return with articles, brochures, and even books about the country. So far, however, they have not hurt the popularity of writings by academics in the China field. Political-economic analysis and predictions about the future development of China society, which has a special interest for the American elite, are still within the purview of the educated. Some of the political science journals in Asian studies, such as Asia Mail, Asian Survey, and Asian Affairs, are well known among people interested in foreign affairs.

The increased role of Asian scholars in American society also occurred because Chinese topics strike a responsive chord among school children and especially university students. Programs connected to the study of China have increased by 30-40 percent in the last years and in some universities and colleges by as much as 80-100 percent. The growth of China
research continues and they receive generous subsidies from the government as well as from private foundations and corporations. The Social Science Research Council alone made over 200 major grants to programs meant “to improve understanding” with Asia in general and the P.R.C. in particular. This conspicuous growth in the activities of Asia scholars in the socio-political and, to some extent even the economic life of the country, makes them an important factor in influencing Washington’s policy toward China and international relations in general.

There are a number of reasons why scholars are consistently pushing the United States to broaden and deepen interdependence with Beijing and promote a positive approach toward China. In the first place, they are interested in cooperating with the P.R.C. from a professional point of view. This desire affects Sinologists as well as representatives of other specialties, whose interest in scholarly exchanges with the Chinese has been peaked by their inability to enter China for two previous decades and by the hullabaloo created in the United States around the normalization of U.S.-China relations. Contacts with the P.R.C. during the past years were established by a number of national-level academic associations, as well as individual university research centers: the University of California established such contacts in 1973, Stanford University in 1974, and so on. Most scholars who have established contacts with their Chinese colleagues avoid any criticism of the P.R.C. fearing that they might elicit adverse response from the Beijing leadership and lose their connections. This behavior is especially prevalent among the Chinese scholars, because for them to visit the P.R.C. is a question of professional prestige and, in the final analysis, success in their career.

In the second place, China scholars quite naturally wish to call the attention of the government and society in general to U.S.-China relations, because by dramatizing the “China question,” they promote their own interests: they obtain positions in government agencies, receive larger grants, and increase the popularity of books on China.

Third, and finally, quite a few China scholars are liberals who, for ideological reasons, either do not notice or else ignore the P.R.C.’s faults and make every possible effort to improve America’s perception of that country.
Clearly apologetic for China’s foreign and domestic policies are the works of such China scholars as Richard Baum, Peter Van Ness, John Gurley, D. Damyen, Victor Li, Richard Pfeffer, John Service, John Starr, Ross Terrill, Richard Walker, B. Ward, Benjamin Schwartz, and others. Some of the academics with pro-Beijing leanings promote Maoism as a means of solving China’s basic problems, through the creation of new spiritual and moral values, which in a very basic way differ from the predominant Western concepts of social development. Others attempt to prove that Mao Zedong’s rule of personality and his adventurous political and economic experiments were imperative for China. Yet others develop the thesis of a non-aggressive Beijing.

At the same time it is impossible to say that all Asia scholars have the same views regarding the P.R.C. Considering that academics have been participating in China debates for more than ten years now, it is useful, at least in general terms, to consider their main positions with regard to the “China question.”

During the first stages in the development of Sino-American contacts, from the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 to the December 1978 announcement establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, the primary topic of discussion in the academic world was how to strengthen the dialogue between Washington and Beijing and prevent the P.R.C.’s return to positions held by countries in the socialist system. These goals were never questioned.

A significant proportion of the academics, primarily liberals, called for the normalization of Sino-American relations by quickly settling the “Taiwan problem.” The question of Taiwan, some of them claimed, was of fundamental importance to Beijing, and if it were not settled in the near future, the Chinese leadership would re-examine the foreign policy that calls for closer relations with the United States. Among the representatives of the academic establishment, this position was expressed by Doak Barnett, Allen Whiting, and Ross Terrill. Similar thoughts were expressed by Roger Brown, a China scholar working in the CIA, by Columbia University professor Thomas Bernstein, by University of Oregon professor T. Thompson, and Pittsburgh law professor Karl Herbst.

Other academics who followed this school of thought believed that simply the establishment of normal diplomatic relations would open
possibilities for developing a variety of contacts between the United States and China and make it possible to enter into a lasting dialogue with Beijing by protecting it from short-term fluctuations in world politics. Still others were interested in bi-lateral contacts with the P.R.C. for more pragmatic reasons: to facilitate the study of China’s domestic situation, increase trade relations, and exert an ideological influence on Chinese society.

The number of people favoring immediate normalization of Sino-American relations fluctuated with the domestic politics in China, the state of the Sino-American dialogue, as well as with the atmosphere in the U.S.-Soviet relations. During critical periods, when Chinese leadership conflicts were severe, for example, in 1976, before and immediately after Mao Zedong’s death, the voices of those who wished to speed up normalization of relations between China and the United States were especially loud, and they were joined by political scientists with moderate and conservative views. At other times, which were considered to be more favorable by Washington in terms of U.S.-China relations, moderates and conservatives, and even individual liberals, suggested greater patience in recognizing Beijing in order to gain some preliminary concessions with regard to the “Taiwan question.”

Among academics who recommended diplomatic recognition of China, there was no unanimity about the methods for solving the “Taiwan question.” Allen Whiting and D. Wong, for example, supported the use of the “Japanese formula,” accepting Beijing’s conditions with regard to Taiwan, but maintaining unofficial commercial and other contacts with the island. John Fairbank spread the idea of giving Taiwan autonomy within the framework of the P.R.C., William Barnds considered it permissible to accept Chinese conditions, as long as the United States legally reserved the right to continue commercial contacts with Taiwan and to place weapons on the island. Victor Li and John Lewis suggested a reduction in American representation on Taiwan to a chargé d’affaires and an exchange of ambassadors with the P.R.C. giving Beijing and Taipei “the opportunity to find their own solutions to China’s domestic contradictions.” Robert Barnett, director of the Washington Center of the Asia Society, and Harvard professor Jerome Cohen insisted on an unconditional break in official relations with Taipei, assuming that the Kuomintang regime will not suffer from this, because China “does not have either the desire or the physical capability to conquer Taiwan by force.”
There were also other options for solving the Taiwan problem: a plebiscite on the island to determine its political future, U.S. termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan while maintaining the U.S.-Taiwan defense agreement, a break in official relations with the Chiang Kai-shek followers while at the same time declaring Washington’s willingness to defend the Taiwan Straits, and so forth.

The second school of thought regarding the “China question” consisted almost exclusively of conservatives who categorically rejected Beijing’s conditions with respect to Taiwan, while some of its representatives are, in general, against any changes in the status of U.S.-Taiwan relations. In defense of this position, they argued that by leaving an ally at the mercy of fate, the United States would undermine its international authority and create panic among the small unaligned nations, especially in Southeast Asia, which depend on the United States. They also expressed concern that such a stop might create a breeding ground of tension in the Taiwan Straits region, as a result of which the United States could find itself drawn into a conflict with the P.R.C.

Some Sinologists belonging to this second school of thought stressed that simply on the grounds of “honor” and “morals,” the United States had no right to sacrifice Taiwan. As an alternative concession to Beijing, they suggested maintaining a “two-China” policy, i.e. recognizing the P.R.C., without cutting off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Finally, there were even those academics who believed that it was impossible to settle the Taiwan problem because of the pro-Taiwan disposition of the American public and the large investments on the island by U.S. monopolies.

The third school of thought, just as the second one, was also composed of conservative political scientists who also objected to any concessions to China with regard to the “Taiwan question.” They differed from the China scholars in the second group, however, by calling attention to the fact that any weakening of U.S. support for Taiwan could only hurt the dialogues with Beijing. From their point of view, the Chinese leadership does not see the Taiwan problem as of primary importance and no longer wishes for the United States to leave the island. According to these Orientalists, Washington’s break with the Kuomintang would be proof of American impotence and cause Beijing to lose respect for the United States, as a betrayer of allies. The Chinese would be disappointed in U.S. ability to stand up to the Soviet Union and would be forced to make peace with the
U.S.S.R. Most importantly, claimed the representatives of this group, it was necessary for the United States to prove to Beijing its power and its readiness to hold the Soviet Union in check.

Among the scholars holding the above views emerged an opinion that Washington and Beijing should coordinate their actions with regard to strategic questions, that military technology and arms be transferred to China, and finally, that an open Washington-Beijing alliance be created, with a possibility of including in it Tokyo and the west-European partners of the United States.

In the beginning this notion was proposed rather timidly by a few individuals, but with the passage of time and the fanning of the flames of anti-Soviet psychosis in the United States, they became more vocal and more persistent in pushing it, garnering ever greater support within the military-industrial and conservative political circles. Specifically, it was noted that China was the only “trump card” still available to the United States which could help Washington apply “pressure” on the Soviet Union. Moreover, by drawing a significant proportion of Soviet military forces to its borders, the P.R.C. becomes an important part of western defense and making use of it would not only satisfy the military interests of the West, but strengthen the P.R.C.’s trust in the capitalist world.

The listed arguments, or at least some of them, supported many of the political scientists who earlier had fought for the urgent settlement of the “Taiwan question.” Now they announced that military cooperation could pacify Beijing and neutralize and lessen the sharpness of its dissatisfaction with the absence of a Taiwan solution. The “breathing space” achieved in this way would be used for the gradual psychological preparation of American public opinion for the break in relations with the Kuomintang leaders, and, at the same time, for increasing Taipei’s defense potential.

However, among the political scientists who proposed establishing and “anchor” in U.S. foreign policy toward China, there were many opponents of both liberal and conservative persuasions. Some of them stressed that the development of a dialogue with the USSR was the key to peace and stability and that U.S.-Soviet relations should not be placed in danger in order to achieve less important subsidiary relations with Beijing. These international specialists called attention to the fact that the relaxation of relations with the P.R.C. was meant specifically to improve Soviet-
American relations on conditions that would be favorable for the United States. To bracket Washington with Beijing would contradict this strategy, and reduce its effectiveness to nothing, because it would completely undermine Soviet confidence in American foreign policy goals.

Many China specialists believed that it is not vital to call attention to the instability and unreliability of Beijing as a partner, the danger being that at any moment the Chinese could once again radically change their political course and use the military technology acquired from abroad against the suppliers, the United States and its allies. The other argument against closer ties with Beijing was that, in any case, the Soviet Union could not be frightened by the “China card,” by military handouts, and similar attempts to exacerbate the international situation.

Some of the proponents of speedier establishment of diplomatic relations with the P.R.C continued to insist that the “Taiwan question” was of primary concern to Beijing. They did not deny the validity of using the China factor in the pursuit of anti-Soviet goals, but felt that the playing of the “China card” will be successful only after overcoming the Taiwan “obstacle” in the normalization of relations with China.

Standing apart in the political arguments that were tearing apart the academic circles in the United States during all of the 1970s was a group of right-wing international relations scholars who did not believe in the wisdom of closer relations with Beijing. According to them, the normalization of Sino-American relations would make sense only if China would make radical changes in its relations with the United States, specifically, if China would agree with the “two China” formula, and so on. Thus, John Copper, research associate at the Hoover Institute of War and Peace, suggested setting aside the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasizing the strengthening of relations with American allies. Some other right-leaning political scientists advocated Washington’s return to the foreign policy of previous decades.

Some of those who objected to the taking of an active role in the “China question” held that, in any case, whatever the United States did, it would not be able either to influence the P.R.C.’s foreign policy or its relations with the Soviet Union. Other specialists deem such involvement unnecessary because China always has and always will consider its “northern neighbor” to be an enemy. Ray Cline wrote that giving Beijing
handouts just so it will maintain an anti-Soviet position is comparable to paying the Mafia not to love the police.

The sharpness of the polemic within the American academic circles about the normalization of U.S.-P.R.C. relations decreased in 1977-78 when the new Beijing leadership’s policy changed to complete rapprochement with the West. Many of the conservative political scientists who previously demonstrated a hard line toward the P.R.C. now relinquished their objections to various concessions for Beijing. Most of the academics reacted positively to the proposal by President Jimmy Carter to recognize the P.R.C. and only individual political scientists, Chalmers Johnson, Ray Kline, Robert Scalapino, and some others, criticized the White House because the conditions of Sino-American normalization did not provide for adequate concessions for the United States.

In the meantime, after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, debates flared up about what American strategy should be in the context of the “large triangle,” U.S.S.R. – U.S.A. – P.R.C. A significant part of the academic world, following the lead of reactionary groupings of monopolistic capitalists, came out for a change in direction toward Beijing. After the worsening of the climate in U.S.-Soviet relations, advocates of improved relations with China multiplied, absorbing political scientists with the most diverse points of view, from liberals: Michael Oksenberg, Jerome Cohen, and others to such confirmed conservatives as Franz Michael, Chalmers Johnson, William Whitson, and Frank Trager. At the same time, many of the conservative academics did not in any way change their negative attitude toward the P.R.C. and considered Beijing to be only a temporary fellow traveler in the battle against the Soviet Union.

Among those who objected to the playing of the “China card” were political scientists with varying ideological views, liberals and moderates as well as conservatives. Their arguments against the anti-Soviet maneuvers by Washington and Beijing differed widely. Academics with liberal and moderate views were primarily concerned that the geopolitical alliance between the United States and the P.R.C. would only aggravate the international situation and threaten world peace. In the words of research associate G. Daffi of Stanford University, Washington’s efforts “to threaten the Soviet Union with the help of the P.R.C…can, for a long time, damage any hope of settling the international problems.”
In the atmosphere of a serious anti-Soviet psychosis which has gripped the American ruling class due to periodic defeats of imperialism on the world stage, less and less attention and trust is given to opinions of sensible academics. At the same time, under the new leadership of President Ronald Reagan, considerable influence is exerted by the camp of conservative professors with direct ties to the Republican administration, who oppose the playing of the “China card.” Reagan’s supporters, Ray Cline and Richard Walker, have earlier established themselves as the principal foes of close relations with Beijing. Their recurring themes are: the P.R.C. is not a reliable partner, is a country which has global ambitions, and is a threat to the world and to Asia. According to Cline, China is not against supporting insurgents in Asian countries. The future of Taiwan also concerns these observers. Walker and Cline believe the position taken by the previous administration of Jimmy Carter with regard to the “Taiwan question” is a “betrayal of an ally,” and repeatedly have expressed their support for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan. They look with suspicion at the current Chinese line calling for a “reconciliation” with Taipei.

Suspicion of Beijing comes through the statements of many other academics working the conservative think tanks. They preach naked anti-Sovietism and profess reactionary, belligerent, doctrines toward the Soviet Union. That is why it would not be surprising if in the final analysis, anti-Sovietism will lead the conservative think tanks to approve policies that advocate using China to “pressure” the U.S.S.R. Already in the beginning of 1981, soon after the appearance of Reagan in the White House, scholars in the above-mentioned scientific research institutions, as well as those involved in the practical work of the administration, have voiced their support for continuing the flow of military technology to Beijing. The new difficulties for the United States in foreign relations, and they are inevitable, considering that American imperialism does not reject its general expansionist course, can further strengthen the attraction of reactionary political scientists toward Beijing’s anti-Sovietism.
On the Scene

The Two Chinas: Student Orientations in the PRC

Wayne Bert

Which China will emerge as the 21st century political and economic power? A China where the citizens are concerned with careers and a comfortable level of consumption? A China where consumers drive the cars that make Beijing less and less livable as traffic jams proliferate? The China with people buying large houses in far-flung suburban locations? The China increasingly becoming an “ordinary” country, with people on the up and up, mainly concerned about careers, consumption and the climb up the social ladder. Or will a second China emerge? A China where people are passionate about the recovery of Taiwan? Where they repeat ad nauseam anti-Japanese rhetoric and worry about recovery of the Diaoyu Islands (claimed by Japan), look forward to integrating the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea into China and mull over suspicions about what the upstart power India is about in the Indian Ocean? Will it be the China whose students worry about the democratic “colored” revolutions (Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic) and the hegemony of the sole superpower, even in China’s backyard?

These themes emerged in the classes I taught in two Chinese cities during the last couple years. I first taught English at Tianjin University, an accomplished technically oriented university an hour and a half by train from the capital. My students represented a wide range of skills and levels of preparation. In some ways they reminded me of the young people in fundamentalist protestant church camps I went to as a kid: very nice but rather naïve about the way the world works. And there was the occasional bright student from the countryside, disadvantaged but more than making up for it with an avaricious desire to learn. Generally speaking and with some exceptions, one had trouble generating a lot of interest in social or political topics in class. Like the students in any mid-range state school in the US, they were interested in getting through school and getting a good job. They focused on the usual personal concerns and interests and for most politics was a rather abstract subject of secondary interest. As the students said, this was particularly the case for the women. As a China specialist who had
started my career during the turbulence of the Maoist years, I sometimes had to pinch myself as a reminder that I really was in China. In my students’ minds, at least, politics was no longer in command, as Mao had put it. These students were familiar in their focus on the personal and the private, even if there was more concern with protecting tradition and reporting on emperors that lived centuries ago than one was likely to find in contemporary US schools. These students are the building blocks of bourgeois society, a quiet, subdued society where routine, the good life and day to day concerns reign supreme. For China to become a normal country, a country that will realize its place in the international system and play a responsible role there, the contribution of the Tianjin students, consumers with Chinese characteristics, will be vital. They provide normalcy, predictability and stability to today’s China. They are the middle class that wants what middle classes in all countries want: a comfortable predictable existence where they and their children can realize the good life. China has made tremendous progress in realizing that dream.

The atmosphere was different when I moved to the elite China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. There I taught international relations and American foreign policy. Many of these students were moving on to government jobs, some would be in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. These students were much more overtly nationalistic. Some of the brightest students in China, they were very interested in politics and much more aware of the issues. Reports and papers concentrated heavily on China oriented issues, especially Sino-Japanese relations and the “recovery” of Taiwan. Discussions were lively and I often directly and frankly defended my more Western perspective, even as they argued their Chinese vision instead. Why does the US frustrate the culmination of the Chinese revolution (the recovery of Taiwan)? How can the Sino-Japanese relationship improve given the failure of the Japanese to take responsibility for and acknowledge the historical reality of what has happened in East Asia? The spread of the “China threat” rhetoric is pernicious given China’s emphasis on peace and development and its commitment to a “peaceful rise.” The third world is severely disadvantaged in the international system because the rich countries exploit the poor and frustrate their development by determining the rules of the system. A multipolar international system is emerging (in spite of the experts who maintain the US hold on a unipolar system is without parallel). Why do the Indians hate us so? Sometimes to listen to my student talk, one would think that everybody threatens China, but China is a threat to nobody.
But this impression is too simple. Listening more closely, it is possible to see that while many students are quite nationalistic, many are thoughtful and try to do careful analysis. I was happy to discredit one argument I had heard: that the brightest students are the most nationalistic. It is rather the opposite. The frustration from teaching in China does not stem just from the students taking positions on issues that parallel those of their government. It comes from what the students have not been taught about providing evidence for their arguments and defining concepts on the basis of observation and experience. This results in a kind of rhetorical writing and argument that is short on evidence, very familiar to those who regularly peruse the writing of the scholars and propagandists in China who pontificate on international relations. This writing was the norm before the 1980s when Marxism and Maoism were taken seriously. Much of the effect of that training is still felt today (or is it the effect of traditional Chinese culture?). Students tend to be focused on theory, often oblivious to the idea that unless you can ground theory in fact it serves little function. One example will illustrate the problem. Students told me overwhelmingly that the international system is unfavorable to poor countries trying to raise their standard of living. My response to that was that China, starting as a poor country, has had a growth rate of 9-10 percent or higher for more than two decades. Are those two statements consistent, or is further explanation required? Not surprisingly, these analytical deficiencies often made it difficult to have a focused discussion.

It is hard to define exactly the problem in getting a more balanced approach in the classroom. Obviously, if students are never taught modern research methodology, they won’t do good analysis and research. I encountered little evidence that they get that training, even in this elite school. But there is also a problem with their attitude toward history. The Chinese are at once too little aware of the actual sequence of events, but still obsessed with that legacy. Even though China has “opened” to the West, one gets the strong impression that both students and their elders are still carrying on that centuries old debate over how much China should “borrow” from the outside. How many of our Chinese values and traditions should we sacrifice for the sake of modernization and a free flow of information? The obsession with this question, however, does not always lead to substantive insights on what the issues are or how they might be resolved. And while I was often assured that the students are trained in history, I got little in the
way of specifics and too few signs in class of any real knowledge of the historical legacy.

Similarly, passion for democracy seems well contained. Nationalist concerns often trump concern with democracy. Docile by American standards, many students seemed to prefer strong leaders and a little ruthlessness to representative institutions. For those doing well in China, democracy is an abstraction that may seem remote and secondary to more immediate career and living concerns. All this being said, however, a little digging often produces an assumption that democracy is both desirable and inevitable. And in the poor and neglected rural areas, there is also more interest in vehicles for protest. The top leadership is not paranoid if it is losing some sleep over the potential “fire next time.”

One of the biggest obstacles to change is the difficulty of getting information, especially books and materials from the outside. If the media provide only the bland and sanitized fare one gets in China, how can you learn? If the best writing is not published in China and it requires dollars to buy these books abroad, how will you obtain them? And if there is little encouragement in the classroom to throw off the old ways of thinking and rely on the evidence you have, how can intellectual life be expected to flower?

These more politicized Beijing students will provide leadership and create policy as China becomes an increasingly influential power. That leadership and those leaders, however, must be grounded in reality and more interested in understanding our complex world than were the Maoists when they radicalized China decades ago. Both groups of students need a better education that can only come from opening up the system and stressing analysis rather than a predetermined result. China is moving in that direction. Each generation is more sophisticated than the last educated under this regime. My best students were very impressive. From the perspective of those in the West, China is moving too slowly, but in the Chinese timeframe, the progress has been phenomenal. The West should encourage change, but American conservatives should also remember that there are limits to the pace of orderly change. In the West patience with developments in China is a virtue.
The Critics


**Reviewed by Edward McCord and Diana Xiong**

The publication of this book is significant not only because it is the first attempt to write a comprehensive history of Chinese philanthropy but because it represents an effort to effect a radical change in the understanding of philanthropy in China both as a subject of historical study and as a contemporary phenomenon. As the authors frankly note in their introduction, “leftist” influences that dominated after the founding of the People’s Republic turned the traditional esteem for philanthropic activities in China upside-down. Western charities, largely led by foreign missionaries, were damned as extensions of imperialism. Chinese philanthropy was condemned as a means by which elites consolidated their control over Chinese society. Thus all “so-called” philanthropy was denigrated as nothing more than a cover for foreign and ruling class oppression. Meanwhile, it was also argued that the establishment of socialist society eliminated any need for private charities. Indeed it was feared that allowing their continued existence would be taken as an implicit acknowledgement of the inability of the socialist state to meet the needs of its people. Thus the Chinese government moved quickly in the 1950s to close down or take over both Western and Chinese philanthropies.

This leftist perception of philanthropy slowly came under attack in the 1980s, but alternate views did not really gain strength until the 1990s. One of the co-authors of this book, Zhou Qiuguang, was an early proponent for an academic reappraisal of philanthropy, reflected in his 1991 book that detailed, in a strongly positive light, the charitable orphanage/school organized by the prominent early 20th century reformer, and early Republican Premier, Xiong Xiling (*Xiong Xiling yu cishan jiaoyu shiye*. Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe). A new context for this reappraisal was also provided by growing recognition in the Chinese government of the potential value of private charities in meeting needs beyond its own capacity. Thus the book cites a number of official statements in the mid-1990s that private philanthropy was needed by Chinese society and should be supported (pp. 5-6). More recently, no less a figure than Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao included a statement of support for the development of philanthropy in a report to the 2005 National People’s Congress.

Under these circumstances, this book has two purposes. First, it seeks to rehabilitate the reputation of philanthropy in China’s past. As a comprehensive study, the book reminds readers that philanthropy has a long, and distinguished history, in China; and that throughout this history philanthropy met important needs of the Chinese people. Likewise, without denying that Chinese elites used philanthropy to enhance their social status or that Westerners active in charitable work also benefited from imperialism, the authors argue that it is still impossible to deny the good work they accomplished. This positive reappraisal of the role of philanthropy in China’s past leads naturally book’s second purpose—an argument that private charities can still serve an important purpose in Chinese society today and thus should be actively promoted.

The book begins with a useful introduction that discusses issues such as the meaning and definition of philanthropy, approaches to the study of philanthropy, and an review of Chinese, Japanese, and Western literature on philanthropy in China. This is followed by a chapter that shows how various philosophical and religious traditions in China (focusing mainly on Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism) provided a persistent ethical framework that both defined and encouraged charitable activity from ancient China to the present. The bulk of the book is organized in chronological fashion to examine the development of philanthropy in China from ancient times to the modern era. The book then closes with a survey of philanthropy in contemporary China (post 1949), as well as in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. If there is any doubt that China had a strong, indigenous tradition of philanthropy, this book’s history of wide-ranging and extension charitable activities clearly puts them to rest. At the same time, the book does not shy away from highlighting influences on Chinese philanthropy from the West, including for example a chapter focusing specifically on the contributions of Western missionaries.

If the book has any problem, it is an unresolved issue over the role of government in philanthropy. In order to make its case for a long tradition of philanthropy, the book relies extensively on citations of government organized relief efforts and charities by successive ruling dynasties, especially in the early periods of Chinese history. “Popular” (minjian) philanthropy as compared to governmental -sponsored activities is shown
not to have taken off until the Tang dynasty, and the real expansion of private philanthropy does not take place until the late imperial period. The authors themselves actually argue that strictly speaking government programs should not be defined as “philanthropy” (p. 6). In their view, the care of a country’s people is more of a responsibility of government than a purely charitable act, and one that is in effect paid for by the people themselves through their taxes. To the extent that ruling dynasties were motivated to provide disaster relief or aid to the poor by their fear of social or political disorder, this activity also fails to meet the criteria of “selfless” activity the authors set for philanthropy. In the end, however, the authors seem reluctant to demand full autonomy of the government as a condition for inclusion in their survey and settle for a careful designation of government programs as “official philanthropies.”

Part of the problem with this issue is that philanthropy clearly belongs within the “public sphere,” which increasing numbers of scholars have been reluctant, at least in the Chinese case, to define as a realm completely autonomous of state control or participation. Rather there has been a tendency to see the Chinese public sphere as an arena where the both government and the people interacted to pursue “public” initiatives. But one hardly needs to make a case for Chinese exceptionalism in this regard. Philanthropies in the United States today receive legitimation and financial support from the government through tax benefits, and often rely extensively on government grants as a source of funding. One can hardly expect more autonomy of philanthropic organizations in China than is actually seen in the West. Nonetheless, the book’s classification of some purely government managed welfare activities as philanthropy remains problematic.

In the end, the authors are in fact arguing for greater leeway and more autonomy for the organization of non-governmental philanthropic organizations in China today. Nonetheless they are not so naïve as to expect that Chinese government to yield all supervisory control over the development of such organizations. And at the same time, they clearly realize the potential benefit for such organizations from active government support. It is to this end—gaining government as well as popular support for the expansion of philanthropy in China—that the authors devote their efforts in this book. As such, the authors’ positive assessment of the long history of philanthropy in China makes the best case for potential benefits to be gained from this expansion. While pursuing this goal, though, the authors have also produced an invaluable resource for Western as well as Chinese scholars.
interested in understanding the place of philanthropy, past and present, in Chinese society.


**Reviewed by Marilyn Clemens**

The Art of Survival is a dramatic title, and the prime author behind this attractive book believes the role of landscape architecture is no less than that, the key to human survival. Kongjian Yu, Dean of the Graduate School of Landscape Architecture, Beijing University and Mary Padua, Assistant Professor in the Architecture Department, Hong Kong University, have co-edited a publication devoted to the thought and designs of Professor Yu and his landscape and urban design firm, Turenscape. Martha Cecilia Fajardo, President of IFLA, provides a glowing Foreword to the book, and many of Yu’s previous speeches and articles, as well as reprinted journal reviews of Turenscape’s work are included. While readers may well conclude that the book is primarily promotional, the importance of Yu’s design ethic to China, and to designers, environmentalists and scholars interested in China, should not be underestimated. Many writers inside as well as outside of China have decried its rampant development, but here is a leading practitioner providing not only criticism but real examples of another way of building, apparently in harmony with local environments and cultural conditions. Equally as important as the text are color images illustrating the analysis process leading to the designs and photographs of built projects, comprising half the volume.

Kongjian Yu believes that landscape architecture should recapture its role as steward of the land, protect and preserve natural systems and learn from them, develop with a light and deft hand, and keep people connected, perhaps reconnect them spiritually, to their places of livelihood and residence. Survival depends on land management techniques responsive to local environmental conditions and the vernacular landscape of significant indigenous architecture and plant species. Yu criticizes well-known architectural projects by foreign architects such as Rem Koolhaus for using an excessive amount of concrete and steel and for having exploited the
Chinese leaders’ lust for singular architectural statements, further evidence of China’s disconnect from its cultural heritage. China needs to rediscover its historic “Land of Peach Blossoms,” an iconic landscape where people live in harmony within a useful, balanced and healthy environment. He laments the fact that garden as ornament, exemplified by the classical Chinese garden, has overwhelmed and replaced the sound practices of land stewardship. J. B. Jackson, Spiro Kostof and other well-known English-language writers on the landscape and architecture are references cited in this book whose influence can be felt. Reprinted articles by Gareth George writing in Beijing Today and Susan Jakes of Time Asia Magazine articulate the recent explosion of development in China vis à vis the importance of Turenscape’s design approach.

Of the 15 articles included, Yu wrote or co-authored ten. Some of these contain passages and verbal images, references to deities, spirits and mother earth, expressed in the language of fables that may draw a chuckle from American readers accustomed to dry, analytical delivery. Readers will find some of the articles written in basic but understandable English with a few clumsily translated phrases or Chinese hyperbolic expressions, but keep in mind, the images, are as important as the idiom. The projects described, apart from the wetland park outside Beijing, are not on the usual visitor’s circuit or in locations well-known to Westerners but provide a variety of design responses to different situations, from the village of Magang in Guangdong province, to a derelict shipyard on the mainland across from Hong Kong, to the grounds of a major university in Shenyang, that affect millions of Chinese. Each project is discussed, with the analysis process depicted in color diagrams, and photographs of the projects provided. This writer, in six visits to China, has never seen the combination of a simple and bold plant palette, modern use or reuse of architectural forms, and inventive means of interacting with water and the landscape shown in these projects. Rather, most new open spaces in China’s large cities and towns recall familiar Chinese or European models.

The book is divided into sections entitled “Positioning Landscape Architecture in the New Era,” “The Negative Approach: Landscape Leading the Way,” “The Art of Survival” “Landscape Architecture Recovered” and “The Poetic Vernacular” which express the main points of Turenscape’s approach to land management and design. To this writer, the poetic vernacular best speaks for the design expression evidenced here, being at
once modern, imbued with local references, artful and sensitive to the needs of people and the environment.


Reviewed by Robert Worden

With the seventieth anniversary of the infamous Nanjing Massacre at hand, it is appropriate to highlight the research of Dr. Hu Hua-ling on Wilhelmina (Minnie) Vautrin (1887–1941), an American missionary and educator who saved the lives of numerous women at the Ginling Women’s College (Ginling Nüzi Daxue) in Nanjing in 1937 and 1938. Hu’s book is both a biography of Minnie Vautrin and a history of the years she spent in China.

The book is organized into six chapters. They cover Vautrin’s life in Secor, Illinois, her administration of and fund-raising for the college, a review of the years that led up to 1937, the events of 1937–38 and the Rape of Nanjing, the heroic actions of Vautrin during Japanese depredations, and Vautrin’s few remaining years thereafter. The book ends with an epilogue (describing an emotional visit to Vautrin’s grave), end notes, a selected bibliography, and an index. It also has three very useful maps (China before 1945, Nanjing in 1937–38, and the Nanjing Safety Zone in 1937–38) plus nineteen black and white photographs of Vautrin and her activities in the United States and China. Senator Paul Simon of Illinois contributed a brief foreword noting the inspiration he found in Minnie Vautrin defense of humanity.

Ginling Women’s College was founded in 1915 and opened for classes in 1917 with funding from American Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian missionary boards and Smith College. Minnie Vautrin became acting president in 1919 and quickly set herself to the task of gaining financial and moral support for Ginling both in the United States and China. The Japanese attack on Nanjing in 1937 was not the first serious threat to Ginling College. During the Northern March of 1927, anti-missionary sentiment was high and foreign-run schools, foreigners’ homes, and even foreign consulates in Nanjing were looted and burned. Despite this, Ginling
was one of the few institutions that did not suffer the same fate because of officer of the expeditionary forces had sister who was a student at Ginling and he ordered looting soldiers to instead guard the college against other marauding forces while Vautrin, along with other foreigners, fled to safety in Shanghai. Despite continued turbulence, Vautrin and her staff returned to Nanjing within six months and reopened the college for classes. By 1931 things had stabilized to the point Vautrin took a lengthy home leave, traveling through Europe, taking education course at the University of Chicago and the Chicago Theological Seminary, hiring new teachers, raising funds for new buildings. The college obtained the support of Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang and continued to operate as best it could during these chaotic years. Then the Japanese attack on Shanghai occurred in August 1937 and the evacuation of Nanjing was underway.

Despite bombings of Nanjing and the evacuation of Americans, Vautrin was allowed to stay. By the time Chiang Kai-shek fled Nanjing on December 7, 1937, the first refugees had arrived at Ginling and Vautrin’s heroics were about to begin. She kept a diary, which is well used by Hu to describe what occurred. Similarly, Hu used the diary of the German John Rabe, who also courageously saved many Chinese lives. Ginling was within the Nanjing Safety Zone established by various missionaries and educators under the aegis of the International Committee for the Nanjing Safety Zone (later renamed the Nanjing International Relief Committee; Rabe was its chairman) and its buildings were cleaned and readied for refugees, with U.S. flags flying. Vautrin personally stood guard at the college gates, hoping to admit young women, married or not, who were most threatened with rape but eventually letting in thousand of others who pleaded their cases. She stood up to Japanese troops who came onto the campus searching for Chinese soldiers, protecting servants threatened with detention. When she, along with other foreigners, were ordered to leave Ginling, Vautrin refused. When Japanese soldiers succeeded in removing some Chinese women from the campus, Vautrin went to the Japanese consul in protest and obtained proclamations from him to post on the college gates. Another time her demands led the consul to send embassy guards to protect the college against the Imperial Army troops. These and other actions she took proved effective but it was her physical presence and sternness that dissuaded many soldiers from carrying out their intended depredations. Ginling’s safety record became well regarded. As tens of thousands of civilian rapes and murders occurred elsewhere in the city and even in the safety zone, Vautrin continued to take in women of all ages. Men came too, feeling their lives were
threatened as ex-soldiers, and were admitted. One Japanese officer even convinced Vautrin to take in his Chinese girl friend and her sister for safekeeping. The more the Japanese tried to clamp down on refugees and forbid their access to the safety zone, the more Vautrin disobeyed their orders and allowed more in. Refugees began to call her “Living Goddess” and “Goddess of Mercy.” At the peak, more than 10,000 men, women, and children found refuge at Ginling. For her heroic actions, Minnie Vautrin was secretly awarded the Order of the Jade on July 30, 1938, by the Chinese Nationalist government.

Vautrin’s travails did not end with the lessening of violence in Nanjing. Incidents continued to occur under Japanese military rule. Despite being exhausted and ill, she continued to work to protect the college and continue its educational programs. In 1940 she felt confident enough to take a year’s furlough but she was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. She returned to the United States and, after a brief hospitalization, she continued treatment for depression and, sadly, convinced she would never recover and be able to return to China, she committed suicide on May 14, 1941.

In her book, Hu Hua-ling has made a notable contribution to Nanking Massacre literature while highlighting the little-known career to a simple American missionary who was heroic in her call to duty.


**Reviewed by Robert L. Worden**

For collectors and others who appreciate the art form, *Selling Happiness* by Ellen Johnston Laing, a retired Chinese art history professor from the University of Oregon, is a welcome addition to the otherwise small number of Western sources on twentieth-century Chinese popular prints. Although Laing’s study focuses on Shanghai rather than all of China, this is quite acceptable because Shanghai was the trend setter for Chinese popular culture during this era. The book is presented in ten thematic and chronologically arranged chapters. The test is heavily documented with endnotes and accompanied by a glossary of names of artists, printing companies, and relevant Chinese terms in pinyin romanization and standard
Chinese characters. An extensive bibliography of Chinese- and Western-language sources and an index rounds out the book.

The book is beautifully illustrated with 34 color plates, 3 black and white plates, and 113 thirteen figures (reproductions mostly of prints and a selection of photographs of artists and other subjects). Collectively known as yuefenpai (calendar posters), the colorful and lively prints show many aspects of popular culture that proliferated in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century urban China. The earliest example identified by Laing is an Anglo-Chinese calendar for 1854 printed in Hong Kong by the Chinese newspaper China Mail. This and other early prints provided both Chinese and Western calendars as well as commercial information, mail steamer schedules, exchange rates, and even opium sales. The author demonstrates how some early Chinese calendar artists imitated Western calendars in form and concept while others adhered to traditional Chinese-style layouts and content. As time went on, Chinese artists developed a blend of Western art techniques, as Laing puts it, such as with “relatively anatomically correct figures in proper proportion, lifelike gestures and poses, detailed settings of Chinese or Western gardens, Chinese or Western interiors, and using perspective to suggest recession into space, and chiaroscuro to produce volume and mass in figures.” Artists had how-to-paint manuals that depicted numerous facial expressions, poses, postures, clothes, and other details from which to chose for their yuefenpai. The feminine form was extremely popular and yuefenpai flourished in the 1920s and 1930s as modern and stylish young women in qipao, as well as Western clothing, (and sometimes little or no clothing whatsoever) coyly posed in advertisements for a wide range of products, from cigarettes to flash batteries to medicine, cosmetics, perfume, toothpaste, thread, fabrics, clothing (of the most fashionable styles), and furs. The scenes often showed off smartly modern young women surrounded by the emerging Western material culture of the era. For the more traditional minded, other calendar art employed images of men and women from Chinese classical literature.

Laing traces the genre in Shanghai through its various creators and artistic and commercial developments. Many of the yuefenpai promoted foreign products and services sold by both foreign and Chinese competitors and making attractive advertisements was critical to success. The author carefully analyzes how and why various artists conceived and executed these popular images in response to the needs of the companies. Biographic information is supplied for many of the artists, especially some of the more
obscure ones. The author writes about their techniques, business practices, and personal lives in a thoroughly scholarly but entertaining and compelling manner. And, when China was confronted by civil war and Japanese invasion and the art form was threatened both from the political and economic fronts, she shows how yuefenpai survived war and even continued on into the Communist era.

Having read the book in relatively short order and enjoying it immensely, this reviewer wanted to learn more about developments in the People’s Republic. Some of the later yuefenpai artists continued to work in China through the 1950s and 1960s, until the Cultural Revolution. Their influence continued and some of them died in recent decades. We can hope Ellen Laing will produce an equally valuable volume on this latter period.